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Summary 
The UK airport industry faced regulatory reform following the 1986 
Airports Act. The regulatory reform not only included privatisation of 
the then nationalised British Airports Authority, but also changed 
the airports that used to be directly owned and managed by local 
authorities into autonomous pics. As a result, the industry includes 
four categories of institutional arrangement for the airports in the 
UK, i. e., (1) privatised airports with price regulation, (2) privatised 
airports without price regulation, (3) a local authority airport plc with 
price regulation, and (4) local authority airports plc without price 
regulation. The regulatory reform involves the imposition of price 
cap regulation on 'designated' airports' average airport charge 
levels. In this thesis focus is placed upon the predictions of 
outcome changes in this industry by the regulatory reform. The 
framework of the analyses is based on applied microeconomics, 
particularly on the theory of regulation. The predictions regarding 
the airport charges rebalancing effect and productive efficiency are 
accompanied by empirical analyses as to finding any performance 
changes. Predictions and empirical analyses were carried out 
mainly with regard to (1) allocative efficiency in price rebalancing 
and (2) technical efficiency in production. The price regulation's 
constraint form is the 'Average Revenue Approach' and some 
economists suggest this leads to efficiency distortion. 'Designated' 
airports' price cap constraint uses only the passenger numbers to 
'average' the level of total airport charge revenue. The thesis 
shows that this approach would produce a different outcome from 
the general outcome predicted through a typical 'Average Revenue 
Approach' using both a simple model and interdependency demand 
model, followed by an empirical analysis using price ratio data. As 
to productive efficiency, after predictions of the outcome I used 
Data Envelopment Analysis to test efficiency scores in (A) the then 
nationalised British Airports Authority/privatised BAA as time series, 
and (B) private airports and local authority airports after the reform 
as a panel comparison. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction to Regulatory Reform 
1-1. Introduction 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate how the UK airport industry's 
performance has changed in response to recent regulatory reform. A change in 
performance is identified as a change in efficiency. I focus on both allocative 
efficiency in pricing and internal efficiency in production. The UK airport 
industry's structure has changed since April 1987 following the Airports Act 
1986. The industry faced a drastic change not only with the privatisation of the 
then nationalised British Airports Authority into BAA plc (BAA, hereafter) 1, 
but also with the transformation of the airports that were directly owned and 
managed by local authorities into public limited companies. The airports' 
productive efficiency change analysed in this thesis is linked with these 
ownership changes. Following these ownership changes, the regulations of the 
UK airports were also changed. The allocative efficiency of the airport charge 
regulation is therefore also analysed in this thesis. 
The purpose of this chapter is to consider the basic concepts of institutional 
arrangements, derived from the microeconomics theory of regulation. I base the 
framework of this thesis on the firm's objectives and constraints, the relationship 
between them and the difference between the objectives of the finn and social 
welfare, and the role of any control mechanisms. Section 1-2 addresses the 
importance of examining a structural change as an institutional arrangement's 
change. Section 1-3 examines how we should look at a public corporation under 
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direct control of the government, with a survey of the types of models that 
economists have adopted in the literature, whilst section 1-4 addresses why and 
how regulatory mechanisms play an important role in a privatised organisation. 
Section 1-5 gives brief preparatory comments for Chapter 3 where I explore the 
institutional arrangement's changes and predicted outcomes specifically applied 
to the UK airport industry. 
1-2. Structural change, objectives and constraints 
Recently in the UK there have been many changes in the structure of public 
corporations. These structural changes vary in many ways from one industry to 
another. By the word 'structural change' I mean 'changes in an institutional 
arrangement' in an industry. An institutional arrangement involves the objectives 
of owner(s), managers and workers of a firm and any control mechanisms 
between them (What links the objective of the owner(s) and that of the 
managers with regard to achieving the former can be called a 'control 
mechanism'), and the market structure. Structural changes affect the objectives 
of the stakeholders in the firm. Being simply put, 'structural change' is any 
change in the factors of the paradigm of the theory of industrial organisation 
which consists of market. structure, market conduct and market performance. 
These factors are linked with each other by the objectives of the owner(s) and 
the managers of the firm, competitiveness of the product (and/or input factor) 
market and the strength of the control affecting the firm such as the capital 
market, managers' labour market, and union's negotiation power, etc.. 
The most drastic change for an organisation is a change of ownership because it 
is most likely to change the objectives of all the parties involved. The owners of 
a nationalised firm are the people of the country. The logic behind setting up a 
nationallsed firm (in a capitalist economy where 'ideology' is irrelevant in 
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establishing nationalised firms) is, or at least was thought to be by the advocates 
of nationalisation in the UK, that the public can entrust the managers of the firm 
with regard to maximising the social welfare. Whether or not the managers of a 
nationalised firm have the same objective of maximisation of social welfare, the 
style of operating a firm as a nationalised firm can be believed to be the least 
costly way to secure the ob ective of the whole nation's people. This is related j 
to the concept of the transaction cost to a principal who aims to realise his/her 
objective via an agent in the framework of the Principal-Agent theory. In this 
case the principal is the public and the agents are the managers of the 
nationalised firm. The privatisation programme in the UK in many regulated 
industries can be understood in the light of the Principal-Agent problems. 
Principal-Agent problems originated from the concept of the divergence of a 
firm between ownership and management. The owner of the firm as a principal 
wants the managers as the agent to achieve his/her objectives, because it would 
be more beneficial to the owner to let the specialist managers operate the firm. 
However, the management would not necessarily facilitate the optimum input 
necessary to achieve it. This problem is considered as inescapable and stems 
from the existence of the hierarchy in the management of a firm. The existence 
of any hierarchy means that those who belong to a certain level in the hierarchy 
have private information only available to their level. It either is impossible or 
requires enormous transaction costs in order for those who do not come into 
contact with the management activities in detail to obtain many types/levels of 
decision-making information. Information such as whether production costs are 
minimised or what kinds of potential initiatives are open to the managers are 
indeed their private information. The private information owned by any 
hierarchy in the management of the firm forms a 'rent' to the managers. 
Monitoring the agent with regard to reducing the rent from the private 
information is a 'price' to the owner of the firm to achieve his/her objective, as 
he/she had decided to use the agent. Unless the 'price' exceeds the marginal 
benefit to the owner as to the profit from the firm, spending himself/herself the 
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monitoring cost is a rational behaviour. Principal-Agent problems when they are 
applied to a nationalised firm, can be looked upon at its simplest as follows: the 
government as the principal and the managers as the agent. The government, on 
behalf of the general public, is supposed to aim to maximise welfare via the 
managers of the firm (the relationship between the public and the government is 
also one between the principal and the agent). If there was no information 
asymmetry, which would be an unrealistic situation, i. e., if we assume that the 
government as the principal can perfectly monitor the behaviour and the 
performance by the managers as the agent, we could consider that the 
institutional arrangement of the nationallsed firm is superior to any other form of 
institutional arrangement. However, information is asymmetric between the 
government and the managers as the government is not directly involved in the 
operation of the firm, so there is a need for monitoring by the government. If the 
monitoring cost to the government has become too large, the control mechanism 
having either ceased to work or never having worked, or if the market structure 
has changed there may have emerged a better way to secure the social welfare. 
Changes in the institutional arrangements would be called for. 
Another tier of principal and agent should be added when considering a 
nationalised firm's institutional arrangement, i. e., the public as the real owners 
and the government. Unlike in the case of private firms, the owner of any 
nationalised firm is the wider public. Considering the existence of the taxpayers, 
consumers, and at the same time voters as the wider public, there is room for 
moral hazard that government ministers might have against the principal. A 
Minister of the department that is in charge of a particular nationalised firm is 
able to act so as to influence the voters. Suppose the Minister knows the exact 
meaning of total welfare and knows how to increase it through an efficiency 
gain, e. g., total cost reduction, would it be plausible that he/she can let the wider 
public know the correct effect of what he/she has done? Even if it would be 
plausible, he/she would have no incentive to do so, if his/her action is not linked 
directly with his/her ultimate likely objective, i. e., the contribution toward the 
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election of the political party he/she belongs t02. Another complication is that at 
the lower level of the hierarchy, there is a relationship between the minister and 
the non-elected department officials (Civil Servants), adding other 
Principal-Agent problems. Typically, as the public choice academics explain, 
department officials may be budget maximisers and their objectives may include 
maximising their department's size, i. e., they are most interested in 'empire 
building'. The structure of these multiple and complex relationships between the 
principal and the agent in each tier observed in a nationalised firm can also be 
seen in the institutional arrangements of a firm which is directly owned and 
managed by local authorities. Changes in ownership of nationalised firms and 
local authority firms involve changes in the relationships between the principal 
and the agent in all the tiers, as well as changes in the objectives of the 
stakeholders. 
As there are many changes included in the change in property right's allocation, 
normative microeconomics has reached a limit in analysing the changes of 
institutional arrangements within its traditional framework because it assumes 
full information setting. Instead, 'how do the participants in an industry actually 
behaveT has become a more important question, and thus the positive approach 
has become useful as the theory of information asymmetry has become 
sophisticated (see Appendix at the end of this chapter for the relationship 
between the development of this field and mechanism design). 
1-3. Nationalised firm's control mechanisms 
An inherent problem regarding nationalisation is a constraint from the capital 
marketas one of the external controls. Whatever the constraint imposed on a 
nationalised firm , it cannot 
be stronger than that from the capital market. The 
pressure on the private firms' manager mainly comes from the threat of 
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take-over. Although there would be X-inefficiency, at least the managers try to 
perform above the level where their performance would reduce the value of the 
firm, because in the case of a take-over, there would bea chance that the 
managers would be redundant. The possibility of being sacked is a real threat to 
the managers, though the recent theory of the firm confirms that it would be a 
'satisficing' behaviour that the managers are likely to conduct under the threat of 
take-over, and the managers are not likely to try 'maximising the profit' for the 
shareholders. 
There is also a problem with control mechanisms as an incentive structure. 
There are arguments that the control mechanisms under nationalisation were not 
correctly designed. An interesting question is whether a nationallsed firm can 
become more efficient if its control mechanism is 'incentive-wisely' designed. 
The history of control mechanisms in the UK nationalised industries makes one 
doubt if the managers had welfare in their minds as their objective. If the 
managers of nationalised industries had been welfare-oriented, why control 
constraints as such? Why did successive governments always try to create 
constraints and change them often? 
Thus in the remainder of this section I summarise some models which public 
enterprise economists have established with regard to determining the problems 
of control mechanisms in nationalised industries. 
I adopt the following notations in this chapter: 
q: product output 
p: product price 
q= q(p): demand function 
R: revenue 
11: profit 
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S: consumers' surplus 
W* total welfare 
V(q): consumers' willingness to pay 
C: total cost of production 
c: non-capital cost 
f production function 
w: wage rate 
1: labour input 
r: opportunity cost of capital 
k: capital input 
0: target rate of return 
Another common assumption as well as that of information asymmetry is that 
the managers are not allowed to raise profits (which Is always the case and 
described in each Act of Parliament establishing relevant public corporations) 
and also that the managers' salaries are not performance-related. 
(1) models in which the manager's objective function includes 
welfare, and the theme of which is to examine why control 
mechanisms are technically imperfect 
In the model of Gravelle (1977) the problem the manager has to solve is: 
Max W(- V(q) - wl - rk) 
J(q, 1, k) >- 
R-wl-Ok>- 0 (1-1) 
The result, fklfl > r1w is shown, which is the other way round to the 
well-known Averch-Johnson effect. (Because in the US type rate of return 
I regulation the constraint is a maximum requirement unlike a minimum 
requirement here). Gravelle proved that because of this marginal cost is not 
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minimised, which is a technical bottleneck deduced from this type of financial 
target constraint. The concept of the 'financial target' applied to the UK 
nationalised industries, which were different from industry to industry, was 
introduced by the guidelines in the 1961 White Paper on the nationalised 
industries. It was typically 'a rate of return on net assets' in a financial year. 
In contrast to this Gravelle model whose purpose was to examine allocative 
efficiency, Gravelle and Katz (1976) aimed mainly at an examination of the link 
between the form of the financial target and X-efficiency. The problem that the 
manager faces is: 
Max U(W, E) 
st R- C(I, k) - fill k, q, 0) >0 
U is manager's utility and E is the amount of effort to reduce total cost. One of 
their contributions is that they showed that one of the conditions satisfied 
allocative efficiency (marginal cost pricing), but effort level input is not 
sufficient when compared to the optimum. They also examined variations of 
financial targets (i. e., specification ofj(*)), lump sum constraint, and target rate 
imposed on total cost and target rate on capital. However, they found that none 
of these forms can a priori lead the firm to improve welfare without specifying 
the production function. 
These two models show the relationship between control mechanisms and both 
allocative and X- efficiency. Vickers and Yarrow's model (1988) allows us to 
find the condition as to investment policy efficiency, by dividing total cost into 
non-capital cost and capital cost. Their manager's problem is to solve: 
Max W= V(q) - c(q, k, x) - bx - rk 
s. t. R- C(q, k, x) -x- O(k)k >0 (1-3) 
Here x denotes a factor in terms of cost reduction. Though it would cost bx to 
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the manager as his/her disutility of effort if he/she inputs effort, the input of 
effort reduces the total cost by x. bx has a similar role as Laffont and Tirole's 
assumption (pl(e) >0 and T11(e) >0 meaning manager's disincentive (see 
Appendix in this chapter). bx is disutility itself here, i. e., T(e) = bx. By putting 
an assumption of b>1, that the manager does not have the right incentive 
towards cost reduction, effort can be expressed, though it is linear. The 
outstanding point Vickers and Yarrow made is that 0 is a function of capital 
employed. From the Vickers and Yarrow model the following three efficiency 
conditions are derived: 
P-cq 
p 
-cx =b+Z 
r+ -ck = 1+2, 
where c is inverse elasticity of demand and i7(k) ao -ký meaning the ak 0 
elasticity of the financial target with regard to capital input. These conditions 
can be usefully compared with a benchmark set of conditions derived from 
maximisation of total welfare: 
Max V(q) - c(q, k, x) -x- rk (1-7) 
Benchmarks (optimum) are: 
cq 
-CX =I 
Ck =r 
(1-8) 
(1-9) 
(1-10) 
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a model in which the manager's objective includes welfare and 
union's utility 
Rees (1984) set a model where the manager can solve: 
Max E[U(q)] + pu(w, I) 
s. t. J(q, 1, k) 
R-wl-rk-I-IO >0 
k (1 -11) 
where U is the manager's utility, u is the union's representative's utility, p is a 
parameter expressing the union's bargaining power, rIO is an absolute term 
target constraint and 9 is the maximum capital amount the firm can use. u(w, 1) 
expresses the trade-off to the union between wage rate and employment. The 
excessive labour intensity resulting from the solution is of a similar kind as that 
from Gravelle (1982), though the labour-intensity problem is suggested to be 
stronger due to the capital constraint. This capital constraint encapsulates 'cash 
limits' (called also external financing limits) which were introduced in 1976/77 
by the government. These were used as tools for reducing PSBR by the 
government when it faced a deficit burden. 
(3) a model which can allow room for the parties to try to influence 
constraints 
Rees (1989) proposed another way of looking at the above model, i. e., an 
extension of the model to a two stage game. His game's players are: the 
government, the manager, and the union official. The way the constraints are set 
should be, according to his idea, the result of bargaining between the 
government and managers which is followed by bargaining between the 
managers and the union officials, which is the first stage. As workers know 
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there is room for rent extraction, they want the target to be set as loosely as 
possible. The managers also know the room for rent extraction. The second 
stage is solved by examining how the firm would behave under a given set of 
constraints. Looking at the procedure in this way, we can say that the other 
models mentioned earlier are all 'reduced form' models mainly focusing on the 
second stage game. 
1-4. A privatised industry's institutional arrangement 
When we take privatisation as an example of regulatory reform, it is necessary 
to discuss the following points in order to evaluate a change into a new 
institutional arrangement: 
1) How can the manager's objective become closer to those of the shareholders? 
2) How strong is the pressure on the manager from the external control? In 
particular, how effective is the monitoring ability of the capital market, i. e., how 
strong is the shareholders' interest in the value of the firm (in a collective 
sense)?; how do the private capital lenders evaluate the firm? and how effective 
is the threat from potential hostile bidders? 
3) What kind of 'artificial' regulation should be introduced in the case of weak 
competition in the product market? 
4) Is the degree of hierarchy smaller than under the nationalisation framework? 
In terms of 1) the key is how the manager's performance is linked to his/her 
income, going back to the original sense of the Principal-Agent problem. 
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Vickers and Yarrow (1988) considered this point with regard to the disutility 
function shown in the previous section. They compared the nationalised firm's 
manager's disutility for cost reduction bx with the equivalent of the private 
firm's manager, ax. They tried answering the question: under which condition 
would a<b be held. The answer depends both on elasticity of x with respect to 
reduction of c, and price elasticity. 
As to 2) the strength of the pressure from the capital market is very much 
related to the size of the firm. The point 3) is the most crucial as it is directly to 
do with allocative efficiency. Obviously the market in which a former 
nationalised firm has been operating would not be changed just by a change of 
ownership. As the factor of natural monopoly was very often one of the reasons 
for nationalisation, many former nationalised firms, when privatised, had 
monopolistic power. Socially it is necessary to prevent welfare loss through 
monopolistic pricing, which was the obvious reason for setting up new 
regulatory mechanisms. Like the point in 2), it is impossible to generalise about 
this, because in some industries deregulation in the product market was 
introduced (or began to be introduced) at the same time as their regulatory 
reforms, but other industries still remain monopolistic (or locally monopolistic). 
Needless to say replacement by competition in the product market is the best 
regulation. In reality, most of the industries are multiple product suppliers. Thus 
in the UK the introduction of deregulation is often adopted in the relatively 
competitive markets with other markets being left as regulated. Another 
dimension is that newly privatised firms are allowed to go into the markets 
where they used to be prohibited from operation. Although I do not define 'core' 
or 4non-core' markets in general terms, it goes without saying that 'ring-fencing' 
is required between the two kinds of markets for protecting the consumers in the 
ccorel markets which are quite often still natural monopolistic. Doing this is one 
of the duties of the independent regulators to whose position we now turn. 
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The answer to the last point, 4), would be 'yes', if we refer to the argument in 
section 2, on condition that there is no new regulation as such. The question to 
ask is: can the general public trust the government when it sets up 'independent' 
regulators? It seems strange when we think about privatisation of firms which 
used to be owned by the public. There is a logic here. We can look at the 
procedure of privatisation: an alternative way of funding, other than through 
taxation, of nationalised firms in order to improve their performance. This was 
accepted by the public who also accepted the expectation that improvement of 
the performance would contribute to total welfare gain. On behalf of the public 
as the principal, the government as the agent made the decision to implement 
this logic. The government happened to be able to commit themselves in the 
implementation of this logic because their action was linked to the electoral 
commitment of the Conservative party, which gave the government an incentive 
to create regulators legally bound by their duties. Further, their duties which are 
described in the relevant Acts are better-defined as 'welfare and efficiency' 
duties at least compared with the objectives set out in those Acts relevant to 
each nationalised firm. 
1-5. Conclusion of this chapter and some preparatory 
comments for Chapter 3 
In this chapter we have examined how we should look at an institutional 
arrangement's change, mainly by focusing on the form of the cha nges involved 
in privatisation of a nationalised firm. In Chapter 3 where I analyse the 
privatisation of the then nationalised British Airports Authority, which had been 
a major UK airport operator, I use the concept of this chapter. An interesting 
feature resulting from the regulatory reform of the airport industry in the UK is 
that there is not only privatisation, but also a legislation change in which local 
authorities' directly owned and managed airports became autonomous plcs- In 
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this chapter I raised the question: whether a regulatory reform creates a different 
performance of a firm because it mainly changes the objective of the firm's 
management, or because it mainly changes its constraints? The airport industry 
in the UK, thanks to the existence of local authority airports, enables us to 
examine how firms under the same ownership can change when their control 
mechanisms differ. 
In Chapter 31 use the basic model form that Vickers and Yarrow applied in 
their models, as they are most convenient for three different kinds of efficiency 
conditions. However, I use output as a manager's objective function to be 
maximised, which Rees originated4 and Vickers and Yarrow developed. I 
explain the reason for this in chapter 3. Yet, before the application of the 
economic theory to the UK airport industry, I explain in the next chapter what 
policies were/are imposed on this industry both before and after the regulatory 
reform, as well as external changes to the industry structure, together with an 
examination of the various types of the constraints. 
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Appendix to Chapter 1 
In the late 70's, Scott (1978), Loeb and Magat (1979) and Tam (1979) tried to 
design a mechanism through which the manager of a natural monopoly firm 
would have an incentive to produce the level of output which optimisation 
would require, regarding control constraints as an incentive structure. Their 
approach was to design a mechanism so that the manager could be given a 
whole or a portion of the consumers' surplus realised as a result of the 
production. With this method there is no way for the manager to maximise 
his/her profit other than by trying to maximise welfare, leading to the result of 
first best without the need for the regulator to know the cost level. However, 
setting aside the distribution problem ("Is it socially optimal to give all the 
welfare to the firm? "), there is the question of how to measure the consumers' 
welfare. Finsinger and Vogelsang(1981) developed the concept by solving this 
question. Their way of regulating this type of firm is to set several periods (t), in 
each of which the manager is allowed to get the portion of Qt- Ix [Pt- I- Pt] 
which is an approximation of each period's gain in consumers' surplus (Q is the 
output and P is the price). This mechanism does not require information of cost 
levels nor demand levels. This was an innovative departure point for information 
economists. 
There is still a question regarding Finsinger and Vogelsang's method: how can 
the effort facilitated by the manager be compensated if the total cost level is 
reduced at period t compared with at period t-I as a result of his/her effort? 
Therefore in order to complete the design method which started from the 
condition 'without knowing the cost level' another condition 'without knowing 
the effort level' is required. There are two types of information asymmetry 
problems; adverse selection and moral hazard. The greatest contribution of 
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information economists is in their construction of models in which cost has these 
two separate factors. In the case of the mechanism that Finsinger and Vogelsang 
created, if there is a case where the manager can expect to have the bonus from 
the regulator without making any effort, this bonus is a pure rent to the firm and 
this is the problem of adverse selection. It is to do with the fact that the firm 
knows the technology and cost structure better than the regulator. On the other 
hand, moral hazard is to do with some amount of action, i. e., 'effort', which 
influences the cost level. As the regulator cannot observe it, the manager has 
very little incentive to make this kindof effort, because there is no reward for 
the effort to the manager. 
For example, Laffont and Tirole's models (1986) include a cost function of 
e)q 
P is technology parameter and e is effort parameter. The regulator can observe 
the total cost of C, but he/she cannot see the level of both P and e. The effort e 
causes the manager the disutility T(e). Here Tl(e) >0 and T11(e) >0 express 
the disincentive of the manager against e. The regulator gives the firm a net 
transfer T as well as recovering the cost. The assumption is that the manager is 
only interested in his/her income and disutility stemming from e. The objective 
function of the manager is 
E(o = E[UýT, T(e)ý] = ET - T(e) 
The regulator knows that P is in the range of but does not know the 
actual level of P. Their model analysed how a linear contract in terms of T, 
T=a- bC, can induce the manager to have the right incentive, facing a 
selection of ýT(P), Qfi)ýorýT(-F), Q-#)ý (in the simplest case of only two 
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types of P). The way this mechanism Works is analogous to the way a consumer 
would select a combination of fixed tariff and price each time he/she has to pay 
when consuming the service, say of the telephone, when a two-part or multi-part 
tariff is introduced. The solution is to do with so-called mechanism design in 
game theory and uses incentive compatibility and participation constraint, i. e., it 
would give the firm no gain if an efficient firm (e. g., a firm that has P) 
announces that its level of P is as if P, (incentive compatibility) and also at least 
U should not be less than _U which is the level of utility realised if the manager 
would not have carried out this project (participation constraint). In the case of a 
telephone company that designs a multi-part tariff, the objective is to maximise 
profit. In this Laffont and Tirole model, the regulator's objective is to maximise 
welfare derived from the project contract. As the result of their solution it was 
shown that the most efficient firm is required to input optimum effort level, but 
on the other hand, the rent it can obtain from its level P is guaranteed. 
Compared with this result, an inefficient firm is not given any rent, although its 
effort level is lower than the optimum level. This mechanism uses a trade-off 
between the rent the regulator has to allow a firm to keep and the effort level. 
Laffont and Tirole's model also showed that the more the transfer mechanism is 
closer to a fixed amount type, the more both the effort and the rent will be. 
The 'optimal regulation' approaches mentioned here always share the same 
presumption. In order to devise the mechanisms the regulator has to know how 
much the disutility of the firm's manager is. Although the approaches treat both 
moral hazard and adverse selection, unlike the models in section 1-3 of Chapter 
1, in which only the moral hazard aspect can be incorporated, 'optimal 
regulation' approaches are constructed on the presumption that the regulator 
knows the level of the manager's disutility, T(e). This is not realistic and far 
from being practical, and is a bottleneck with the 'optimal regulation' 
approaches. The difficulty of knowing the disutility of managers means that in 
reality monetary transfer from the consumers to the managers of the firm is not 
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feasible. For instance, within the framework of the UK nationalised industries 
this kind of transfer was not possible. Thus it would be quite difficult to 
construct the framework for 'optimal regulation' models when analysing the 
UK's institutional arrangements. 
Pint (1991) is one of the researchers who constructed a model which compared 
the performance between nationalised industry and private regulated industry 
using the framework I have explained in this Appendix without the money 
transfer concept but instead using different level of perks which the managers 
could obtain. 
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Notes to Chapter 1 
1- After privatisation the organisation's name was changed into BAA p1c which 
is not an abbreviation of the then nationalised British Airports Authority. In 
order to avoid any confusion I do not use an abbreviation when I mention the 
then nationalised British Airports Authority. 
2. Vickers and Yarrow (1988) attached a cost reduction effort with negative 
weight in the government's objective function because this kind of action is 
better monitored by the workers (especially in the case of redundancy) than by 
the voters. 
3. Because of this reason I excluded models where the manager's objective 
involves his/her income. However, note that the model that Gravelle (1982) 
considered, using the income as a parameter as well as an output and 
cost-reduction effort, is prominent (in the sense that he was successful in putting 
both allocative efficiency condition and X-efficiency condition). Also he proved 
that a lump sum financial target gives no instruction as to improvement of 
X-inefficiency. However, the key roles in this model are the share of the 
managerýs own consumption of the output of the firm and the impact of the 
firm's profit increase on his tax burden, which are rather trivial in the real 
world. 
4. In fact there was a case where output maximisation was explained as an 
explicit policy, which was seen in London Transport in the '70s. See Glaister 
and Collings (1978). 
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Chapter 2 
History of UK Airport Regulation 
2-1 Introduction 
In this chapter I discuss actual changes in the economic regulation of the airport 
industry in the UK. I will confirm the kind of questions we should raise as to 
industry efficiency and the control and constraints from both inside and outside 
the airport companies, by means of viewing the past and current constraints 
imposed on the industry by the regulators or by governtnent national policies. 
It was the Airports Act 1986 that made the most significant impact on the 
parties involved in the UK airport industry. It involved privatisation of the 
British Airports Authority and legislative changes affecting other regional and 
local airports, essentially involving every airport in England, Wales and 
Scotland. As to Northern Ireland there exists The Airports (N. 1) Order 1994, but 
this is almost the same as the Airports Act 1986. The current regulatory 
framework of the industry is based on the 1986 Act. In the next section we will 
look at the history of the regulations which have led to the current framework 
before moving on to describe the current regulatory framework in section 2-3. 
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2-2. Before the Airports Act 1986 
(1) Constraints faced by the then nationalised British Airports 
Authority 
The setting up of the British Airports Authority on April 1966 as a nationalised 
organisation was based upon the Airports Authority Act 1965. The process went 
back to a White Paper published in 1961 (Cmnd 1457 'Civil Aerodromes and 
, 4ir Navigational Services') 
1. After the Second World War central government 
had acquired the major airports, because of the need for large scale capital 
investment (Manchester Airport was an exception which remained under the 
local authority). Therefore, at that time Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted and 
Prestwick belonged to the Department of Aviation with all their employees Civil 
Servants. However, the parties involved including the airlines confirmed that the 
airport business was 'potentially a keenly commercial undertaking' (a statement 
made by BEA: British European Airways) and that it would be more efficient 
for a self-contained and autonomous organisation to manage these airports, 
which was nominally the reason for setting up the British Airports Authority2. 
The establishment of the Authority was judged to be urgently required following 
an examination of the finances. At that time, the loss was f9 million in the 
operations of London's three airports during the period between 1957/58 and 
1959/60. 
Thus the British Airports Authority's constraints on management became subject 
to the policies imposed by the government on nationalised industries. Already at 
the period of set up, the British Airports Authority was a gigantic firm with 
passenger numbers of 60% of the UK total. Its constraints can be roughly 
categorised into six groups. 
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1) Revenue Constraint 
The Authority was required to break even, taking one year with another. It was 
not allowed to have any revenue surplus. This was a statutory provision (the 
1965 Act section 3(l) and (7)). 
2) Investment Criteria 
A White Paper in 1967 (Cmnd 343 7 'Nationalised Industries: A Review of the 
Economic and Financial Objectives') introduced Test Discount Rate (hereafter 
TDR), recommending that investment decisions should be based upon 
discounted cash flow calculations (8%; later increased to 10%). The intention 
was to check if a planned investment could be justified in terms of the 
opportunity costs, and the rate was set in line with the estimated return to 
investment in the private sector. It was criticised, in another White Paper in 
1978 (Cmnd 7131 'The Nationalised Industries'), as counting only new 
investment and not being practical in terms of the industry network, and TDR 
was replaced with Required Rate of Return (hereafter RRR) which looked at an 
industry's investment as a whole (5%; later 10% and 8% from 1993). 
3) Pricing Constraint 
Both the two White Papers mentioned above recommended the introduction of 
long-run marginal cost (hereafter LRMQ pricing into the nationalised industries. 
Theoretically industry prices would be based on the future internal rate of return 
of the capital to be invested, therefore the prices could be linked with the 
financial target and RRR. However, there had never been any discussions or 
linkages between the pricing principle and financial objective. Little and 
McLeod (1972), after criticising this rather vague linkage and the fact that the 
1967 White Paper related LRMC with a tool for leading optimum use of existing 
capacity as well as with guidance on the best possible investment decisions, 
pointed out that it was highly questionable whether LRMC was a relevant 
concept in cases of extremely lumpy investments such as airports, commenting 
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that 'airports are quite unlike electricity, for example, where each new 
generating station is marginal to the system'. Little and McLeod set out the 
reasoning for the British Airports Authority's introduction of peak landing 
charges (morning peak hours at Heathrow was in question), and the logic was 
clearly based on the cost of delays in landing, i. e., short run marginal cost, not 
LRMC. There may have been a long debate within the British Airports 
Authority as to how to meet the government's pricing rule based on LRMC and 
financial objective ending with their peak-load landing charge policy. 
4) Financial Targets for the British Airports Authority 
In all of the three White Papers published in 1961 (Cmnd 1337 'Financial and 
Economic Obligation of the Nationalised Industries'), 1967 and 1978 
respectively, the government had required the nationalised industries to meet 
financial targets which would be set for each industry individually. In theory 
these targets were supposed to express both the pricing constraints and 
investment criteria. However, the actual way of setting this target was by 
negotiation between the nationalised industry and the Minister in charge. In the 
case of the British Airports Authority, the period of negotiation with the 
Department of the Board of Trade was sometimes lengthy, during the first three 
years of its operation the target was never actually set. Also from 1976/77 to 
1980/81 the Authority had not had a financial target due to the introduction of 
the 'cash limit' mentioned below. Table 2-1 (see at the end of this chapter) 
shows the financial targets and the figures actually achieved. 
5) Borrowing Constraints 
The British Airports Authority was able to borrow money only from the 
Minister (from 1966 the Board of Trade) (section 5 of the 1965 Act). However, 
in 1976/77 the government introduced 'cash limits' on the external borrowing of 
the nationalised industries. In the case of the British Airports Authority these 
were set on the basis of 100% self finance which meant that at least the profit 
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including grants should exceed the total expenditure including debt repayment. 
In the early '80s the cash limit was very tight for the Authority and this 
constraint seems to have overruled the financial target. According to the Annual 
Report 79/80 of the British Airports Authority, this cash limit was the only 
binding constraint in that year. 
6) Policy Constraint 
It is by its nature that a nationalised industry is affected by a nation's macro 
economic policies. As to this aspect, the requirement of supplying 'cheap and 
adequate' services is a problem often discussed in relation to nationalised 
industries. Rail and bus services, and public utilities like gas and electricity need 
a relatively uniform provision throughout the country. Cross-subsidisation from 
profitable businesses to unprofitable ones is often required. The inefficiency of 
cross- subsidisation had always been a topic discussed in the White Papers. In the 
case of the British Airports Authority, however, uncertainty was the most 
serious problem3. With regard to allowing the Authority to develop particular 
investment programmes, the government had quite often changed its decisions. 
The timing of investment plays an important role in an airport needing large 
scale construction projects. Policy constraints were sometimes connected to 
borrowing constraints, as 'cash limits' were adopted when the government 
wanted to reduce its overall financial burden generated by the nationalised 
industries. Policy constraints are also often to do with environmental concerns. 
Airport development very often needs lengthy planning inquiries. Inquiries cause 
delay as well as uncertainty. Heath (1984) pointed out that, because of the 
uncertainties surrounding the result and length of the inquiry as to the Stansted 
project, the Authority had to include both the Stansted development and 
Heathrow's fifth terminal in its 1983 Corporate Plan, although the two plans had 
been considered as alternatives previously. The government's airline policy had 
also constrained the investment decision. The weighting placed on terminal 
development rather than runway development due to changes in aircraft 
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technology was recently reduced, helped by airline deregulation policy. 
(2) Constraints faced by the local authority airports 
In a way, local authority airports before the 1986 Act can be seen as analogous 
to the government owned airports before they were acquired by the British 
Airports Authority under nationalisation. The constraints imposed on the 
management of local authority airports were even stronger than those imposed 
on the British Airports Authority. I categorise these into four groups. 
1) Funding Constraint 
Funding for airport services was allocated from the responsible authority's 
revenue via the local rates and grants from central government. Many of the 
airport services were loss-making. The accounting convention had not included a 
depreciation concept. 
2) Price and Wage Constraints 
The standard level of pricing for services throughout the country including 
landing fees had been set by the Joint Airport Charges Committee. As far as I 
know there was no benchmark or principle regarding how they set the price 
levels. Wage levels for their staff were set by the National Council for Airports. 
3) System Constraint in the Case of the Airports Owned Jointly by 
Several Authorities 
There were cases where airports were owned by several local authorities. As 
Povall (1994) noted, sometimes one function of an airport was controlled by one 
Council with other functions controlled by other Councils. The difficulties in 
communication between owners certainly formed a constraint on management. 
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4) Policy Constraint 
'Airport' services, as part of the local authority's direct provision, seemed to 
have been treated in the same way as 'education' or 'health' services. It can be 
said that the existence of the voters in a local community itself was a constraint. 
Attracting voters has to be one of the main objectives of local politicians. This 
must have played a key role in deciding whether or not to invest in local 
authority airport facilities. 
(3) Two national policies 
Until 1978 when the Government published a White Paper 'Airports Policy' 
(Cmnd 7084), central government had no national airports policy as such. Since 
the setting up of the Roskill Commission in 1967, many efforts and much time 
(almost 7 years) had been spent in the search for the location of the Third 
London Airport and discussion of its timing (Maplin project). In 1974, the 
Labour Government decided to abandon the project, which meant that the airport 
industry for the time being had to give up the idea of having a new airport in the 
UK. This government decision made the parties involved reconsider alternative 
means to expand capacity to meet the projected future demand in the London 
area. The focus of the 1978 Airports Policy was therefore 'the most effective use 
of existing airports'. The parties involved realised that the concentration of 
traffic demand in the South East area would be unavoidable, that the effect of 
diversion of traffic from the South East to the other regions would be limited 
and that there had been overcapacity in airports located in areas other than the 
South East. When this White Paper was published, the technology of the aircraft 
industry had improved in all the three aspects of size; noise reduction; and fuel 
efficiency. Because of this it was suggested that airport capacity would be 
gained more effectively by terminal development rather than the construction of 
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further runways. 
Two groups of decisions as to England and Wales were mentioned in the 1978 
White Paper. 
1) South East area: 
" consideration of development possibilities at Stansted 
" restriction/ban on the use of particular kinds of traffic at Heathrow 
" willingness of the Government to let the British Airports Authority own 
and manage local authority airports 
2) other areas: 
e concentration of air services on a limited number of airports 
The Government categorised all airports into the following four types: 
(A) International Gateway Airports; 
(B) Regional Airports; 
(C) Local Airports; 
(D) General Aviation Aerodromes. 
It intended to use this categorisation as a tool for policy making, deciding that, 
outside the South East area, Manchester should be the only 'International 
Gateway Airport', and that Birmingham, East Midland, Newcastle, 
Leeds/Bradford and Cardiff should be 'Regional Airports'. As to the South East, 
Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted and Luton were considered as a single 
'International Gateway Airports system'. This kind of policy change was closely 
related to 'policy constraint' and 'funding constraint' for local authority airports. 
(e. g. Teeside Airport has been in decline after being categorised as a Local 
Airport, whereas Newcastle has grown in importance. ) 
We can see, in the 1978 Airports Policy White Paper, that the then goveniment, 
which was very pro-co-ordination, wanted to ignore competition among airports. 
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In the case of Luton Airport, it said: if 'Luton Borough Council and the BAA 
were to agree to a transfer of ownership of Luton airport this would assist the 
BAA in exercising its major executive and co-ordinating role in the development 
of the London airports system'('BAA' in this statement is the abbreviation of the 
then nationalised British Airports Authority). The neglect of competition among 
airports was inherited from the policy expressed in the 1978 White Paper by 
another policy expressed in the 1985 White Paper. 
The White Paper, 'Airports Policy' (Cmnd 9542) published in 1985, under the 
Conservative Government, followed broadly the recommendations of the Public 
Inquiries' report in which Stansted's new terminal project was approved and the 
fifth terminal project at Heathrow was turned down. In this White Paper the 
concept of the introduction of private capital was expressed. Discussion of the 
change in ownership of airports, together with the suggestion of introducing new 
economic regulation (see next section 2-3 (2)) and traffic distribution policy in 
the London area (see 2-3 (5)) were the main features of this White Paper. It 
mentioned the reasons why the Government believed that the privatisation of 
airports would bring benefits: it would 
1) reduce the size of the public sector, 
2) assist the Government's objective of creating wider share 
ownership, 
3) increase employee participation, 
4) provide for greater freedom for management (e. g., access to 
private capital), 
5) encourage more innovative management and 
6) lead to efficiency gains and greater responsiveness to customers. 
There had been arguments over whether the British Airports Authority should be 
sold as seven separate companies or sold as a single body. The former argument 
advocated in terms of separation: 
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a) that there would be advantages from competition among airports 
and 
b) that the incentive to increase efficiency through the potential threat 
from take-over would be advantageous. 
The latter argument considered that if it would be left unseparated, 
a) it would be easier to support the early development at Stansted 
and 
b) the Government would quickly achieve its aim of privatisation. 
(As to these argument, see Starkle and Thompson (1985). ) 
The Government was supporting the idea of privatising the British Airports 
Authority as a single entity. In the 1985 White Paper it believed that even in a 
totally deregulated airline market, effective competition between airports would 
be limited. The Government made it clear that the new regulator should be the 
Civil Aviation Authority (hereafter CAA). The Government tended to consider 
that it would be only through competition among airline companies that the 
airline industry would become competitive. This might have implied that the 
Government may have liked to see both the airport industry and the airline 
industry together under the same regulatory body. 
The British Airports Authority was privatised in 1987 and the name was 
changed into BAA plc [not an abbreviation]. It seems that the Government's 
priority to maximise the sales value of the seven airports was put above the 
creation of competitive airports. At the beginning of April 1987, the seven 
airports under the ownership of this privatised monopolist BAA were Heathrow, 
Gatwick, Stansted (three London airports) and Edinburgh, Glasgow, Aberdeen 
and Prestwick (Scottish airports). After privatisation BAA sold Prestwick and 
bought Southampton. 
The Govemment also said that local authority airports would be run more 
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effectively if they were constituted as Companies Act companies. It was up to 
the owners, i. e., local authorities, to decide whether or not to use their power 
under the Act to dispose of their initial shares to introduce private capital. As far 
as the White Paper was concerned, the Government seems to have wanted them 
to privatise their airports. It said that although 'the Government will encourage 
them to introduce private capital, it has decided not to askfor powers to compel 
them to do so'. 
Following the 1985 policy, all major local authority airports became plc airports. 
Under the 1986 Act, any plc airport that had had an annual turnover of more 
than f1 million in two of the previous three financial years became subject to 
economic regulation (currently 28 airports in the UK at the end of 2000). 
2-3. The framework within the Airports Act 1986 
In this section I explain the current framework of economic regulation mainly 
based on the 1986 Act. The price control regulation of airports is only relevant 
to 'airport charges'. The purpose of subsection (1) below is to define which 
charges are regulated. 
(1) Definitions in terms of airport business and airport charges 
1) Operational Activities 
'Operational activities' means 'any activities which are undertaken for the 
benefit of airport users'. Operational activities are subject to current economic 
regulations. However, 'non-operational activities' are regarded as businesses 
which are not directly relevant to airport users themselves, such as hotels, leisure 
facilities, industrial estates and supermarkets. Freedom for the management to go 
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for 'non-operational' business constitutes one of the advantages under the 1986 
Act regulatory change. However, it does not seem that the CAA had expected 
the plc airports to have extensive 'non-operational' business, as it stated that 'in 
most cases airports will be involved in non-operational activities only to a very 
limited extent if at alP4. 
Operational activities consist of two kinds of activities. One is (a) 'air-side' 
activities which can be regarded as core services, and the other is 
(b)'commerc ial- side' activities which originally started as the by-products of 
'air-side' operation. 
(a) 'air-side' 
Roughly the following services belong to 'air-side' business: 
e aircraft taking off and landing 
" aircraft parking 
" taxiway management 
" ground handling, i. e., passenger handling, baggage handling, cargo 
handling, flight catering and aircraft toeing 
In the 1986 Act the businesses that belong to 'air-side' are strictly categorised 
under the name of 'relevant activities'. A complication is that not all of the 
services in the 'relevant activities' category are subject to price control 
regulation. Only the prices which belong to 'airport charges' defined below are 
regulated. 
(b) 'commercial-side' 
Services normally managed by the concessionaires, such as check-in desks 
operation, duty-free and tax-free shops, banks or restaurants, including car parks 
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are all categorised as 'commercial-side' operation. 
As to 'air-side' and 'commercial- side' operations, there is an important feature 
which is common to the airport business, called the 'single-till' approach, I will 
mention it later in this section (2-3 (4)). 
2) Definition of Airport Charges 
Airport charges, according to the definition in the 1986 Act (section 36(l)), are 
defined as charges levied on operators of aircraft 
a) in connection with the landing, parking or taking off of aircraft at 
the airport. 
b) They also include charges levied on aircraft passengers on arrival 
at, or departure from, the airport by air. 
In the UK the following four categories are normally used: 
" landing charge 
" parking charge 
" taking-off charge 
" passenger charge (or passenger supplement feel) 
Apart from airport tax which is levied by the government in its budget, these 
charges are normally imposed indirectly on the passengers through airline 
companies. 
(2) Framework of the current economic regulation 
The responsibility for the economic regulation of the airport industry was given 
to the CAA. The CAA had been an organisation which was solely in charge of 
the economic and safety regulation of the airline industry and management of air 
traffic control. This feature made the regulation of the airport industry very 
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different from other newly privatised regulated industries such as 
telecommunication, gas, water and electricity. Independent regulators were 
introduced at the time of the privatisation of these industries, i. e., Oftel, Ofgas, 
Ofwat and Offer. The uniqueness of airport regulation is the fact that the 
regulator is also the regulator of the actual users of this industry. 
The duties of the CAA as a regulator of the airport industry under the 1986 Act 
(section 39 (2)) are as follows: 
(a) to further the reasonable interests of users of airports in the UK, 
(b) to promote the efficient, economic and profitable operation of 
such airports, 
(c) to encourage investment in new facilities at airports in time to 
satisfy demands by airport users, 
(d) to impose the minimum restrictions that are consistent with the 
performance by the CAA of its functions and 
(e) to take into account the international obligations of the UK. 
The regulatory framework consists of two-fold regulations. There is a first level 
of regulation relevant to all plc airports and an upper level of regulation which 
is only to do with 'designated' airports. 
1) The First Level of Regulation 
Airports which are subject to economic regulation have to ask for permission to 
levy airport charges and are required to submit accounting information specified 
by the CAA. The only grounds on which a permission may be refused is where 
the airport fails to provide the information the CAA needs. However, the airport 
users can make complaints against the level of airport charges to the CAA. So 
far (up to the year 2000) there have been no cases where the application of 
airport charges was not permitted by the CAA, nor have there been any 
complaints against airport charges with regard to the airports which are not 
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'designated'. However, there have been several official complaints against the 
level of airport charges set at BAA's London airports, which I will mention later 
in Chapter 5. 
2) The Upper Level of Regulation - 'designated' airports 
The 1986 Act also provides the Secretary of State for Transport with certain 
powers, one of which is that he can designate particular airports for the purpose 
of economic regulation (section 40(l 0)). Although it is not known on what basis 
the Secretary of State designated them, four airports, Heathrow, Gatwick, 
Stansted and Manchester were designated. Two kinds of regulations are imposed 
on designated airports. 
(1) regulation in terms of accounting information 
Designated airports are required to submit accounting information specified by 
the CAA. Each of the designated airports is required to show (a) separately the 
revenue from and the costs of airport charge related activities, other 'operational 
activities' and 'non-operational activities', and (b) how much the revenue from 
the 'non-operational activities' exceeds the cost of these activities, only when 
there is a loss on 'operational activities'. This accounting regulation gives the 
CAA information as to the degree of cross- subsidisation from 'non-operational 
activities' to 'operational activities'. As I have mentioned (I)-I), the CAA did 
not seem to expect 'non-operational activities' to be extensive, the possibility 
that there might exist a cross- subsidisation from 'operational activities' to 
6non-operational activities' was not presumed. These accounting conditions can 
by discretion be imposed on any regulated airports which are not 'designated'. 
This is Particularly the case where the non designated airport's owner is a 
'designated' airport, as in BAA's Scottish airports. The CAA intended to impose 
these accounting conditions on these BAA Scottish airports, although currently it 
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is a convention that all the regulated airports show separate accounts of airport 
charge related activities, other 'operational activities' and 'non-operational 
activities'. 
(2) regulation of price controls 
'Permission to levy airport charges' is not relevant to designated airports. The 
CAA imposes such conditions 'as the CAA considers appropriatefor regulating 
the maximum amounts' on designated airports. (section 40(3) of the Act) This is 
regarded as a form of price cap regulation. It was mentioned by the Government 
in the 1985 White Paper that price regulation should be in the form of RPI-X 
which means the annual rate of price increase may not go up more than the 
Retail Price Index, less an amount representing a targeted increase in 
productivity. This form was also recommended in the report published by the 
Department of Transport in consultation with NERA in 1986. Once the price 
limit is set, it is relevant to the following five years until the new Price limit 
comes into force following the new review. 
The most unusual feature concerning the economic regulation of 'designated 
airports' is that the Monopolies and Mergers, Commission (hereafter MMQ is 
given a specific role. The MMC has its traditional role as the investigation of 
monopolies, mergers and anti-competitive practices. Also the MMC has 
additional roles under the principal Acts in relation to the privatised public 
utilities, where the MMC acts as an arbitrator between the regulated companies 
and the regulators. When a regulated company contests the regulator's decision 
the company can refer to the MMC, as can the regulator if it suspects the 
regulated company acts against the public interest. However, in the case of 
designated airports, the MMC is involved in the review process itself. The CAA 
has to refer to the MMC concerning what level of airport charges would be the 
maximum the designated airport can impose on its users, as well as whether 
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there has been any conduct by the airport which is suspected of being against 
the public interest. 
After the MMC investigates the airport company, the CAA publishes a report 
based on the MMC's recommendations. At the same time the CAA announces 
its own initial proposal regarding the conditions it proposes on the airport 
charges during the following quinquennium. When there are findings which the 
MMC considers are against the public interest, the CAA also has to include 
suggested remedies in the initial proposal. The MMC's report is not regarded as 
binding. The MMC is not a regulator as such and the report is treated as 
recommendation. Therefore it is totally open to the discretion of the CAA as to 
the extent that the CAA's initial proposal is based on the MMC's 
recommendation or reflects the CAA's different opinion. 
After the announcement of the CAA's initial proposal, the parties involved can 
give their opinions in terms of the proposal within one month. The parties 
involved are: the airport in question; the airline companies; other airports; 
Department of Transport and other groups like organisations of tour operators 
and local authorities in the airport's surrounding area. After considering these 
opinions, the CAA publishes the final conditions. The designated airports cannot 
rely on the MMC as an arbitrator even if they are not satisfied by the CAA's 
final decision, because the MMC is the first mover. 
This process where the regulation of designated airports starts from the MMC's 
involvement is rather unusual. Because there is single-till approach (which I 
describe later in subsection (4) in relation to international obligations), the 
regulation of airport charges requires investigation of the whole of the 
4operational activities' as to profitability, cost of capital and business risks etc.. 
As mentioned before, 'operational activities' have both an 'air-side' and a 
4 commercial- side'. When the regulation was originally introduced it was 
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considered that the CAA was not experienced in investigating the 
4 commerc ial- side' because the CAA was originally a regulatory body that 
specialised in the airline industry and aviation safety. However, the Department 
of Transport is trying to change the procedure, on the grounds that the current 
procedure and order set in the regulatory system is wasteful6. 
The process I have mentioned so far is relevant to the quinquennial regulatory 
reviews. Apart from the quinquennial review, if there is a complaint from any 
users to the CAA against an airport's particular conduct, the CAA would have to 
publish its decision on the complaint including complaints as to the airport 
charges as I mentioned above in (2)-1). There would have to be either measures 
to remedy the conduct or undertakings as to future conduct. The airport has a 
right to object to the imposition of conditions. If the airport does object, the 
CAA has to refer to the MMC. The MMC's conclusion based on its 
investigation is binding in this case. The CAA has to impose conditions to 
remedy the course of conduct subject to the MMC's conclusion. 
(3) Licence for public use of aerodrome 
Normally in the other regulated industries such as telecommunication, gas, water 
and electricity, public supply licences include conditions as to economic 
regulations. Thus sometimes the threat of deprivation of the licence can be used 
as a strategy by the regulators. However, in the airport industry, the 1986 Act 
does not include licensing as such. There is the Air Navigation Order 1985 
which says that a principal condition of public use licences is for the airport to 
be open to all aircraft on equal terms and conditions. As an airport is important 
from a national defence viewpoint, regulations under this Order might be used in 
case of national emergency. Otherwise, the licence matter would never be an 
issue. The 'licence' matter is not tied up with economic regulation. 
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(4) International obligations 
International obligations play a very important role in the regulatory mechanism. 
The Secretary of State has power (under the 1986 Act) to give general 
directions. A direction may override any condition, including a price condition. 
There are four international obligations which are particularly relevant to the 
economic regulation: 
a) Article 15 of 'Chicago Convention (1944) 
b) Article 10 of 'Bermuda 2 (1977) 11 
c) 'Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of 
United States of America and the Government of the United 
Kingdom on Airport User Charges (11983)' (hereafter MOU) and 
d) 'Exchange of Notes' (1994) 
Article 15 of the 'Chicago Convention' mainly prohibits discriminatory charging 
against foreign airlines. Article 10 of 'Bermuda 2' has been a bottleneck for the 
British Airports Authority (and to BAA p1c, too). It provides the key principle in 
setting airport charges. It says: 
T T- 
User charges* may reflect, but shall not exceed, the full cost to the competent 
charging authorities ofproviding appropriate airport and air navigation 
facilities and services, and may provide for a reasonable rate of return on 
assets, after depreciation. ' (*'User charges' defined in 'Bermuda 2' mean 
charges made to airlines for the provision for aircraft, their crews and passengers 
of airport or air navigation property or facilities, including related services and 
facilities) 
Bermuda 2, agreed between UK and US Governments, contains the most 
detailed obligations in terms of the level of airport charges. However, there had 
been a dispute between the UK and US Government in the early '80s. In 1980 a 
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group of international airlines brought an action against the British Airports 
Authority and the Government of the UK on the grounds that the level of 
charges was excessive. This action was brought under Bermuda 2. At the same 
time, two American airlines brought a separate action. They claimed that the 
peak pricing structure had discriminated against them. They were operating 
long-haul services in busy periods. The action was brought under the Chicago 
Convention. Both cases were settled out of Court between the UK Government 
and the US Government. The settlement agreement was expressed in the form of 
the MOU. 
When this agreement was reached, the policy of privatising the British Airports 
Authority had already been under consideration. Therefore the MOU can be 
regarded as an important evolving constraint upon the future regulation of the 
British Airports Authority. 
Firstly, the Bermuda 2 principle was confirmed that airport charges should be 
just and reasonable. 
Secondly, the Secretary of State suggested that he might even have to seek 
external financing for future expenditure of the British Airports Authority: 
'If BAA * incurs major capital expenditure, there will be occasions when BAA's 
after-tax cash flow, including user charges, is insufficient to cover BAA's 
requirements for capital expenditure in a given year, and in such circumstances 
it would be necessary and appropriate for BAA to fund all or part of its capital 
expenditure programme from other sources ......... as may 
be permitted by 
future legislation. ' (section 4(b)) (*'BAA' here stands for the then British 
Airports Authority, -and not 'BAA pIc'. ) 
The above paragraph implies that future capital investment would not 
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necessarily be covered by airport charge revenue. 
Thirdly, the MOU confirmed the single-till approach, defining the concept of 'a 
reasonable rate of return on assets' in Bermuda 2 as rate of return on total assets 
including the commercial-side: 
'In formulating financial targets with BAA, UK Government looks for no more 
than a reasonable rate of return on investment. In computing revenues that 
contribute to the rate of return on assets, no distinction will be made as to the 
sources of revenue, including duty-free sales and other commercial revenues. ' 
(section 4(c)) 
The following quotation from 'BAA: Offer for Sale' (prospectus of BAA at the 
time of floatation) shows the importance attached to international obligations: 
'The system of economic regulation ........ was 
developed takingfull account of 
the UK's international obligations. In particular, the RPI- I formulae for SEAL 
were determined taking account ofprojected revenues from all operational 
activities . ......... and the projected costs of the provision offacilities and services 
at those airports over the nextfive years. ' 
There is a question as to why privatised BAA should need price level limits via 
RPIA. If we strictly follow what the MOU provides, it would lead an airport 
operator to fully rely on the monopolistic rent charged to its concessionaires on 
the 'commercial-side'. Normally the reason for the introduction of RPIA into 
other privatised industries is to prevent the firms from cross-subsidising 
unprofitable or competitive markets from profitable monopolistic markets. 
International obligations in the airport industry require cross-subsidisation. Thus 
RPI-X regulation in terms of airport charges can be looked upon as a tool to 
enforce cross-subsidisation from 'commercial-side' operation to 'air-side' 
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operation. However, most of the revenues from 'commercial-side' operation is 
the pure by-product of 'air-side' operation. The monopolistic rent of an airport 
charged to its concessionaires and tenants is the extreme external effect 
stemming from the 'air-side' operation. If there were no runways and taxiways 
no one would want to start his or her business in the terminal. 
Regarding d) there was an end to the conflict between US government and BAA 
and the UK government in the form of 'Exchange of Notes' on October 1994. 
The main points are: 
1) At Heathrow the differential between peak and off-peak 
international passenger charges should be phased out in four 
substantially proportionate instalments. Also a peak international 
passenger charge should not be re-introduced before either 2003 
or the opening of Terminal 5, whichever is the earliest. 
2) At Heathrow there should be no change in the balance of landing, 
parking and passenger charges, whilst the peak international 
passenger charge is being phased out. 
3) At Heathrow a weight-related element in peak landing fees should 
not be re-introduced. 
4) At Heathrow the level of parking charges relative to the level of 
total user charges should not be increased. 
5) The 'single-till' approach was confirmed. 
These points which were made clear in an 'Exchange of Notes' were only 
related to Heathrow. In the report MMC4, the MMC was concerned that the 
phasing out of the peak international charge at Heathrow would distort the effect 
of pricing in terms of allocative efficiency. As the Airports Act 1986 requires 
the CAA to take international obligations into account, there seems to be no 
option but to accept the principle set out in the 'Exchange of Notes'. However, 
neither the MMC nor the CAA mentioned anything about the differential 
between peak and off-peak charges at airports other than Heathrow. As 
described in Chapter 5 both Gatwick and Stansted have seemed to phase out the 
differential between peak and off-peak international passenger charges (and 
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domestic, too). No description about this feature was found in MMC's reports or 
the CAA's final announcement of the current (1997-2002) formulae of airport 
charges. 
(5) Capacity Constraints 
It was since the 1978 White Paper that the government introduced regulations 
regarding the types of airline services at Heathrow. Through the physical 
banning of new international operators, new domestic services and charters from 
Heathrow, the government intended to maintain a balance with other UK 
airports. 
When the 1985 Airport Policy was published the government's intention was 
based on a reluctance to leave the capacity problem to market forces, i. e., slot 
allocation through pricing such as auctioning. This was mainly because of the 
matter of fairness, as the government considered that the economic allocation of 
slots at Heathrow would make the incumbent airlines that already had 
'grandfather's rights' even more dominant. Although in the White Paper's 
discussion the government did not intend to remove so-called 'Traffic 
Distribution Rules', the Secretary of State for Transport largely removed these 
rules in 1991. The problem of slot allocation still remains. 
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Table 2-1 Financial targets and actual rate of return on net assets achieved 
year financial actual rate 
TDR/ brief explanation of financial constraints 
target of return RRR 
1966/67 10.3 8 establishment of the British Airports 
Authority (financial target has not yet been settled) 
1967/68 11.0 8 financial target still under negotiation 
1968/69 12.3 8 1- last stage of the negotiation 
with regard to financial target 
1969/70 14.0 13.4 10 financial target still under negotiation 
1970/71 14.0 12.3 10 financial target for the three year period 
from 
69/70 to 71/72 as 14% per year 
1971/72 14.0 14.3 10 the 
British Airport Authority 
acquired Edinburgh Airport 
achieved rate of 17.4% was calculated as 1972/73 14.0 17.4 10 
roughly equivalent to 6% under CCA 
financial target for the three year period from 1973/74 15.5 16.2 10 
73/74 to 75/76 was set as 15.5% per year 
1974/75 1 15.5 11.5 10 
yielding of 14.2% as average rate of return during 1975/76 15.5 15.0 10 
the three year period from 73/74 to 75/76 I 
assets were revaluated: 15% of rate of return 
1976/77 6.1 (HCA)/ 10 calculated under pre-revaluation of the assets 
1.5 (CCA) 
(from this year CCA had been introduced) 
9 (HCA)/ 8 'cash limits' was introduced: yet the British Airports 1977/78 . 10 
2.5 (CCA) Authority's capital was still within this year's limit 
Continued to the next Page 
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Table 2-1 (continued) 
year 
financial actual rate TDR/ brief explanation of financial constraints 
target of return RRR (%) 
1978/79 9.8 (H CA)/ 10 its capital was still within the cash limits 
2.8 (CCA) (maximum borrowable amount was E125 million) 
its capital borrowed exceeded its cash limits 
by EO. 8 million: Annual Report mentioned that 11.0 (HCA)/ 1979/80 5 in the absence of a rate of return target, 2.1 (CCA) 
the British Airports Authority's financial policy 
had been dictated by (primarily) cash limits 
- 
financial target was set at 6% per year for the 
1980/81 6.0 (CCA) 5.9 (CCA) 5 three year period from 80/81 to 82/83 
the British Airports Authority was able to borrow 
E20 million 
1981/82 6.0 (CCA) 5.6 (CCA) 5 
the actual rate of return was 5% on average 
1982/83 6.0 (CCA) 3.8 (CCA) 5 during the period from 80/81 to 82/83 
e discussion on pirivatisation was started 
a formula for setting a financial target was 
introduced: [minimum of 3% + -L of traffic growth 5 
1983/84 4.1 (CCA) 5.4 (CCA) 5 as total terminal passenger numbers (5.7% in this 
year)] was the target for this year o break-even 
target on the Scottish Airports as a whole was 
I introduced for the three years from 83/84 to 85/86 
[previous year's target (4.1 %) as the minimum 
return + -L of the traffic growth (11 % in this year)] 5 
1984/85 6.3 (CCA) 6.9 (CCA) 
was the target for this year o Scottish Airports 
turned into profit-making this year (E4 million of profit 
as a whole (previous year's profit was EO. 7 million 
[previous year's target of 6.3% ++ -L of the traffic 5 1985/86 7.3 (CCA) 7.5 (CCA) 5 
9 rowth (4.8% in this year)] was the target for this year 
5 2% is unknown fi th i lt t f6 f th 1986/87 6.2 (CCA) 7.6 (CCA) e nanc a arge e reason o or . 
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Notes to Chapter 2 
1. 'London's Airports' published in July 1961 (The Fifth Reportftom the Select 
Committee on Estimates) recommended that 'an Independent Authority should 
be established to manage the London Group of Airports. In August 1961 the 
Government announced (in Crand 1457 White Paper) that 'an Airports Authority 
should be set up to own and manage the main international airports now owned 
by the State'. 
2. British Airports Authority's Annual Report and Accounts 1966/67. 
I Unprofitable but socially needed airports, i. e., airports located in the Scottish 
Highland and Islands had been owned by the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). 
The problem of cross-subsidisation from profitable business to unprofitable 
business was not an issue. 
4. 'Economic Regulation of Airports - General Guidance' by the CAA (it is the 
first guidance provided by the CAA for the airport operators just after the new 
economic regulation was introduced, although the precise publication date is 
unknown) 
5. Manchester Airport uses this name. Also at Manchester a charging category 
called 'baggage and freight handling charge' is included in its airport charge 
schedule. However, this 'baggage and freight handling charge' is irrelevant to 
6relevant activities' defined by the 1986 Act, which means that 'ground handling 
charge' at Manchester should not be looked upon as 'airport charge' in the 
defined meaning. 
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6. The president of the Board of Trade, 'A Fair Deal for Consumers: 
Modernising the Framework for Utility Regulation (Green Paper)' 1998. See 
Annex D. 
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Chapter 3 
UK Airport Industry: Regulatory Models 
3-1. Introduction 
Here I examine how we can predict the performance of the UK airport industry, 
using the economic theories of regulation I outlined in Chapter 1. We have seen 
in Chapter 2 the industry's changing structure and what kinds of policies have 
been/are imposed on the industry. I use the information described in Chapter 2 
to construct models for this industry and analyse their implications. 
3-2. Before the 1986 Act: The British Airports Authority 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the formulation of the constraints in the models 
which Vickers and Yarrow (1988) established allows us to derive respective 
predictions about each of the three efficiency criteria which I analyse further in 
later chapters, allocative efficiency in pricing (Chapter 4) and internal efficiency 
and investment efficiency (Chapter 6). The model style straightfowardly 
encapsulates a public corporation manager's objectives and constraints. The 
basic settings of the model which are repeated from Chapter I are as follows: 
V(q) : consumers' willingness to pay 
q product output 
r opportunity cost of capital 
k capital stock level 
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x the level of expense for cost reduction (level of internal efficiency 
enhancing activity) 
b marginal cost to the public corporation's manager incurred by 
inputting x 
c(q, k, x) : non-capital cost 
0: financial target (target rate of return) 
Assumptions: 
b>1: disutility of managerial effort 
ac >0: increase of the output would increase non-capital cost aq 
(hereafter expressed as cq) 
ac <0: increase in capital stock level would reduce non-capital ak 
cost level (hereafter expressed as ck) 
Oc <0: increase in the level of efficiency enhancing activity would ax 
reduce non-capital cost (hereafter expressed as cX) 
0 is a function of k; Vickers and Yarrow's assumption is 00 <0 Ok 
(hereafter Ok) 
The objective of the public corporation's manager is to maximise: 
V(q) - c(q, x, k) - bx - rk 
and the constraint is: 
s. t. p(q)q - c(q, x, k) -x-0-k :ý0 
(the rate of return per capital stock should be at least the target rate 
of return) 
The reason for Vickers and Yarrow to make the assumption Ok <0 is based on 
the following sentences expressed in the White Paper published in 1967: 
'Where and when there is s are capacity, as there may be at some points in the p 
business cycle, or excess demand, short run marginal costs are relevant; the 
object is to persuade customers to make use of spare capacity or to curtail 
excess demand. ' (paragraph 21 in 'Nationalised Industries: A Review of 
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Economic and Financial Objectives' Cmnd 3437) 
The idea of setting the financial target as a function of k is prominent, but in 
fact, as seen later, the financial target had been also used explicitly as a function 
of q, during the period from 1983/84 to 1986/87 as the policy for setting the 
British Airports Authority's financial targets. Since the process of setting the 
financial target was mainly by negotiation between the government and the 
industry, and the capital stock level is directly related to capacity level which 
the White Paper above mentioned, the assumption on O(k) is in theory 
convincing. 
The objective function of the managers of the British Airports Authority seemed 
to be to maximise their size (output). Whitbread (1971) made comments 
regarding the British Airports Authority's incentive toward production and 
investment. He suggested the following three points: 
a) It would have been possible for the British Airports Authority, 
because it has been monopolist in the growing aviation industry, 
not to invest, yet still meet the financial targets imposed on it. 
However, it has extensively invested in facilities. 
b) Thus, in terms of financial obligation, 'that constraint suggests 
rather that Government is suspicious of some over-enthusiastic 
willingness to invest by the Authority'. (p. 124) 
c) The British Airports Authority showed a marked preference for 
Cublington as the choice of location for the Third London Airport, 
rather than Foulness. At Foulness the expected passenger 
numbers would be less than at Cublington, though both locations 
were expected to satisfy the Authority's financial target return. 
Whitbread suggested that 'incentives to invest are the result of a conscious 
desire to see the Authority grow in terms of the physical size and quantity of 
assets 1. 
Very soon after the Third London Airport project was turned 
down, Sir Peter 
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Masefield (the former manager of the British Airports Authority), in 1974, tried 
to emphasise that the British Airports Authority should be allowed to invest in 
both Stansted and Ten-ninal 5 at Heathrow, as a form of 'criticism' of the 
Roskill proposall . 
As described in Chapter 2, one of the suggestions which the government made 
in its White Paper, 'Airports Policy' 1978, was an intention to allow the British 
Airports Authority to own other airports. In responding to this, the British 
Airports Authority itself said, in its Annual Report of 1978/79, that: 
'The British Airports Authority is willing in principle to acquire those five 
regional airports identified in the Government White Paper ......... A growth in 
international services at such airports is highly desirable to lessen the needfor 
passengers ftom these regions to use airports in the South East. The British 
Airports Authority opposes, however, suggestion that passengers ftom the South 
East should be forced to use airports in other regions' (p. 69). 
It is likely that the objective of the managers of the British Airports Authority 
had been to maximise their airports' size. The representative for 'size' can be 
either their outputs or revenue. 
Vickers and Yarrow also developed their model using Rees's suggestion, in 
which the managers' objective is set to maximise q- (b - I)x. The second term 
encapsulates the managers' disincentive for cost-reduction effort. This implies 
the following model for the British Airports Authority's managers: 
Max. q- (b - 1)x 
s. t. p(q)q - e(q, kg x) -x- O(k)k >0 
(3-1) 
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The first order conditions with regard to q, x and k are respectively: 
P-Cq 
C- 
1 
(3-2) p )-P 
-cx 
b- I+ (3-3) 
-'k = O(k)ýl - q(k)ý (3-4) 
where ý, is the multiplier's value in the constrained maximisation problem of 
(3-1). E is the inverse elasticity of demand and ift) is the elasticity of financial 
target with respect to capital input (expressed as an absolute term) 
c9O k 
ak 0 
For reference purposes, where the managers' aim is to maximise the total 
welfare, i. e., to maximise V(q) - c(q, k, x) -x- rk, the first order conditions 
would be written as follows as benchmarks: 
P= cq (3-5) 
-cx =1 (3-6) 
-ck =r (3-7) 
Intuitively from the constraint in (3-1) the higher the value of 0 is set, the 
stronger the pressure would be either in the direction of raising the revenue or in 
the direction of reducing the cost or both. When the constraint is not binding, 
the price mark-up shown by (3-2) can be negative because the size of the 
absolute value of -1 is very large. (3-2) is rearranged as follows: /1P 
Cq 
(3-8) 
When the constraint is binding (ý, >O), tightening of 0, through raising ý,, means 
that the range of p can be either set below the marginal cost, or above the 
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marginal cost cq. The level of p depends on how large /1 would be. In the case 
of the welfare maximisation objective model, the price is always set as the 
marginal cost level (from the benchmark equation (3-5)). 
Where the constraint is not binding, the value of the right-hand side of (3-3) 
would become much larger than I and very little amount of x is expected to be 
input. In the binding constraint's case, however, the greater the ý, 's value 
becomes, 
' the closer -cX becomes to b. However, as long as b>I is the 
assumption, the internal efficiency would never be at the optimum level. 
(3-4) implies that if the capital is employed more than at the level where 
efficiency is achieved, the tightening of 0 would work as a device for reducing 
over-investment, as long as Ok `ý 0. However, the degree of this effect depends 
on the 71(k) or the negotiation between the government and the managers. 
Since 1983/84, the way the government imposed its financial target on the 
British Airports Authority has changed. In 1983/84 the financial target was set 
as: 
[minimum 3% +Ix traffic growth rate compared to the previous 5 
year], 
where traffic means total terminal passenger numbers. This fact is not well 
known, nor have I been able to locate any written documents where the 
reasoning for this 3% or the proportion of 
1 came from. Merely the description 5 
of this financial target formula is shown on the British Airports Authority's 
annual reports. 
This method of determining the financial target continued until the British 
Airports Authority was privatised. Although during the year 1986/87 how the 
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financial target in this year was determined as 6.2% is not known (See Table 
2-1)5 it seems to have been based on this formula (See Table 2-1). Therefore, 
during the period between 1983/84 and 1986/87, assuming that the managers' 
objective was to maximise the output, the appropriate model is: 
Max. qt - (b - I)xt 
S. t. pt(qt)qt - c(qt, kt, xt) - xt - Ot(qt)kt >0 
t (q t) +Ix Y'-ý t-' 5 ql- 
(3-9) 
The superscript t denotes current period t. The first order conditions with regard 
to qt, xt and kt are: 
p 1-cl 
PI 
q= 
Ct I+k, (3-10) 
, ýP' 5pql-l 
t b-I -cx + (3-11) 
t Ot(qt) (3-12) -ck 
When (3-10) is compared with (3-2), pricing is more directly linked to the 
capital employed, because of the third term of the right-hand side of (3-10). 
There is a trade-off between the value of kt and L The larger the capital 
employed, the higher the price becomes, though this link is also related to the 
output in the previous year. The effect of + k' is to adjust the price level if 5p'q'-I 
the price was set below the marginal non-capital cost, compared to the case of 
(3-2) 2. 
In terms of (3-12), the investment condition is directly determined by the 
financial target and indirectly determined by the output. In actuality, as the 
passenger numbers were growing more and more throughout the period (3-12) 
implies that the British Airports Authority was forced to move toward 
under-investment. 
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As the aviation industry has been continuously growing, the value of O(q) is 
assumed to be increasing year by year during the period between 1983/84 and 
1986/87. (3-11) means that via raising ý., the pressure for cost reduction during 
this period became much stronger than before. 
Predictions derived from the conditions (3 - 10) and (3 -12) are not surprising 
when we consider the fact that at the beginning of this period the government 
began its preparations for privatising the British Airports Authority. In June 
1983, in the Queen's Speech the government declared its intention of privatising 
as many airports as possible. 
There is another interesting fact; the British Airports Authority introduced flat 
rate landing fees for aircraft in excess of 50 metric tonnes at Heathrow from 
1985/86 instead of weight-related landing fees. The reason for this is given by 
Toms (1994) as 'the opportunity cost of any landing could be represented as the 
value of the access denied to another potential user who could not use the same 
slot' The recognition of the real (short run) opportunity cost of the capital by the 
British Airports Authority may be regarded as confirmation of the predictions 
from (3-10) and (3-12). 
3-3. Before the 1986 Act: local authority airports 
The institutional arrangements for local authority airports before the legislation 
change in 1986 were more straightforward. The airports were directly owned 
and managed by the local authorities, as explained in Chapter 2. The direct 
principals of those airports' managers were the relevant local authorities, i. e. 
politicians. The managers were local authority officers. Above this level of the 
hierarchy there were the local voters. We see the relationship between the voters 
and the local politicians as another principal-agent relationship. A unique feature 
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of this principal-agent relationship is that the monitoring power constraining the 
agent is stronger in the case of local authorities, compared to the relationship 
between the general public and the Minister of the governmental department that 
is in charge of a particular nationalised firm . The effect of any action which the 
local Council decides to take tends to be more visible because of their closeness 
to the local electorate. An airport has positive externalities in a community by 
attracting other industries, so the total scale of the operation of the airport is 
related to the overall local tax burden. Also the externality comes from the 
availability of the airport itself to the community residents, which is an 
additional value attached by that community. 
On the other hand, the closer link between the local politicians and the local 
voters affects employment policy at the airport, which might affect its internal 
efficiency. 
In the case where a local authority airport faced financial loss, it was met both 
by the local taxpayers' money and by the grants and loans which the local 
authority received from central government, which meant that the airport 
management was not independent of the motives of the local politicians. Thus, 
whilst there were no financial targets such as those imposed on the British 
Airports Authority, pressure from the local politicians seemed to be the main 
constraint on the managers of those airports. Therefore, the objectives of those 
airports managers are not easy to identify. However, considering the scale of 
positive externality contributing to the community itself, which also means the 
managers' non-pecuniary benefit from the operation such as prestige, the 
motives of the managers seem to have been similar to those of the local 
politicians. Furthermore, the Local Government Officers who were in charge of 
the airport service had to compete against others who were in charge of other 
local public services, in tenns of their budgets, which could lead the airport 
managers to a typical 'empire-building' bureaucratic attitude. 
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I mentioned, in Chapter 2, one of the most important decisions by the 
government in the White Paper 'Airports Policy' (1978: cmnd 7084), i. e. 
classification of all airports into four groups. The basic concept of the 
government's decision at that time was: 
'that rationalisation of the facilities outside the South East of England, and 
concentration of air services at a limited number of airports, are likely to be 
among the most effective ways of seeking to redress the balance in air transport 
between the South East and the rest of Great Britain'. (paragraph 115 of 
'Airports Policy' (1978)) 
Before reaching its decision on the classification, the government consulted with 
local authorities, and stated that: 
4many local authorities drew attention to the need to avoid in the future the 
'creeping expansion' of airports which they have contended has been a 
characteristic of the past and to establish 'ceilings' on the growth ofparticular 
airports'. (paragraph 26, ibid) 
This meant that the local authorities admitted their "unco-ordinatect' investment 
competition (which is the word Whitbread (1971) used) through rivalry among 
themselves, and this admission is evidence of the objective of the managers of 
the airports. 
The more interesting point of this classification, i. e., the influence of local 
authorities over the central government, is explained by Barnes (1983). He used 
an example of Teesside and Newcastle. Teesside, after being classified as (C) 
category (i. e., 'Local Airports'), had declined while Newcastle which was only 
40 miles away from Teesside, after classification as (B) category (i. e., 'Regional 
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Airports'), had continued to develop3- He pointed out that the reason why the 
government categorised Newcastle as (B) and Teesside as (C) was because the 
former had possessed more facilities. Therefore he maintained that a local 
authority with ambition for its airport expansion was able to influence the 
classification by initiating a measure of early capital investment. 
From the discussion so far it seems appropriate, in making a model of a typical 
local authority airport, to assume that the objective of the airport's managers is 
to maximise the output. One constraint is a break-even financial obligation 
taking into account the grant from central government and the other is a ceiling 
on the capital borrowable. I assume that the grant is a function of capital 
employed. The managers of the airport solve the following problem: 
Max q- (d- I)x 
S. t. c(q, k, x) - p(q)q +x + rk > G(k) 
K> k- (3-13) 
where d is the marginal cost to the local authority airport's managers incurred by 
inputting x, and thus dx is an expression of the managers' disutility for reducing 
the total cost by x. d>I is assumed as b>I as in (3-1). ý, is the multiplier to 
the first constraint and p is the multiplier to the second constraint, G(k) denotes 
the grant (Gk : -": 
aG) 
and K is the limit to borrowing capital from central ak 
government. The first-order conditions derived from (3-13) are: 
P-Cq 
_I p 
Iýp 
-CX = 
d- I 
= r- Gk- -ck 
(3-14) 
(3-15) 
(3-16) 
In this model, note that the first constraint in (3-13) is set in a different direction 
compared to the British Airports Authority's case. This is because I took into 
consideration that the loss is always met by the local taxpayers' money in the 
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case where the constraint is not satisfied, i. e. this constraint means that the 
minimisation of the local tax that would be put into the airport operation has 
already been incorporated. 
In terms of pricing, (3-14) tells us that if the first constraint is not binding (ý'=O) 
p is always set below the marginal cost, (when we assume that we can eliminate 
the case Of C>cq). When the first constraint is binding, the larger ý becomes, the 
smaller the price becomes. 
An implication from (3-15) is that in the case where the first constraint is not 
binding, i. e. the tax paid by the local residents has to be used to recover the loss 
(ý - 0), the cost reduction effort x is converged to zero as -cx = +Oo. However, 
if the first constraint is binding, the larger the grant from the central 
government, the closer the total cost reduction level becomes to the optimum, 
whose speed depends on the size of (d - 1). However, as I assumed d>1, 
-cx >I always holds and the level of x is always smaller than the optimal 
amount. 
(3-16) means that only if we assume Gk":::: 0 (capital employed is nothing to do 
with the amount of the grant), and p=O (the second constraint is non-binding), 
-'k r holds and the airport is at its optimal capacity level. However, when 
Gk 0, which can be reasonably assumed from what I have discussed above 
and from note 3 in this Chapter, particularly after 1978's Airports Policy, (even 
where the condition that the constraint on the borrowing limit is not binding, ) 
the airport is led to over-invest. When the borrowing limit is binding, the degree 
of over-investment depends on the change in the capital ceiling K. The more 
generously K is set, the smaller the change in K makes p. However, if K is 
reduced, it would raise p and the effect of the borrowing limit change makes the 
problem of over-investment more serious. 
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These predictions seem to be consistent with how the airports' managers actually 
behaved. Particularly, the problem of over-irivestment seems to explain the 
situation that is described as 'creeping expansion' in the 'Airports Policy' 
(1978). Regarding local authority airports price setting, there had been no 
published standard airport charges such as the British Airports Authority's 
'Condition of Use: including aircraft charges' which is normally published each 
year. It is because the airport charges at a local authority airport were (and still 
are at non-designated local authority airports) on the basis of private, normally 
secret negotiations between the airport and airlines. As I mentioned in Chapter 
2, there was a Joint Airport Charges Committee which set national standards for 
airport charges. However, the localauthority airports' managers are said to have 
had wide discretion with regard to their decision making and pricing policies, 
therefore it is quite possible that the structure of airport charges was different 
from airport to airport. The local authority airport managers tried to create a 
structure which would make the airport as attractive as possible to the airlines 
using the airport, from which we can assume that some categories of airport 
charges might have been below the marginal cost. 
There is one thing which the model cannot explicitly incorporate. It is the 
preference and priorities of the majority members of the local authorities owning 
a local authority airport. For instance there remains the following two issues: 
1) the local authority politicians preference with regard to 
employment of workers and 
2) priority the local authority politicians attached to externality 
considerations. 
The first issue seems to have been linked to the policy of the political party 
which the majority of the local authority members belonged to. Particularly, in 
the case of Labour party dominated local authorities, there seems to have been 
greater scope for the workers to improve their employment conditions because 
of their unions' relationship with the politicians. The workers were able to have 
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stronger bargaining power with the managers in terms of their cost reduction 
efforts. We could argue that the managers disutility parameter of cost reduction 
effort, d, in the condition (3-15) has already been reflected by the degree of the 
workers bargaining power. 
The second issue brings about the following question: which kind of externality 
did the local authority politicians put the greater emphasis on, increasing 
positive externality or decreasing negative externality? Although I have 
discussed the incentive to the local politicians for mainly gaining the externality 
through which a community having an airport can become wealthier, we cannot 
ignore the very important environmental problem caused by the pollution and 
noise from an airport operation. The most important consideration the politicians 
in the community around a local authority airport have to take into account 
whenever they decide a particular investment programme is how to strike a 
balance between the effect of the positive externality and of the negative 
externality. Each local authority airport has had different priorities attached to 
this balance. For instance, Luton Borough Council has always put greater weight 
on minimising environmental problems, whilst Manchester City Council/the 
Greater Manchester Council (the local authorities have been different from time 
to time in terms of ownership of Manchester Airport) have seemed to consider 
that the regional development arising from the airport investment is of greater 
importance than reducing the environmental problems. We could argue that this 
externality aspect of the operation of a local authority airport has been implicitly 
expressed through the effect of raising/reducing /I as increasing/decreasing the 
total revenue in the model. 
3-4. After the 1986 Act: London airports of BAA pic 
The Airports Act 1986 established a function within the CAA to impose pricing 
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controls on the 'designated' airports which are Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted and 
Manchester. Of these airports the first three are now owned and managed by the 
privatised BAA p1c. As described in Chapter 2, all the airports which are owned 
by public liability companies (whether they are still in the public sector or not) 
are subject to economic regulation in the form of being granted a permission to 
levy airport charges. As well as this kind of regulation, 'designated' airports are 
subject to a specific form of pricing regulation which determines the maximum 
revenue that the airport can earn by way of airport charges. The economic 
regulator, the CAA, through each airport operator's review, sets the pricing 
formula in a period for five years ahead. Regarding the three London airports of 
BAA the first quinquennium began on 1st of April 1987. 
The prices which are subject to economic regulation are airport charges as 
defined and explained in Chapter 2. Therefore there needs to be a distinction 
between the model that I explore in the next chapter and the model I showed in 
section 3-2 of this chapter, which is, that the model after the regulatory reform 
needs a separation of the revenue which is related to the 'air-side' operation 
from the revenue which is related to the 'commercial- side' operation. 
The maximum revenue has been constrained at BAA's London airports by price 
regulation. The 'maximum revenue' was defined by the Secretary of State for 
Transport to be the maximum average revenue yield per passenger using each 
airport4. There was a discussion about the form of maximum revenue 
regulation, i. e., whether it should be in the form of the so-called 'Tariff Basket 
Approach' where the average revenue is calculated using the weight of the 
previous year's sum of each product of quantity and price of a group of services, 
or alternatively, it should be in the form of so-called 'Average Revenue 
Approach' where the average revenue is calculated using the weight of the 
previous year's total revenue divided by the total quantity. The detailed analysis 
on the allocative efficiency thorough price setting I have carried out in Chapter 
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4. In this chapter I use a descriptive way of expressing the price cap constraint: 
maximum level>- 
TRairside 
qpassengers 
The managers of each airport will try to solve the following problem: 
Max TR(q) - c(q, x, k) - ax - rk 
S-t- maximum level> 
TRairside 
(3-17) qpossengers 
The two other aspects, i. e., the managerial effort and investment efficiency, are 
expected to improve to the monopolistic level so that the marginal conditions 
can be satisfied. Instead of (3-3) and (3-4) or (3-11) and (3-12), the level of 
managerial effort and the investment level are respectively: 
-cx a (3-18) 
-ck r (3-7) 
where a denotes the marginal cost to the managers for cost reduction at each 
privatised BAA airport. I assume a>1. It can be assumed that the value a is 
smaller than b, and is closer to I (b >a> 1). This is because of the stronger 
pressure on the managers after privatisation. The existence of the shareholders 
and the threat of takeover were the main impacts of privatising the then British 
Airports Authority. Unlike some public utilities such as gas and electricity which 
were privatised, efficiency gain through increased competition in the product 
market was not expected to be reallsed to a great extent in the case of the UK 
airports. In fact it was not even included in the Government's belief in the 
benefits of privatising the UK airports when it published the White Paper 
'Airports Policy' in 1985, as mentioned in Chapter 2. Gaining access to private 
capital means that the monitoring of the managers in their managerial effort was 
strengthened compared to the period of nationalisation, because of which the 
assumption a<b can be reasonably justified. 
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The price cap regulation in the form of RPIA is not only imposed on all of 
BAA's three London airports' average revenue, but is also imposed on 
Heathrow and Gatwick separately. Thus there had been three price caps, (1) for 
the system, (2) for Heathrow and (3) for Gatwick. The idea was that whilst 
fixing the maximum price level for both Heathrow and Gatwick, the system cap 
allowed Stansted to set the airport charges in a less restricted manner. 
There were some changes in the 1996 review. The CAA decided to have 
Stansted's airport charge level also separately capped which was RPI+1 for the 
period between 1997 and 2002 (the third quinquennium). During the review the 
MMC stated that if there was an overall system cap on all three London airports, 
it might be possible for BAA to have an incentive to set charges at Stansted 
which would be lower than the level that would minimise the loss at Stansted. 
There were complaints by Luton and Norwich against Stansted's price setting. 
According to Luton, the charges at Stansted were lower than the level at which 
Stansted alone would minimise its loss. At the same time when the new terminal 
was opened, Stansted had introduced a policy by which any airlines that started 
new international routes had off-peak passenger charges applied to them. 
Though the CAA admitted that the pricing at Stansted was harmful to other 
regional airports, it did not feel the need for any remedy. In its view, the policy 
of developing Stansted was 'immature' as there still existed Traffic Distribution 
Rules (See Chapter 2) when the government decided to develop Stansted. After 
Traffic Distribution Rules were removed, there was not so much traffic as 
expected. Thus the problem is whether to totally abandon Stansted or to 
maintain Stansted while recovering just the variable costs. It is not certain if the 
total revenue of Stansted covers its total variable costs. In the MMC's view, 
because the previous price capping system required both Heathrow and Gatwick 
to be capped separately, the low price of Stansted did not necessarily mean that 
the level of charges at either Heathrow or Gatwick were raised. Yet the fact that 
the MMC recommended the separate cap on Stansted and that the CAA 
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followed the recommendation means that they had felt some fear of distorting 
the competition among the regional airports and Stansted. 
Also a combined price cap was newly established for Heathrow and Gatwick 
which was RPI-3, instead of separately capping each of the two airports. 
However, there was a regulation as to the differential between Heathrow's price 
level and Gatwick's price level. Within this combined cap the real reduction in 
charges each year at Heathrow should be 1% less than Gatwick's level. Thus we 
can look upon the effect as two separate caps. The values of X given to BAA's 
three London airports are shown below including Manchester: 
Table 3-1 The values of X at BAA's airports and Manchester 
87 88 89 90 191 92 93 94; 95 96 97 
BAA 111 1* 1 8* 8* 4* 11 3(-1 
MA 111 i3 3 '-3 3 
98 99 00 01 02 
3(--l BAAý' 3(--l) )t 3(-l)t 3(-l)t 
T MA 555 
.55 
MA denotes Manchester International Airport 
* Two separate caps for both Heathrow and Gatwick, plus a system cap for all the three airports 
tA combined cap RPI-3 for Heathrow and Gatwick, with a differential limit, and Stansted's RPl+1 
The existence of the system price cap applied to the whole London system 
makes the prediction as to the first and second quinquennium complicated. 
Therefore I do not include the predictions regarding the conditions of the airport 
charges in this chapter. Instead, I focus on the effect of the price cap imposed on 
a 'designated' private airport in Chapter 4. 
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3-5. After the 1986 Act: Scottish airports of BAA pic 
The airports owned by public liability companies, other than the 'designated' 
airports, are not subject to the price cap regulation regarding airport charges. 
Yet, as I explained in Chapter 2, there is a lesser degree of economic regulation. 
This means that the CAA grants 'permission to levy airport charges' to the 
non-designated plc airports. The airports submit their proposals for airport 
charges or any changes in their airport charges to the CAA who gives the 
operators permission. Section 41 of the Airports Act 1986 mentions the cases 
where the CAA should intervene with their airport charges, such as in the case 
of undue discrimination against particular users or in the case where there seems 
to be anti-competitive conduct against other airport operators. However, there is 
no written information published as to what grounds or on what basis the CAA 
should judge whether the airport charges plans submitted by the operators are 
permissible. This means that a non-designated airport can charge whatever it 
likes and only in the case of complaint against its charges by the users or other 
airports, does the CAA investigate the matter. Therefore the emphasis of the 
regulation regarding the airport charges of the non-designated airports is not 
4pro-active', but rather 're-active'. Regarding the non-designated airports, there 
seem to be no specific constraints, at least in the sense of airport charges. 
Behind the decision by the Secretary of State for Transport in not designating 
the airports other than the three London airports and Manchester, there seems to 
have been a government view that the non-designated airports would behave in a 
market orientated manner. It can be thought that the government, when it 
designated the four airports, suspected that at those airports both the 'air-side' 
services and 'commercial- side' services could be monopolistic, while the 
government had a perspective that there would be room for competition among 
the non-designated airports. Price efficiency will be discussed in the next 
chapter. The conditions as to managerial effort and investment efficiency are 
expected to be improved after the regulatory reform as was the case with the 
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three London airports. The marginal conditions of (3-18) and (3-7) are predicted. 
As to intemal efficiency I include Scottish airports in an empirical analysis in 
Chapter 6. 
Since 1993/94 Edinburgh and Glasgow have introduced so-called 'voluntary 
price-capping' of their airport charges. This is based on consultation between the 
airports and the user airline companies and there are no written documents about 
the 'voluntary price-capping'. The 'voluntary price-capping' on each airport is in 
the fon-n of the 'Average Revenue Approach'. I will mention this later in 
Chapter 5. 
3-6. After the 1986 Act: local authority airports other than 
Manchester 
The local authority airports which became plcs due to the Airports Act 1986 are 
unconstrained with regard to their airport charges, as in the case of the Scottish 
Airports of BAA ple. However, there is a significant difference between the 
local authority airports and Scottish Airports. The local authority airports are all 
(including Manchester) subject to capital constraints because they chose to 
remain in the public sector. As seen in Chapter 2, the government expressed, in 
the 1985 White Paper 'Airports Policy', its wish to encourage the local 
authorities to privatise their airports, though the government did not force them. 
However, the reason for privatising the British Airports Authority, and for 
changing the status of the local authority airports which had turnover of more 
than a given amount into plcs was to reduce the government's financial burden. 
Though most of the local authority airports still remain in the public sector, 
central government influences the airports' incentive for gaining access to 
private capital, by reducing the capital amount which they can borrow from 
central government. 
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The model for the objective of the managers of these local authority airports can 
be expressed as: 
Max TR(q) - c(q, x, k) - ßx - rk 
st K>k 
The first order conditions are: 
P-cq 
(3-20) p 
-CX (3-21) 
r+6 (3-22) 
where 5 is the multiplier of the constraint on capital. P denotes the marginal cost 
to the managers for cost reduction at an airport. I assume P>1. 
(3-20) implies that the price structure is set at a monopolistic level. Compared to 
(3-14) the possibility of prices being set below the marginal non-capital cost is 
non-exisitent. However, as this is a simple model, I have not made any 
distinction between the airport charges and the prices for the 'commercial- side' 
services. One would need a specification for the total revenue function of the 
'commercial-side' service in order to predict price structure in both airport 
charges and 'commercial -side' prices. 
As far as the cost reduction effort is concerned, the same predictions can be 
applied as in the case of Scottish Airports. The difference between (3-15) and 
(3-21) is clear. (3-15) means the closeness to the optimum effort level, i. e. 1, can 
be changed not only by the disutility level of the manager for cost reduction, but 
also by the amount of the central government grant. However, (3-21) means that 
cost reduction effort level is only related to the managers' disutility for cost 
reduction effort. 
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The main difference as to the capital constraint is shown in condition (3-22). 
When the constraint is binding, as 6 is positive, the capital investment is not 
efficient and under-investment is the case because -'k > r. When the constraint 
is tightened, due to the reduction of the borrowing limit from the central 
government, the degree of under- investment becomes larger. The airports which 
had been struggling within tight borrowing limits either chose to sell their 
airports to the private sector or tried to find ways to implement their investment 
programmes by other means than by relying totally on borrowing from central 
government. Airports such as East Midlands, Cardiff, Bournemouth and Belfast 
City, Prestwick, Southend and Birmingham have chosen to be privatised. An 
example of funding a part of the investment programme was seen at 
Birmingham before privatisation. It created a joint venture with several private 
companies including airlines. Currently Luton is using the joint venture 
approach. However, in 1999 the option of borrowing money on the open market 
was given to Manchester, Newcastle, Leeds-Bradford and Norwich by the 
Minister of Transport. 
3-7. After the 1986 Act: Manchester Airport 
Manchester Airport is in a unique position in the UK airport industry. Although 
it chose to remain in the public sector , it was picked as one of the 
'designated' 
airports by the Secretary of State. This means that not only is there a constraint 
on the airport charges, but also a capital constraint on borrowing from central 
govemment. 
The manner in which the airport charges are controlled is that of the RPIA 
price-cap regulation which is the same as in the case of the three London 
airports of BAA p1c. Manchester's price-cap formula is also set by the 'Average 
Revenue Approach'. The regulatory review is at five year intervals, which is 
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exactly the same as in the case of BAA's London airports. 
The managers of Manchester have to solve the following problem: 
Max TR(q) - c(q, x, k) - ax - rk 
S. t. maximum level> 
TRairside 
qpassengers 
K>k (3-23) 
Regarding the price condition, the same complication arises as in the case of 
each of the BAA's airports, because in this simple model the proper distinction 
between the 'air-side' revenue and the 'commercial- side' revenue cannot be 
made. The advantage of the model style in this chapter is however, that one can 
distinguish the conditions of managerial efficiency and investment efficiency. 
The conditions for managerial efficiency and capital input efficiency are as 
follows: 
-cx =a (3-24) 
-ck =r+ (3-25) 
where a denotes the marginal cost to the managers for cost reduction at 
Manchester Airport. I assume a>1. y is the multiplier of the second 
constraint. Therefore, although the managerial efficiency seems to improve 
compared with the period before the regulatory reform, as y is positive, the same 
capital under-investment problem can be the case as with the other local 
authority airports. 
So far I have explained the four different kinds of constraint categories which 
have appeared after the regulatory reform. I analyse in Chapter 4 the price 
conditions regarding the current price cap regulation imposed on the designated 
airports after the reform, and the effects of the rebalancing of airport charges 
followed by an empirical analysis in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6,1 focus on their 
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productive efficiency (as a combination of cost reduction effort and investment 
level) in order to see whether any difference in production efficiency can be 
observed under different constraints. 
70 
Notes to Chapter 3 
1. However, Stansted by 1968 was about to be chosen as the Third London Airport, 
which was much earlier than the establishment of the Roskill Committee. 
2. When B6s's term is used, the 'under-estimation of marginal cost' is adjusted by 
(3-10), i. e., both (3-2) and (3-10) can be rearranged as: 
p-(cq- 
Ac 
p 
1k Ä p-(cq- Ä 5q, ,) (3-10)' p 
(3-2)' means that the firm sets price as though it were a monopolist, but the fmn 
under-estimates its real marginal cost cqas [cq - (3-10)' shows that this 
under-estimation of marginal cost is corrected by the degree of which might 5q` 9 
introduce, in turn, 'over-estimation of marginal cost', depending on qt-1. The 
allocative efficiency in price structure will be analysed in Chapter 4 in greater detail. 
3. The reasons why Teeside has declined after being categorised as (C), whilst 
Newcastle after being categorised as (B) has continued to develop were: 
a) the government varied the grant size and amount that an airport could 
borrow from the government depending upon the category attached 
to the airport and 
b) the government influenced the policy on route licensing reflecting the 
category of an airport indirectly through the Civil Aviation Authority, 
e. g., renewal or permission for a particular route, 
according to Barnes (1985). 
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4. The actual price controls imposed on BAA ple's three London airports are as 
follows: 
Mt = 
(I + Rp"-X) Yt-I - Kt (3-A) 100 
where Mt is maximum average revenue yield per passenger using all three London 
airports of BAA and RPY is the percentage change in the Retail Price Index between 
that published with respect to September in year t and that with respect to September 
in year t+1. Yt-1 is the actual average revenue yield in the year t-I per passenger 
who using all three London airports in the year t-1. Kt is the correction factor which 
is to do with the difference between Mt-2 (the maximum average revenue yield per 
passenger applied to the year t- 2) and the actual average revenue yield per passenger 
in the year t-2. The fon-nula for determining Yt- I and Kt are respectively as follows: 
yt- 1= yt-2 (I + RPII- I -X) + St-2 (3-B) 100 
and 
Kt = 
TI-2-ýQI-2XMI-2ý 
(I+ r )2. (3-C) 
Q 1-2 100 
yt-2 is the actual total revenue in the year t-2 divided by the actual total passenger 
numbers in the year t-2. St-2 is an allowed percentage of the change in total security 
costs in the year t-2 divided by the actual passenger numbers in the year t-2. The 
allowed percentage was initially set as 75% (also initially 75% at Manchester, 
however, since the second quinquennium 95% for both BAA's airports and 
Manchester). Tt-2 is the actual revenue in the yeart -2 and Qt-2 is the actual 
passenger numbers in the year t-2. Where Kt has a positive value, r is 3% plus the 
interest rate for the year t-2, that is the Treasury Bill Discount Rate, and where Kt 
has a negative value, r is equal to the Treasury Bill Discount Rate. 
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Chapter 4 
Price Rebalancing and Airport Charges 
4-1. Introduction 
This chapter addresses some of the resource allocation problems of the regulation of 
airport charges from the point of view of microeconomics theory. As explained already 
in the previous chapters, the regulatory reforrn of the U. K. airport industry under the 
1986 Airports Act mandates the CAA to impose conditions on the 'designated' 
airports. The conditions as to airport charges are the ones that "the CAA considers 
appropriate for regulating the maximum amounts that may be levied by the airport 
operator by way of airport charges at the airport during the period offive years" 
(The Airports Act 1986; clause 40 (3)). The main interest in this chapter lies in the 
prediction of outcomes of airport charges which the airport operators might set under 
this regulatory constraint, i. e., under the 'maximum amounts' of airport charges. 
In this chapter, I focus on the static context. I explain in section 4-2 the fonns of two 
types of price cap regulation implemented in the LTK with a brief summary of what 
economists have predicted might be the outcome difference between them. In section 
4-3ý 1 explain the specific features regarding the 'Average Revenue Approach' price 
cap constraint imposed on the 'designated' UK airports, including the nature of 
4operational activities', as a preparation for the models in the rest of this chapter. 
Section 4-4 shows several comparisons between the predicted outcomes of ordinary 
'Average Revenue Approach' and those of 'Airport Average Revenue Approach' using 
a simple model. In section 4-5 1 analyse the price ratio changes under different 
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regulatory constraints in terms of BAA- I focus on both the difference among airport 
charges and the difference between the airport charges and the unregulated prices. (A 
more complicated model with demand interdependency is shown in Appendix (1) and 
(2)). 
4-2. 'Tariff Basket Approach' and 'Average Revenue Approach' 
In the UK,, virtually all of the privatised utility industries are now subject to 'price 
regulation' which is different in principle from so-called 'rate of return regulation'. 
Price regulation is often called 'price cap regulation' because price regulation in the 
UK determines the maximw-n allowable price level through a price cap which is in the 
fon-n of the Retail Price Index less A'%. There are roughly two kinds of price cap 
regulation. One is called the 'Tariff Basket Approach' and the other is called the 
'Average Revenue Approach'I or 'Revenue Yield Approach, 2. The difference lies in 
the form of the constraint. Under Tariff Basket constraint the regulated firm would 
choose pti which is the price of the service i in the period t subject to the following 
constraint: 
(RPI - X) ,11-_. dptj-Iqit-1 
where superscript indicates period and subscript indicates service i. RPI is the rate of 
increase of the price index between the period t and t-I and X is determined by the 
industry regulator. Average Revenue Approach is different in that the firm faces the 
following type of constraint: 
74 
Ptqi PH t-I I qi 
q 1, _. 
z VU -)0 Y, 
IE qý-l 
(4-2) 
In the UK, of the newly privatised regulated industries, BT and the water industry are 
subject to the constraints that belong to the Tariff Basket 'family', whilst BG, BAA, 
Manchester Airport and the Regional Electricity Companies were initially subject to the 
constraints which are categorised as Average Revenue constraints. (4-1) and (4-2) can 
be shown in simplified forms as follows: 
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pt q t, 
-t qi 
where T represents the level of price cap. The main difference between the two 
formulae is that the fmn under the Tariff Basket constraint cannot control the output 
which weights current prices in the current term. The variables determining the range 
of pit are all externally given. However, there is room for the fmn under the Average 
Revenue constraint to manipulate qtj as the current output is inside the constraint. 
Some literature was produced recently which focused on the differences between the 
outcome under the Tariff Basket Approach and the outcome under the Average 
Revenue Approach, most of which included simulations. Bradley and Price (1988) 
show that if a monopolist firm is regulated under Average Revenue constraint as 
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compared to Ramsey pricing, marginal cost pricing would never be an outcome and the 
price of the service whose marginal cost is expensive might be even higher than the 
price that an unregulated monopolist would set. Bradley and Price (1991) used a linear 
relationship between the marginal cost and the size of the market in order to show that 
a monopolist who is subject to Average Revenue constraint would choose to sell the 
product only where the marginal cost is within a certain level, whilst an unconstrained 
monopolist would continue to supply in the markets where the marginal cost gets 
higher as long as marginal revenue is positive3. Vickers and Yarrow (1988) expressed 
this concept using price mark-up ratios. Under constraint (4-2)' the constrained 
monopolist would set the price of servicej and service k such that the price mark-up of 
servicej, Pf , is higher than the price mark-up of service k, 
Pk 
_, when mcj ý' mck Mcj MCk 
Both Bradley and Price (1988 and 1991) and Vickers and Yarrow (1988) showed that 
a price structure would be different from that under a Ramsey pricing solution. Law 
(1995) and Cowan (1997b) made simulations in order to show that under Average 
Revenue constraint a tightening of the price cap could cause the welfare to be reduced. 
Waterson (1992) generalised the findings of Vickers and Yarrow (1988) and Bradley 
and Price (1988). Given the assumptions that both demand and marginal costs of two 
services are independent and that marginal costs are constant, Waterson analysed the 
price structure of a monopolist who supplies service I and 2, subject to the constraint 
(4-2)'. The profit to be maxiiinised is 
ERi-1: Ci; i=1,2. Ri is total revenue 
from service i and C is total cost from service so that 
57 Ci = mc IqI+ mc2q2 i 
where mci is service i's marginal cost. The first order conditions of the Lagrangean 
can be arranged as: 
MI 
(1--eL) ýI-b(Xj-l)ý 2 (4-3) 
M2 (1--L) ýI-b(R2-0ý el 
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where ej == --ýP-' 
q' which is the elasticity of service i's demand (expressed as the aq, A 
absolute term), m P' P and b )L is the Lagrange multiplier Mci, Mi MCj 
and it is proved that 0<ý<I from the second order condition, which implies that 
b>0. 
Waterson compared (4-3) both with the result of an unconstrained monopolist's price 
structure and with the price structure which would result under Ramsey pricing rule. 
When there is no constraint the monopolist would set the prices of service I and 2 so 
that the ratio of the two services' price mark-ups will be: 
MI e2 (4-4) 
MI I, 
Under Ramsey pricing rule, i. e., when the monopolist maximises the welfare subject to 
a break-even constraint, the price mark-up ratio will be: 
M, I-ae 12 (4-5) M2 I -a 
where a=U and y is the multiplier of the Lagrangean for the Ramsey optimal I +, U 
problem. q>0 and therefore 0<a<1, which means that under Ramsey rule M2 
will be always smaller than -ýL under the unregulated'monopolistic price setting. M2 
Under Average Revenue constraint, it is clear that when mc I Ic2, condition (4-3) 
will become identical to condition (4-4). However, when mc, mc2, and el = e2, 
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as in ýý2, the result will be m11m2. This means that when the demand 
elasticities of two services are the same, the market that is more costly will always 
have a higher price mark-up. When mc I ý' mc2 and el < e2, this tendency will be 
boosted and Waterson suggested that Average Revenue constraint might increase 'the 
peakiness ofpeak load pricing, for example'. This is a different way of showing the 
same findings that Bradley and Price (1988) demonstrated using the distance between 
p, andP2. 
Waterson also showed a condition which would result from the case where Average 
Revenue constraint is imposed on a subset of the monopolist's services. In this case the 
relevant Lagrangean will be: 
E3 Ri-E 3 Ci + 2, 
[T(q, 
+ q2) 
-. i i= I i-- I- 
Ej-- 
1,2 
Ri (4-6) 
where total revenue from service 3 is not affected by the constraint. The price mark-up 
ratio of service I and service 3 will be: 
MI e13 b(fiij M3 I (4-7) 
which implies that, if eI= e2 and if T> mc I, i. e., > 1, then -ý-' > 
m' 
= e3, M2 M3 
This means that the price mark-up of service I is lower when compared with the 
unregulated service than when compared with that of service 2, whilst under the same 
assumption, both the Ramsey condition and the unconstrained monopolist condition 
would be m, = MI M2 M3 
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There is one difference between the general form of Average Revenue Approach and 
the price constraint imposed on airport charges at 'designated' airports, i. e., the 
denominator of the constraint as to the left-hand term of the form (4-2)'. Airport 
charges consist of (a) passenger charge per passenger, (b) aircraft landing charge per 
landing and (c) aircraft parking charge. The maximum average revenue, i. e., -p, is 
formally described as 'the maximum average revenue yield per passenger in the 
relevant year t' in the CAA's announcements and expressed as: 
RPII-I-X), W-l - Kt 100 
where Mt is the maximum average revenue yield per passenger and Yt-l is the 
previous year's average revenue yield per passenger after being adjusted by the cost 
pass through factors such as a part of the security cost which the Government imposes 
on the airport . 
Kt is the correction factor to adjust either over- or under-charging due 
to the difference between the forecast revenue and actual revenue4. As to the 
simplified constraint form of (4-2)% the numerator of the left hand side is the sum of 
the revenues from (a), (b) and (c), whereas, the denominator is the total passenger 
numbers. We will see, in the rest of this chapter, how this slightly different version of 
Average Revenue regulation would produce a different outcome from the general 
outcome predicted by the literature I have mentioned. 
4-3. Features of Airport Charge Regulations 
The revenue of an airport comes from (1) 'air-side' operation, (2) commercial-side' 
operation and (3) 'non-operational activity'. (1) and (2) are the components of 
coperational. activities' defmed in the 1986 Act. The term 'air-side' operation is 
synonymous with the term 'traffic' operation as used in the accounts of the British 
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Airports Authority, and also this term is synonymous with the revenue from airport 
charges. This category 'air-side' operation is made up of (a), (b) and (c) described 
nl-% dbove. 
The revenue relevant to the economic regulation of the UK airports is the revenue from 
(1) and (2). The revenue that is directly regulated by the price cap regulation is the one 
from airport charges, i. e., revenue from (1) only. However, the level of revenue from 
(2) is no less important, because of the 'single-till' approach which I described in 
chapter 2. The tenn 'commercial-side activities' is synonymous with the term 'other 
operational activities' in the regulatory account. 
The 'single-till' approach officially enables the airport operator to cross-subsidise any 
loss of its 'air-side' operation by using the revenue of its 'commercial-side' operation. 
This approach means that as long as the total cost of the 'operational activities' is 
covered by the sum of the revenues from (1) and (2), the level of profits from the 
'commercial-side' that is used to offset the loss from the 'air-side' operation is 
irrelevant. In theory this could then lead to a negative airport charge. 
As described above, the airport charge composed of (a) passenger charge (per 
passenger arriving or departing), (b) landing charge (per landing or taking-off) and (c) 
aircraft parking charge are all subject to the Average Revenue price cap regulation. On 
the other hand, there are many categories of 'commercial-side' activities, as shown in 
Table 4-1. One can classify the 'commercial-side activities' roughly into three 
categories as shown in Table 4-1. The classification is according to the 'MMC2' 
report. 
As far as the hearings into BAA's commercial activities, which have been documented 
in the reports of MMC2 and MMC4, are concerned, it can be noted that there are 
several types of payment that are received by BAA for the right to use its facilities or 
spaces that are either located inside the airports or facilitated in off-airport sites, by 
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either concessionaires, air-side licensees or tenants. The categorisation I have made is 
shown in Table 4-2. 
Table 4-1 Categories of 'commercial activities' 
(1) concessions (2) trading licences (3) rents, 'occupation licences' and 
other property related revenue 
ground handling 
passenger baggage 
cargo handling etc. 
retailing 
catering check-in desks 
air-side licences 
'banking fuel rents 
in-flight catering 
car hire transit shed operation 
aircraft cleaning 
car parking off-airport car parking leases 
supply of duty/tax-free goods 
flight insurance offices 
etc. 
hotel bookings VIPlounges 
crew transport 
advertising etc 
disabled passenger services 
etc. 
aircraft security 
passenger coaching 
etc. 
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Table 4-2 Methods of payments: examples 
percentage of turnover retailing 
& catering, air-side licences (6% X turnover 
since the late '70s not being changed until 1996) 
fixed fee as economic rent 
based on the value of check-in 
desks, on-airport office rents 
the space 
hybrid rents (ground rent 
ground handling companies, transit shed operators, 
with an element linked 
off-airport car parking leases 
to turnovers) 
based on a formula 
linked to passenger numbers 
fuel rents 
and the RPI 
voluntarily set ceilings car parks 
such as RPI 
allocated cost related buses and coaches 
We can write the profit of a designated airport, rl, as the sum of the airport charge 
revenue, TR R, and the unregulated 
'commercial-side' revenue, TR U, minus the total 
Cost Tc. 
rl : --::: TRR + TR U- TC (4-8) 
I assume that a privatised airport maximises IFI as its objective. I set aside the other 
profit coming from 'non-operational' activities. The income and the cost 
from the 
cnon-operational' activities is independent and not relevant to the economic regulation 
of the UK airport industry. As described in Chapter 2, this group of activities 
is strictly 
ring fenced from the airport users by the 1986 Act, although 
it has been an important 
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addition to income resource since the industry reform. Therefore rI means the profit 
from the total 'operational activities'. One could add the profit from these 
'non-operational activities' to the right hand term of (4-8), but it would not affect the 
results of the analysis, as the profit from 'non-operational activities' is totally 
unregulated and not relevant to any of the economic constraints. 
TRR, which is the revenue from airport charges can be expressed as the following: 
TRR TRP + TRL + TRK 
= TRp(qp) + TRL(qL) + TRK(qK) (4-9) 
where the notations are as follows: 
TRp : total revenue obtained from passenge r charge 
qp : total passenger numbers 
TRL : total revenue obtained from landing charge 
qL : total landing numbers 
TRK : total revenue obtained from aircraft parking charge 
qK : number of parkings made by all aircraft 
The revenue from 'commercial-side' which is not directly regulated, TRU, can be 
expressed as: 
TR U= TR U(p U, qp) =p Uq U(p U, qp) 
(4-10) 
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There is no single unit measurement for qU which represents either a unit of space or 
a unit of a facility that is hired by concessionaires, trading licensees or tenants. pU is 
the unit price that the third party who uses the space or facility pays to the airport 
operator depending on which facility they are using. Although the payment methods for 
the 'commercial-side' services are varied, they are in effect closely related to the 
passenger numbers (apart from the bottom two rows in Table 4-2 - those two 
categories' charges are deterinined as the results of interventions by either the Office of 
Fair Trading or local communities, on the grounds of fairness). This is the reason why 
I justify TR U as the function of passenger numbers 
5. 
As to the costs, there are many facilities and spaces which are commonly used by both 
'air-side' and 'commercial-side' operations. I will use the following notations to denote 
common costs and attributable costs: 
" attributable unit cost of passenger service: cp 
" attributable unit cost of landing or taking-off: CL 
" attributable unit cost of parking space: CK 
" opportunity cost per unit of output measured differently for each category 
of 'commercial-side' operation: cuh (h = 1,..., M) 
" volume of the output of 'commercial-side' operation which is hired or 
rented (or leased out) by either concessionaires, trade licensees or 
tenants: Qh (h 
" common cost (non-attributable cost): F 
cUh is the value of space per square metre if the measured unit Qh is the size of the 
space (such as check-in desk) rented by the tenants or trade licensees, whilst it is the 
maintenance cost per facility (such as a baggage conveyor) if the measured unit is the 
number of the facilities. Thus the total cost function can be expressed as: 
TC = cpqp + CLqL + COK + 
57h CUhQh +F (4-11) 
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The constraint which is imposed by the airport charge regulation can be written as: 
TRp+TRL+TRK 
<- 
qp -p 
(4-12) 
It is worth stressing again here that the denominator of the equation (4-12) is passenger 
numbers not including landing numbers nor parking volume. This constraint is different 
to the generally known style of Average Revenue Approach price capping. Let us now 
call this price cap constraint the 'Airport Average Revenue' (AAR) constraint. 
4-4. Simple model of 'Airport Average Revenue Approach' 
In order to make the rest of the analysis simpler, I use only two types of demand 
categories relating to airport charges, i. e., passengers and other air-side output. One 
can regard the latter category either as a mixture of landing numbers and the time and 
space used in aircraft parking, or, more practically, as just landing numbers. The 
determinant of the numbers and/or capacity of the facilities located outside terminals 
(e. g., the numbers and the size of runways, taxiways and aprons etc. ) are in fact 
landing numbers. It is more convenient to put airport charges from both landing and 
parking together into one category. Normally an aircraft parking charge is imposed on 
the airline based on the time spent in parking and the weight of each aircraft, which 
complicates the modelling in terms of analysing the price structure. Let us call this 
combined category 'runway' output6. Another reason for putting aside aircraft parking 
is that the share of the aircraft parking charge in the total of airport charges at an 
airport is normally quite small7. For these reasons I make the model structure simpler 
than the one explained in the previous section. Instead of (4-9) the total revenue 
from 
airport charge is, from now on, expressed as: 
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TRR "::::: TRP + TRW (4-13) 
where suffix P denotes passenger charge and suffix W denotes charge from 'runway' 
output. 
Likewise, the total cost and the price cap constraint can be simplified. Instead of the 
expression (4-11), 1 use the following expression of total cost: 
TC : -- cpqp + cWqW + cUqu +F (4-14) 
This simplification does not affect the results of the analysis. cW means the unit cost 
of runway related output. cU means the unit cost of commercial-side activity. 
The price cap constraint AAR can be reduced to the following form: 
TRp+TRw 
qp (4-15) 
One can see how this AAR constraint would result in a different set of outcomes from 
the outcomes predicted by an ordinary Average Revenue price cap constraint. In order 
to see the difference, I use the following outputs: 
qpj : peak passenger numbers 
qp2 : off-peak passenger numbers 
qWj : peak runway output numbers (or simply peak landing numbers) 
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qpV2 : off-peak runway output numbers (or simply off-peak landing 
numbers) 
U: amount of 'outputs' (either volume or space) in unregulated 
commercial activities 
The regulated airport aims to maximise its profit subject to this AAR constraint. The 
airport maximises: 
1-1 == TRp + TRW+ TRU - TC 
ppiqpi + 
37, 
p Wiq Wi +p Uq U- (y cpiqpi + cWiqWi + cUqU + 
;i=1,2 
(4-16) 
The constraint (4-15) can be rewritten as the following: 
ppiqpi+E p wiq wi 
qpi 
PF ;i=1, (4-17) 
Each demand is set as independent here. ppl, pp2, p Wl, p 9/2, p U are peak passenger 
charge, off-peak passenger charge, peak runway charge, off-peak runway charge and 
commercial activity's 'price', respectively. The Lagrange function is as follows: 
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1-1 +, ýýT(qpj + qp2) - (TRp + TRW)ý (4-18) 
The first order conditions of the Lagrangean X can be expressed as: 
ppi 0- 
1- 
ýT -jp-, )(I cpl ep, (4-19) 
PP2 0- -L) 0 cP2 eP2 (4-20) 
P W, - 
Lw 
)(I 
c W, 
ew, (4-21) 
P (1 - X) c 9`2 (4-22) 
PUO cu eu (4-23) 
These results can be arranged in the form of prices as follows: 
pp, cpl-ý, TF 
- ep, I) 
(I 
- 
A) (4-19)' 
PP2 
CP2-A 
eP2 
(4-20)' 
Pwl (1 -, ' 
Cwl 
W, )0 -A) 
(4-21)' 
P (I IC 02 - )(1 -A) 
(4-22)' 
eW2 
cu (4-23)7 
e1u) 
A is the Lagrange multiplier. The second order condition holds and deduces that 
0<A<1. Using the same style of expression in the section 4-2, i. e., mpi = PP' CPi 
Mk -Wi 
LU-1 ! ýIpi ifiWi and b we can rewrite Wi CWi, Mu = Cu CPi CWi I -A 
(4-19) to (4-23) as the following: 
mpi = 1-1 1 
ýl - b(iiipj - (4-24) ep, 
MP2 = 1-1 1 
ýl - b(ffil: "2 - 0ý (4-25) eP2 
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m W, 11 (I+b) (4-26) 
ewl 
m ff/2 
II (I + b) (4-27) 
'W2 
MU= 
elU 
(4-28) 
Comparisons between the results of this AAR constraint setting and the result of an 
ordinary average Revenue constraint setting are surnmarised in Table 4-3. As it is clear 
from Table 4-3 in which I used Waterson's expression (from section 4-2), the most 
interesting difference between the outcome predicted from the ordinary Average 
'D - Revenue constraint and the one from AAR can be seen in the price marginal cost ratios 
of (2), (3) and (5). 
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Table 4-3 Price marginal cost mark-up ratios 
(1) between regulated services both inside the constraint's denominator 
ordinary Average Revenue ml -2 M2 
AAR MPI n? P2 0- 1 ýI-b(! ýIP2-1)ý 1PI 
(2) between regulated services, one included in the constraint's denominator, 
the other not in the denominator 
ordinary Average Revenue 
AAR M, 
Mirl (1-ýPl ) (I+b) 
(3) between regulated services 
both not included in the constraint's denominator 
ordinary Average Revenue 
AAR M", 
412 
MIV2 0 
(4) between service regulated and included in the denominator 
and unregulated service 
ordinary Average Revenue b(lffi - 0ý M 3 
AAR M 
Mpi ej, b(ýgpi - 0ý U 
(5) between service regulated but not included in the denominator 
and unregulated service 
ordinary Average Revenue 
AAR m -Lýu- (1 + b) MU I- I q Y1 
As to (2), by considering the term inside the large bracket of the outcome from AAR, 
the following cases can be examined: 
m pi - 
(I-eWl ýI-b(fiip, -I& >P -W] 1) if 1ýipl :50, m wl (I- I- (I- I) ep, (I +b) epl 
(I- I) 
2) if -fflpl > 0, nl" 
(I-e jW'ý I-) ýI-b(Iiipi-l)ý 
< 
eWl 
MWI I (I- I) (I-ep, ) (I+b) epl 
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As defined T ! ýipi = ý- and both T and -Cpl are positive, the case 1) is impossible P"I 
and the case 2) always holds. This means that the ratio of the price marginal cost 
mark-up of the landing charge, relative to the mark-up ratio of the passenger charge, 
would be always larger than would be realised under the unregulated monopolist price 
setting. 
Regarding (3), i. e., the mark-up ratio of peak and off-peak landing charges, the ratio 
predicted by AAR constraint shows that it is exactly the same as in the case of the 
ratio that would be realised under an unregulated monopolist. (4-2 1) and (4-22) can be 
rearranged as: 
M, RWI = pW, (l - 
L 
w) ew, c W, 
AMK2 = PKO - el, 
) 1), cK2 
where the left hand side of each equation is the relevant marginal revenue. This means 
that the marginal revenue from the landing charge is equal to the related marginal cost 
multiplied by 1 
2- 
X which is larger than 1. Therefore, the marginal revenue from 
landing charge always exceeds the marginal cost. There would be fewer landings than 
with an unregulated monopolist. 
As to (5), the ratio of the mark-up of landing charge to unregulated service shows that 
it is larger than the ratio of the mark-up of passenger charge to unregulated service. 
It is convenient to show the same findings in the form of price ratios, not price 
marginal cost mark-up ratios. This is because (a) it makes the expression simpler and 
(b) I can use the expression directly in Chapter 5. There is a problem in terms of 
carrying out the empirical analysis due to the lack of information that would be 
required to deduce an estimation of marginal costs. I use only price data in the 
91 
empirical analysis in Chapter 5, and I re-arrange the summary of this simple model's 
outcome into the price ratio forms shown in Table 4-4.1 also rearranged the two base 
benchmark settings, i. e., a simple unregulated monopolist setting and Ramsey pricing 
rule setting, from the form of the price marginal cost mark-up ratios ((4-4) and (4-5) in 
section 4-2) to the price ratio form. This is shown in Table 4-5. 
Table 4-4 Price ratios: difference between Average Revenue constraint and AAR 
(1) between regulated services both inside the constraint's denominator 
ordinary Average 'Revenue PI - 
O-eI2) 
C, ýIýp 
P2 (1--e L 
I 
C2-X7T 
AAR 
PPI 
(1-IP2) 
CPI-; L-)T 
P/ý O-eýl ) CP2-ýPý 
PI 
(2) between regulated services, 
one included in the constraint's denominator, the other not in the denominator 
ordinary Average Revenue 
AAR 
ppi 
= 
(1--e-W, 
Cpl-; Lg 
pwi (I- I CIVI 
ep, 
(3) between regulated services 
both not included in the constraint's denominator 
ordinary Average Revenue 
AAR Art = 
(1-71E) Cin 
) CW2 Pý12 (I-e I 
j Vj 
(4) between service regulated and included in the denominator 
and unregulated service 
ordinary Average Revenue C, 1 P3 II -X)C3 
AAR ýLPLI 
eu CpI-, 
IPF 
pUI (I-A)CU 
ep, 
(5) between service regulated but not included in the denominator 
and unregulated service 
ordinary Average Revenue - 
AAR Pin - 
Liu- CW) 
(I-X)CU Pu 1-4 VI 
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Table 4-5 Price ratios in two Benchmark cases: Unregulated monopolist's setting and 
Ramsey setting 
(M) Unregulated Monopolist Pk C, 
(R) Ramsey rule P, 
c, 
Pk (1-a-L) Ck 
In order to be able to compare the price ratios, there is a need to make several 
assumptions regarding the elasticities and marginal costs of the relevant services. 
Throughout the chapter I assume each demand function is downward sloping. Each 
output is assumed to be supplied only within the range where the marginal revenue is 
positive. Therefore the value of price elasticity of each service, expressed in the 
absolute term (i. e., ej -= ), is assumed to be larger than 1. aV, qi 
It is arguable that one can detect the independent elasticity of airport charge 
distinguished from the elasticity of the airline tickets' price. Airport charge is regarded 
by airlines as a part of the total cost of flights. The cost of operating a flight by an 
airline consists of lots of cost categories, such as fuel cost, aircraft capital cost (or 
leasing cost), crew cost, in-flight-catering cost, overhead cost etc., apart from airport 
charge. One can detect 'elasticity of airport charge to the supply' of total capacity 
(such as the total number of landing and total seats) to an airline company. The 
problem is that the airlines don't reflect the cost of operating a flight averaged by 
passenger numbers to the ticket's price, let alone the marginal cost. There exists a 
'yield management' technique which airlines employ in order to maximise the load 
factor, which means that most of the indirect and even direct costs incurred by flying a 
commercial aircraft are passed on to an individual passenger in a different way. Not 
only the technique of yield management, but there are many kinds of manipulations that 
airlines can conduct in order to make their operations more profitable through raising 
the number of passengers, e. g., they can change the size of the aircraft and the 
93 
destination or route distance. The way the airlines pass a part of the total cost of a 
flight on to each passenger depends on these controllable elements. Intuitively one can 
assume that the 'elasticity of airport charge of the supply' would be smaller when the 
airline uses a larger aircraft and a longer route, as the proportion of airport charge to 
the total cost of a flight is smaller where it uses a larger aircraft and longer haul route. 
This is because of the 'runway' charge which is fixed per aircraft, becoming a smaller 
amount per passenger on average if the airline uses a larger aircraft on a longer haul 
route compared to using a smaller aircraft and shorter route. The recent Practice of the 
airlines is to impose the passenger charge on a passenger as an addition to the ticket 
price. In a way one can regard the mix of passenger charge and 'runway charge' 
(i. e. janding charge plus parking charge) as a kind of 'two-part tariff system. Here I 
assume that (a) one can identify elasticity of airport charge from the airline demand and 
(b) each elasticity of passenger charge and 'runway' charge can be detectable 
separately. All assumptions as to the price elasticities are as follows: 
(1) ej > 1: the value of price elasticity of each service, expressed in the 
absolute term (i. e., ej -= -Lq-ik'- ), is always larger than I ap, qi 
(2) ep, < ep2: elasticity of peak passenger charge is smaller than that of 
off-peak passenger charge 
(3) ep, > eW, and ep2 > eK: elasticity of runway charge is smaller 
than that of passenger charge in both peak and off-peak period 
(4) eWj < eK: elasticity of peak runway charge is smaller than that of 
off-peak runway charge 
(5) ep, < eU and ep2 < eU: elasticity of passenger charge (in both peak 
and off-peak) is smaller than that of commercial service 'price'. 
(6) eW, < eU and eK < eU: elasticity of runway charge (in both peak 
and off-peak) is smaller than that of commercial service 'price' 
Assumptions (2) and (4) are based on the nature of the derived demand of transport. 
The passengers who would like to use the airline service during the peak hours are 
more likely to have their trips based on business demand than on leisure demand. 
Assumption (3) is less convincing. As suggested above, it is difficult to separate 
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landing charge elasticity from passenger charge elasticity. However, there exists a 
physical constraint, i. e., the slot limit when it comes to landing and taking-off. 
Although in this thesis the issues regarding slots are not explored, slot problems have 
concerned transport economists particularly the property rights issue. 'Grandfather's 
rights' are quite often looked upon as an asset by airlines and the level of landing 
charge would be likely to have significantly less importance than a decision to give up 
a slot. In terms of landing time, there isanother restriction, i. e., availability of take-off 
and landing slots at other network departure or destination airports. Also, as described 
above, whilst the recent custom is to show the passenger charge separately to the 
airline ticket purchasers, there are many ways of distributing landing charges among 
different passengers per flight which is 'hidden' inside the ticket price. I presume that 
the assumption (3) is justified. As to assumptions (5) and (6), one can assume that the 
air-side services are less price elastic than the commercial services. The commercial 
6output' is a mixture of goods from many kinds of industries with different degrees of 
competitiveness as shown in Table 4-1. Some goods or services sold inside an airport 
terminal (such as medicines, foods, banking and all kinds of consumable goods, etc. ) 
are pure by-products exploiting the externality that the airport produces, but they are 
quite competitive. Other goods which are directly related to the airline operations (such 
as fuel, check-in desk space and ground-handling services, etc. ) are less competitive, 
but under inspection by the MMC regarding their competitiveness. However, the 
air-side services are the 'goods' which the airlines cannot dispense with if they are to 
operate in the airport. 
Assumptions regarding marginal costs are as follows: 
cp, > cp2: the marginal cost related to each peak passenger is 
larger than the marginal cost related to each off-peak passenger. 
(2) cWj > cg2: the marginal cost (short-run) incurred by the landing, 
taking-off and aircraft parking of each aircraft during peak period is 
larger than that during the off-peak period. 
(3) cWj > cpl and cU2 > cp2: the marginal cost (short-run) of landing, 
taking-off or aircraft parking incurred by each aircraft is larger than the 
95 
marginal cost per passenger (in both peak period and off-peak 
period). 
In so far as I have been able to determine there has been no marginal cost estimation 
actually carried out except in the case where the British Airports Authority once 
published its two internal documents in 1983. It calculated the peak and off-peak 
marginal costs at Heathrow and Gatwick in order to justify their peak passenger 
charges on the basis of their costs. This investigation of the costs came about because 
of the conflict between the Authority and the airlines which had led to 'the 
Memorandum of Understanding 1983' mentioned in Chapter 2. As these documents 
are unfortunately 'classified' inside BAA, I can only refer to the MMC2 report in 
which there is some description of the results of the estimation. According to MMC2, 
if the peak passenger charge had been set at the marginal cost level, the peak charge 
would have had to be roughly 10 times more expensive than the off-peak passenger 
charge. Therefore assumption (1) is clearly justified. As to the 'runway' marginal 
costs' assumption (2), not only the opportunity cost such as the 'congestion cost' 
during the peak hours incurred by each aircraft, which is one of the bases for the 
BAA's introduction of peak landing charge8, but also the larger physical unit cost 
related to peak 'runway' operations, such as maintenance costs or fire security costs, 
justify that the marginal short-run cost of peak 'runway' service is larger than during 
off-peak hours. Assumption (3) comes from the matter of unit measurement. The 
marginal cost per passenger is related to each passenger, whereas the marginal 
4runway' cost is measured by each aircraft movement, which justifies the marginal cost 
of 'runway' being larger than the marginal cost per passenger. 
An additional assumption as to the value of ýpF can be deduced from the elasticities 
assumption (1) above, i. e., ej > 1. Under this assumption the value of I- -L is e, 
always positive. As ppi is positive, from the equations (4-19)' and (4-20)' , it is 
automatically deduced that: 
cpl > ZpF and 
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CP2 ý' ý-T- 
As to the level of price cap level, p7, if the AAR constraint is binding, the price cap 
level can be expressed as: 
pplqpl+pp2qp2+ppnqm+pw2qK2 
qpl+qp2 
and this must be larger than the 'weighted average price of passenger charges', let's 
call it T, that can be expressed as-. 
pplqpl+pp2qp2 
qpl +qp2 
Therefore, 
pplqpl+pp2qp, )+ . -pwlqm+pg2qK > 
pplqpl+pp2qp2 
qpl +qp2 qpl +qp2 
It is likely that T is larger than both cpl and cp2, and therefore it is not too unrealistic 
to assume that PF > cpl > cP2- 
Based on the all assumptions I have made above, we can compare each price ratio 
from (1) to (5) in Table 4-4, with (M) and (R) in Table 4-5 which are set as 
benchmarks. 
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(1) Between regulated services both inside the constraint's denominator 
peak passenger charge to off-peak passenger charge under AAR (and ordinary Average Revenue): 
pp, 0- ý, ) cpl- 'P2 PP2 I (I 
-ep, 
) CP2-, ýT 
(Ml) peak passenger charge to off-peak passenger charge under 
unregulated monopolistic setting: 
PPI 'P2 CPI 
PP2 1 CP2 
epi 
(Rl) peak passenger charge to off-peak passenger charge under 
Ramsey rule: 
ppi a C. 1 eP2 
PP2 CP2 
ep, 
The results are surnmarised in Table 4-6-(1). 
(2) Between regulated services, one included in the constraint's denominator, 
the other not in the denominator 
(2) peak (off-peak) passenger charge to peak (off-peak) runway charge 
under AAR: 
PP, - 
(I-ew', 
Cpl-). p7 
PWI 0- 1 CW1 
ep, 
(M2) peak (off-peak) passenger charge to peak (off-peak) runway 
charge under unregulated monopolistic setting: 
PP, - 
(I-ejWIF, 
Cpj 
PWI CW] (I-ep, 
(R2) peak (off-peak) passenger charge to peak (off-peak) runway charge 
under Ramsey rule: 
PP, 
(I-ejaF 
Cp, W1 
PWI a CW1 
ep, 
The result is summarised in Table 4-6-(2). 
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(3) Between regulated services both not included in the constraint's 
denominator 
(3) peak runway charge to off-peak runway charge under AAR: 
PWI 0- e' CW, W2 
P W2 1 CW2 eW, 
(M3) peak runway charge to off-peak runway charge under unregulated 
monopolistic setting: 
pw, O-el CWI W2 
p H-2 0- 1 clf2 
ewl 
(R3) peak runway charge to off-peak runway charge under Ramsey rule: 
a PWI eW2 CWI 
PW2 a CW2 
eW, 
The result is surnmarised in Table 4-6-(3). 
(4) Between a service regulated and included in the denominator and an 
unregulated service 
(4) peak (off-peak) passenger charge to commercial 'price' under AAR 
(and ordinary Average Revenue): 
PPI 
PU (I-ep, ) (1-, ý)CU 
(W) peak (off-peak) passenger charge to commercial 'price' under 
unregulated monopolistic setting: 
PPI _ 
(1-e]U) 
Cpj 
PU (I-ep, ) CU 
(R4) peak (off-peak) passenger charge to commercial 'price' under 
Ramsey rule: 
ppi 
= _(l-eU) 
Cpj 
PU (1_ a) CU 
ep, 
The results are surnmarised in Table 4-6-(4). 
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(5) Between a service regulated but not included in the denominator and an 
unregulated service 
(5) peak (off-peak) runway charge to commercial 'priceý under AAR: 
PW1 (I-elU) cw, 
Pu I (1-eW, ) (1-, ý)CU 
(M5) peak (off-peak) runway charge to commercial 'price' under 
unregulated monopolistic setting: 
PWI 
= 
(1-elU) 
CW, 
Pu (I- I) Cu 
eW, 
(R5) peak (off-peak) runway charge to commercial 'price' under Ramsey 
rule: 
PWI 
_ 
(I-e'U) 
CW, 
Pu a) CU 
eW, 
The result is surnmarised in Table 4-6-(5). 
Table 4-6-(1) Price ratio comparison: peak passenger charge to off-peak passenger 
charge 
PPP' comparison among 
(1), (Ml) and (Rl) 
(RI) < (MI) < (1) 
Table 4-6-(2) Price ratio comparison: peak passenger charge to peak runway charge 
PPI (M2) and (R2) arison amon (2) com Pw, g , p 
(2) < (M2) < (R2) 
Table 4-6-(3) Price ratio comparison: peak runway charge to off-peak runway charge 
(M3) and (R3) (3) arison amon g , p 
(R3) < (AB) = (3) 
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Table 4-6-(4) Price ratio comparison: peak passenger charge to commercial 'price' 
PPI 
PU comparison among (4), (M4) and (R4) 
if CP1 >T (R4) < (M4) < (4) 
if cp, :ýT inconclusive: (4) < (R4) < (M4) or 
(R4) < (4) < (M4) 
Table 4-6-(5) Price ratio comparison: peak runway charge to commercial 'price' 
pwi c arison amon (M5) and (R5) om (5) g p , 
(R5) < (M5) < (5) 
Regarding the result of (1), Table 4-6-(1) shows that the price ratio of peak passenger 
charge to off-peak passenger charge is higher than the ratio which would be realised 
under an unregulated monopolist. 
As to the ratio between runway charge and passenger charge, it is clear from the result 
shown in Table 4-6-(2) that runway charge would be set inefficiently higher than 
passenger charge by more than the degree that would be achieved under an 
unregulated monopolistic situation. 
There is a suggestion made by MMC that is very directly linked to this context. In the 
case of Manchester Airport, MMC concluded in their first report MMC I that the use 
of the Tariff Basket Approach was preferable to using the AAR (although MMC called 
it 'Revenue Yield Approach', at the time of the investigation it had already 
been 
established that the 'Revenue Yield Approach' imposed on the 'designated' 
UK 
airports was meant to be in the form of AAR) because MMC was concerned with the 
potential incentive for Manchester to try to inflate the demand placed on the terminal 
capacity under AAR. MMC said that 'just as rate of return control may provide an 
artificial incentive to maximise the rate base, so the revenue yield approach may 
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provide an artificial incentive for a regulated airport to increase passenger numbers 
without due regard to cost'. At the time of this investigation, Manchester's terminal 
capacity was rather tight but the runway capacity had surplus, in contrast to BAA's 
London airports. MMC was therefore concerned that AAR constraint would give 
Manchester an incentive to inflate the demand for airport terminal capacity which is 
directly related to passenger charge. MMC was concerned that 'in some circumstances 
the airport might seek this otherwise unprofitable traffic because the associated losses 
can be more than compensated by increases in other airport charges'. This can be 
looked upon as another way of predicting the outcome of the price ratio (2) shown in 
Table 4-6-(2). However, CAA did not take into account this conclusion. As to the 
BAA's case, the recommendation regarding the constraint type was made by NERA in 
a report commissioned by the Department of Transport. NERA's report didn't discuss 
the possible drawback with the Average Revenue constraint which MMCI was 
concerned with. What may seem even more outlandish is that NERA's suggestion 
against the Tariff Basket Approach was based on the notion that the price structure 
under a Tariff Basket price cap constraint would give an incentive to a 
profit-maximising airport to concentrate price increases where the demand was 
increasing most strongly. NERA's concern was that the runway capacity (which is 
related to 'runway charge') was limited at BAA's 3 London airports, i. e., the 
apprehension that BAA would have a potential incentive to increase passenger charges 
relative to Peak landing charges. However, apart from the capacity limit, this particular 
notion of the predicted outcome under a Tariff Basket Approach is rather more of an 
efficiency oriented outcome, and close to the Ramsey outcome. Yet, NERA 
recommended that the price cap constraint on BAA should be a Tariff Basket 
Approach, mainly because of the simplicity of calculation. 
Regarding the result of (3), i. e., the ratio between peak runway charge and off-peak 
runway charge, (shown in Table 4-6-(3)) the ratio realised under AAR is exactly the 
same as the ratio which would be realised under an unregulated monopolistic situation. 
However, the actual runway charge itself, regardless whether at peak or off-peak, is 
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always higher than the monopolistic level as I have explained before. 
As for the price ratios between airport charge and unregulated commercial 'price', the 
one between passenger charge and commercial 'price' is very different from the one 
between runway charge and commercial 'price'. Regarding the former ratio, it always 
holds that the ratio under AAR is lower than the ratio under a monopolistic situation as 
shown in Table 4-6-(4). As to the comparison between the ratio under AAR and the 
ratio under Ramsey setting, it is inconclusive. In the two cases shown in Table 4-6-(4), 
i. e., as to the relationship between cpl and T, the likely relationship is cpl !ýT, 
which I have already presumed, and in this case the price ratio of passenger charge to 
commercial 'price' under AAR is either higher or lower than with Ramsey rule setting. 
Regarding the latter ratio, i. e., the ratio of landing charge to commercial 'price', the 
result shown in Table 4-6-(5) means that the ratio under AAR is always higher than 
the degree of the equivalent ratio which an unregulated monopolist would set. 
4-5. Rebalancing predictions of BAA's airport charges 
The purpose of this section is to try to predict the effect of changes of constraints on 
relative prices in the case of BAA (and of course the then nationalised British Airports 
Authority). Because the purpose of this section is to examine the effect of changes of 
constraints,, I analyse the predicted outcomes under the different constraints which the 
then nationalised British Airports Authority had faced and BAA is now facing. As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, one suspects that the British Airports Authority had tried to 
maximise its output, the main financial constraint being the financial target. During the 
period between 1983/84 and 1986/87 which is just before privatisation, a formula to 
set each year's financial target was established so that the financial target was directly 
linked to the growth rate in passenger numbers. As described in Chapter 3, the 
financial target constraint applied to the year Ps activities was expected to be: 
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TRt - TO > Ot - It (4-29) 
where superscript t denotes the year t, and Ot is the financial target for the year t and It 
is the investment during the year t. (4-29) is the constraint relevant to the period before 
1983/84. However, during the period between 1983/84 and 1986/87, the financial 
target's form was changed so that the financial target itself became the function of the 
passenger numbers, as the result of the incorporation of the passenger numbers growth 
rate into the financial target. This constraint can be expressed in a simple form as: 
ot_l +t -qpl- 
I 
TRt - TO > _L x 
qp 
I 
1, (4-30) t- 5 qp 
The following five types of constraints are considered in this section (and also in 
Appendix (1) and Appendix (2)): 
(M): Unconstrained monopolist's pricing 
(R): Ramsey pricing rule 
(Q): Output maximisation 
(QG): Output maximisation with passenger growth 
(AAR): Airport Average Revenue constraint 
The first two settings are for benchmarks. The constraints that the then nationalised 
British Airports Authority had been subject to and BAA is now subject to have been 
changed in the order of (Q), (QG) and (AAR). I have also carried out the price ratio 
calculations based on an assumed alternative objective of the British Airports 
Authority, i. e., that of maximising its revenue. Although I have made a model for the 
British Airports Authority's management maximising its output as its objective in 
Chapter 3, nothing is certain concerning the objectives of nationalised industries. It is 
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still a grey area. The most likely alternative to output maximisation of this organisation 
as the objective under the nationalisation era was probably revenue maximisation. In 
Appendix (4), 1 show the results of the price ratios using the combination of this 
objective and the corresponding constraints, instead of (Q) and (QG) categories above. 
Each combination of the objective and the constraint in a simplified form under each 
category (R), (M), (Q), (QG) and (AAR) can be expressed as the following (See 
A" 
Appendix (3) for the full Lagrangean form under each category): 
(R): the firm maximises CS(P)+rl 
rl 
where CS(P) denotes consumers' surplus, rl is the profit of the firm, and 
z is a constant number (required minimum profit or zero). 
CST) = cs(ppi, p wip U) 
0 ppi Zif 
ppi 
qpi(ppi)dppi 
f 
Pi P, 
ppi 
0 pwi 
Ei fpwi 
q Wi (p Wi) dp Wi 
pu 
q Wi(p Wi)dppi +f 
pp 
ou 
q U(p U)dp U 
(4-31) 
IFI Ei ppiqpi(ppi) + 
YJ 
1. 
p Wiq Wi (p Wi) +p Uq U(p U) 
-E. cpjqpj(ppj)-j] cWiqWi(pWi)-cUqU(pU)-F 
(4-32) 
rl here means the profit from 'operational activities' as explained in 
section 4-3. 
(M): the firm maximises 1-1 (same as (4-32)) without any constraint. 
(Q): the firm maximises total output q 
s. t. TR - TC >0-I 
qpi(ppi) +q Wi(p Wi) +q U(p U) 
The period which is relevant to each p and q, and the 
financial target 0 
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and I in the constraint TR - TC >0-I is the same period, i. e., this 
constraint is the same as (4-29) which means: 
Ei 
ppiqpi(ppi) + 
Ili 
p Wiq Wi (p Wj) +p Uq U(p U) 
- 
Ei 
cpiqpi(ppi) -Ei cWiqWi(pWi) - cUqU(pU) -F>0 -1 
(QG): the firm maximises total output q 
S. t. TRt - TC > 01-1 + -L x 
q"-q'i' it 
1- 5 qP1 
where q is the same as (4-33) and the constraint is the same as (4-30) 
which means: 
Ei 
ppiqpi(ppi) + 
Ei 
p Wiq Wi(p Wi) +p Uq U(p U) 
-Li cpiqpi(ppi) - 
Zi 
cWiqWi(pWi) 
(ql, +ql )-(qt-ý+q1-1 
-cUqU(pU) -F> 01-, It + 
L' xp 
P2 Pl P2 
) 
5 qi-I+ql-' Pl P2 
(AAR): the firm maximises ri 
p, iq, i(p, i)+E piqi(pj) 
s. t. <p 
q, j(p, j) 
(4-36) 
where IFI is the same as (4-32). The constraint (4-36) is the same as 
(4-17). 
In order to show the calculation results in a less complicated form, I use the following 
notations: 
ý, Q: Lagrange multiplier for the constraint applied to (Q) 
ý-QG: Lagrange multiplier for the constraint applied to (QG) 
A: Lagrange multiplier for the price constraint applied to (AAR) 
y: Lagrange multiplier for Ramsey rule constraint (same as before) 
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(same as before) I+p 
d= 1 XQ 
C)G 
(d> 1) 
(v> 1) 
ej: own price elasticity of service i in the absolute term (= -ý-q-, 
RL) 
ap, qi 
(same as before) 
A= qt-1 + qt-1 (this denotes the total passenger numbers in the PI P2 
previous year) 
1: capital input in period t 
Each passenger charge under (R), (M), (Q), (QG) and (AAR) can be expressed (after 
rearranging each first order condition of the constrained maximisation shown above) as 
the following: 
(R) ppi cpi - 
(4-37) 
epi 
M pp, cpi ' 
(4-38) (I- 
epi 
(Q) ppi cpi- 'd 
(4-39) 
epi 
(QG) 
CPi-V+ 
5A (4-40) F Pi 0-I) epi 
(AAR) ppi cp ' 
i-4F (4-41) 
epi 
)(I 
-/I) 
Each runway charge under (R), (M), (Q), (QG) and (AAR) can be expressed (after 
rearranging each first order condition of the constrained maximisation shown above) as 
the following: 
(R) p Wi cwi ' - eWi 
(4-42) 
(M) P Wi -cl cwi 1 eWi (4-43) 
(Q) P wi 61-wýil 
d 
ewi 
(4-44) 
107 
(QG) P wi cwi-v (4-45) (I- I) e Wi 
(AAR) pWi 0- " 
cwi (4-46) 
wi)(l-, ý) 
Each unregulated commercial 'price' under (R), (M), (Q), (QG) and (AAR) can be 
expressed (after rearranging each first order condition of the constrained maximisation 
shown above) as the following: 
(R) pU= 'u a (4-47) 
eu 
M PU = CU (4-48) 
elu 
(Q) PU= cu-d (4-49) 0- 
elu 
(QG) pU cu-v (4-50) (I- 
eU 
(AAR) pU cu (4-51) 0 
elu 
The results are shown below. I use the prices applied during peak period in the 
comparison case (2) where each price ratio is expressed as the ratio of passenger 
charge to runway charge, because of the focus of this section. (Each equation in (2) is 
interchangeable into off-peak version, when one changes the suffix (attached to each p) 
from I to 2. ) 
(1) Between regulated services both inside the constraint's denominator 
(RI) peak passenger charge to off-peak passenger charge under 
Ramsey rule: 
PP, O-ea CPI P2 -P2 a CP2 
epj 
(Ml): peak passenger charge to off-peak passenger charge under 
unconstrained monopolist's pricing 
PP, 0- CP, eP2 CP2 PP2 
ep, 
(Ql): peak passenger charge to off-peak passenger charge under output 
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maximisation 
-P, c?, -d PP2 CP2-d opi 
(QG1): peak passenger charge to off-peak passenger charge under 
output maximisation with passenger growth 
pp, (I-e, cpl-v+ I P2 5A 
PP2 I (I-ep, CP2-V+ 
5A 
(AARl): peak passenger charge to off-peak passenger charge under Airport Average Revenue constraint 
pp, 0- ý, C, 'P2 
) 
PP2 (I-epl, ) CP2-, ýPF 
(2) Between regulated services, one included in the constraint's denominator, 
the other not in the denominator 
(R2) peak (off-peak) passenger charge to peak (off-peak) runway charge 
under Ramsey rule: 
PPI 
a 
CP1 eW, 
PWI a CW, 
ep, 
(M2): peak (off-peak) passenger charge to peak (off-peak) runway 
charge under unconstrained monopolist's pricing 
I PP, 
- 
(I-eWwl 
C?, 
PWI (I- CW1 
ep, 
(Q2): peak (off-peak) passenger charge to peak (off-peak) runway 
charge under output maximisation 
PP, 
0- 
e w' c, -d W1 PWI I c,, I-d ep, 
(QG2): peak (off-peak) passenger charge to peak (off-peak) runway 
charge under output maximisation with passenger growth 
P, 
0- 
ew', CPI -V+ 
' 
5A 
PWI C. 
'I -V 
(I- 
ep, 
(AAR2): peak (off-peak) passenger charge to peak (off-peak) runway 
charge under Airport Average Revenue constraint 
, 
Ppl G- W, ) cp]-APF ewl 
, 
PWI (I- I) Cwl 
ep, 
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(3) Between regulated services both not included in the constraint's 
denominator 
(R3) peak runway charge to off-peak runway charge under Ramsey rule: 
a)c pw, 'W7 wl 
PW2 a) CW2 
ewl 
(M3): peak runway charge to off-peak runway charge under 
unconstrained monopolist's pricing 
I PWJ e4 CWI W2 
Piv2 1 CW2 
eW, 
(Q3): peak runway charge to off-peak runway charge under output 
maximisation 
PWI 
(I-eU12 
c,, -d -(I- ' c, -d eW, 
(QG3): peak runway charge to off-peak runway charge under output 
maximisation with passenger growth 
PWI 'FV2 CWI-V -I 
T;;; - I C, -V 
eW] 
(AAR3): peak runway charge to off-peak runway charge under Airport 
Average Revenue constraint 
PWI ePIV2 
) 
CWI 
PW2 
eW, 
) CW2 
(4) Between service regulated and included in the denominator and unregulated 
service 
(R4) peak (off-peak) passenger charge to commercial 'price' under 
Ramsey rule: 
ppi 
_ 
(I-eU) 
Cpj 
PU a) CU 
epi 
(M4): peak (off-peak) passenger charge to commercial 'price' under 
unconstrained monopolist's pricing 
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pl-I (1-elu) CPI 
Pu 0- 1) cu 
epi 
(Q4): peak (off-peak) passenger charge to commercial 'price' under 
output maximisation 
PPI 
_ 
(1-e'U) 
c, -d PU 0- ,) cu-d ep, 
(QG4): peak (off-peak) passenger charge to commercial 'price' under 
output maximisation with passenger growth 
PPI 
(I-e'U) CII_V+5A 
PU (I- I) CU-V 
ep, 
(AAR4): peak (off-peak) passenger charge to commercial 'price' under 
Airport Average Revenue constraint 
PPI Cpj-, 
ý 
PU (1-epl ) CU(I-A) 
(5) Between service regulated but not included in the denominator and 
unregulated service 
(R5) peak (off-peak) runway charge to commercial 'price' under Ramsey 
rule: 
PW 
a CW1 IeU 
PU a CU 
eWj 
(M5): peak (off-peak) runway charge to commercial 'price' under 
unconstrained monopolist's pricing 
PWI 
: 
(I-e'U) 
CWI 
PU (I-eWj ) CU 
(Q5): peak (off-peak) runway charge to commercial 'price' under output 
maximisation 
PWI eU cw, -d 
PU ý1; cu-d ewl 
(QG5): peak (off-peak) runway charge to commercial 'price' under output 
maximisation with passenger growth 
PWI 
(1-e'U) 
CWI-V 
PU (1-eWl ) CU -V 
(AAR5): peak (off-peak) runway charge to commercial 'price' under 
Airport Average Revenue constraint 
III 
pwi (1--F'U'-) cwl Pu Fiv ) cu(l-ý, ) ewl 
In the price ratio comparison case of (1), the relationship between (RI), (Ml) and 
(AARI) was already shown in Table 4-6-(1), and (Rl)<(Ml)<(AARl) was the result. 
Here the level of both (Ql) and (QGl) should be analysed in relation to the level of 
(AARI). It is clear that (Ml)<(Ql) always holds in terms of the price ratios, although 
each passenger charge under (Q 1) constraint is always lower than each passenger 
charge under an unconstrained monopolistic situation. However, one needs to consider 
the effect of -L in the case of the constraint (QG). It is worth noting that under (QG) 5A 
if the value of -L is higher than the value of v, each passenger charge is even higher 5A 
than the charge which an unconstrained monopolist would set (it is clear from the 
equations (4-38) and (4-40)). The value of I is related to the effect of the passenger 5A 
number growth rate incorporated in the constraint applied to (QG). Although my main 
interest lies in the price ratio, this particular case where the effect of I is 5A 
overpowering the effect of v produces an interesting finding. Each passenger charge 
under (Q), (QG) and (AAR) is lower than the unregulated monopolistic level except in 
this particular situation of (QGI). In this particular case, the price ratio under (QG) is 
always lower than the price ratio which would be realised under (M I), which means 
that both peak passenger charge and off-peak passenger charge are higher than the 
equivalent monopolistic level of charge, and also the ratio of peak passenger charge to 
off-peak passenger charge is lower than the unconstrained monopolistic price ratio. 
This scenario implies that the (QG) constraint would have worked as a pressure for the 
then British Airports Authority to relatively suppress peak passenger charge and 
I 
relatively escalate off-peak passenger charge. When the value -ýA- become larger, the 5A 
value v becomes smaller, which enhances the effect of --L on both the price ý-QG 5A 
ratio distortion and each price's increase. If this would be the case, the order of the 
price ratio level under each constraint would be (QGI)<(Ml)<(Ql)<(AARI), with 
either (Rl)<(QGI)<(MI) or (QGI)<(Rl)<(MI). 
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However, if one assumes that v> --L is the case, the relationship between the price 5A 
ratios under different constraint categories is inconclusive, depending on the scale of 
the Lagrangean multiplier that is relevant to each constraint. It is at least certain that all 
the price ratios under (Q), (QG) and (AAR) are higher than the ratio under (M). The 
relative scale of d, v-I and ýT should be considered. The results are summarise d 5A 
below: 
if d>v- 5A if d< v- 5A 
(Ql)>(QG1) (Ql)<-(QG1) 
if ý-7T >v- -L 5A 
if )ýPF <v- 
5A 
if ýPF >v- 
5A if 
ýTF <v- 
5A 
(AAR1)>(QG1) (AARl): ý(QGl) (AARI)>(QG1) (AARI)<-(QG1) 
(Ql)>(QG1) (Ql)>(QG1)>(AARl) (Ql)<(QG1)<(AARl) (W): ý-(QGl) 
(AAR1)>(QG1) (AARl): 5(QG1) 
What generally one can predict from this summary is that the stronger the constraint 
effect, the larger the price ratio in question tends to be, e. g., if the constraint (QG) is 
relatively more effective than that of (Q), the price ratio (QGI) tends to be higher than 
(Ql), and if the constraint (AAR) is relatively more effective than that of (QG), the 
price ratio (AARI) tends to be higher than (QGI). Therefore without the knowledge of 
the constraint's strength, the price ratio prediction cannot be made. As shown in the 
summary table above in the normal and likely case of v> -L, one cannot state how 5A 
the Price ratio might have been changed from (Q), (QG) to (AAR) because there exist 
all the possible orders of relative size in this case. However, as Table 2-1 suggests, in 
the past the constraint (Q) does not seem to have been effective and from this reason it 
is likely that d>v- -L was the case. The constraint (QG) seems to have 
been met 
5A 
throughout the period before privatisation since- 1983/84. This means that we can 
predict that firstly (QGI)<(Qt), implying that since 1983/84 the price ratio dropped 
during operation under the then nationalised British Airports Authority, and secondly, 
(QGI)<(AARI) following the privatisation of this organisation. The relationship 
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between (R I), (Q I) and (QG I) is inconclusive. 
In the case of the price ratio comparison (2), it always holds that (AAR2)<(M2)<(R2) 
as shown in Table 4-6-(2). It also always holds that (AAR2)<(M2)<(Q2) and 
(AAR2)<(QG2). As to the relationship between (Q2) and (QG2), here again one needs 
to consider both the effect of -L and the relative strength of d and v- -L. As in the 5A 5A 
comparison case of (1) if one assumes that d>v-1 was the case, and that the 5A 
constraint (QG) is relatively more effective than the constraint (Q), the result would be 
predicted as (AAR2)<(Q2)<(QG2). The relationship between (R2), (Q2) and (QG2) 
cannot be certain. 
In the case of the price ratio comparison (3), the relationship between (R3), (M3) and 
(AAR3) is that (R3)<(M3)==(AAR3) as shown in Table 4-6-(3). It should be noted 
again that the price level (not the price ratio level) realised under (AAR) is actually 
higher than under an unconstrained monopolist's price setting, although the price ratio 
level is the same as under an unconstrained monopolist's setting, as I have mentioned 
in the previous section in the form of (4-2 1)' and (4-22)'. The term (I - I) in the 
equation (4-46) is cancelled out when the price ratio form is expressed. p Wi under (R) 
constraint is always smaller than p Wi under an unconstrained monopolist's setting. The 
runway charges (for both peak and off-peak) under (Q) and (QG) are lower than the 
level of (AAR), and as to the price ratios, it always holds that (Q3)<(AAR3) and 
(QG3)<(AAR3). It is uncertain whether each runway charge under (R) constraint 
would be smaller than under the (Q) (and (QG)) constraint, and also whether the price 
ratio under (R) constraint would be smaller than under the (Q) (and (QG)) constraint. 
This is because that whilst the term 
(1-7k) 
is always smaller than the term 
(I- ep'P'2 )9 Ti 
-- -ý 
-4 --, ) (I-ew, 
the term in (Q3) c,,, -d (in (QG3)'s case cwl-v) is always smaller than --ý-w-' so that 
c, -d 
CW2-V CK 
the relationship between (R3) and (Q3) (and (QG3)) is inconclusive. In terms of the 
comparison between (Q3) and (QG3), if one assumes that d>v was the case, 
meaning that the constraint of (Q) was less effective than the constraint of (QG), 
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(Q3)<(QG3) is the relationship between the two price ratios. However, if d<v was 
the case, (QG3)<(Q3) holds. In the likely case where the constraint of (Q) was weak 
and the constraint (QG) was effective, the price ratios' degree order is such that 
(Q3)<(QG3)<(AAR3)=(M3). The difference between (QG3), (Q3) and (AAR3) 
depends on the tightness of the constraints during the nationalisation era. If the 
constraint under (QG) was weak, there might have been a sudden jump after 
privatisation, to the higher ratio under (AAR). However, if the (QG)'s constraint had 
been strong, the change of the price ratios from (QG3) to (AAR3) may have been 
marginal. 
In the comparison case (4), the relationship between (R4), (M4) and (AAR4) was 
shown in Table 4-6-(4). Under the likely assumption of cpl < T, it always holds that 
(AAR4)<(M4), although it is not clear whether (R4)<(AAR4) or (AAR4)<(R4). Under 
an additional assumption that cpi > cU, the relationship between (Q4) and (M4) is 
(M4)<(Q4), and it also holds that (M4)<(QG4). The commercial 'price' itself, 
however, is always lower under either (Q) or (QG) constraint than the price level under 
(M). If one assumes that the constraint of (Q) is less effective than that of (QG), as 
with the cases in the above other comparisons (1), (2) and (3), i. e., d>v, the 
relationship between (Q4) and (QG4) is concluded as (Q4)<(QG4). Thus, the price 
ratios relationship among (Q4), (QG4) and (AAR4) is predicted as 
(AA, R4)<(Q4)<(QG4). The relationship between (R4), (Q4) and (QG4) is inconclusive. 
As to the comparison category (5), i. e., the price ratio of runway charge to the 
unregulated commercial 'price', it is always the case that (R5)<(M5)<(AAR5) holds as 
in Table 4-6-(5). Regarding the relationship among Q5), (QG5) and (M5), 
(M5)<(Q5)<(QG5) is deduced under an additional assumption of cWj > cU as well as 
with the assumption that d>v. In the comparison between (QG5) and (AAR5), the 
relationship depends on the tightness of the constraint of (AAR): 
if 'u-' > 1: (AAR5)>(QG5) (1-, ý)Cu 
115 
if C, v <I and also if cW, - cU < 
ý'c`c', then (AAR5)<(QG5) (1-ý, )C, -v 
if Cu-v <I and also if cW, - cU > 'kwlcu, then (AAR5)ý: (QG5) (I-), )cu -v 
The first case of the three conditions above implies that the constraint of (AAR) is at 
its tightest level. Where the constraint is not as strong as the first case, the relationship 
between (AAR5) and (QG5) rather depends on the difference between c W, and cU 
and is inconclusive. Therefore where c W, >cU, the relationship can be either 
(Q5)<(QG5)<(AAR5) or (Q5)<(AAR5)<(QG5) or (AAR5)<(Q5)<(QG5). The last 
case is rather unlikely considering that the effect of constraint (Q) should be assumed 
to be weak in relation to the effect of constraint (AAR). If one assumes that the 
difference between cWl and cU is quite large, it seems that one can predict that the 
relationship is (Q5)<(QG5)<(AAR5). The relationship between (R5), (Q5) and (QG5) 
is inconclusive. 
As to the commercial 'price', there is a notion that the importance attached to the 
revenue produced from the unregulated commercial services has been increasing in the 
case of BAA's airports and that the relative standard of airport charge has been 
reduced partly because of the 'designated' airport charge regulation. (for example, 
Condie (2000)). The outcome of (AAR4) compared to (R4), (Q4) and (QG4) shows 
that the price ratio of R'--' was predicted to be lower under (AAR4) than the ratio PU 
which might be realised under any other constraints. However, as to the outcome of 
(AAR5), i. e., the price ratio of runway charge to commercial 'price', the relative ratio 
under (AAR) was predicted to be the highest of all the outcomes under the constraints 
I considered. This is because of the effect of the peculiar (AAR) constraint in which 
runway charge related output is not included as its denominator. 
If one wants to firid out if and how BAA attempts to increase its revenue from their 
unregulated services, one must not just look at the airport charge price regulation, we 
should also look at the way this unusual 'single-till' policy works. Many economists 
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would say that the 'single-till' is the problem and why should there be a price cap on 
airport charges? The incentive for the airport to increase their commercial revenue 
might be closely linked to the cost side of the commercial-side. So there is a very 
interesting issue here which is to do with how the 'single-till' approach combined with 
the way the regulator, i. e., the CAA sets the "X" in the price cap RPI-X might affect 
the airport operator's incentive to inflate the total cost. On the other hand, the pressure 
to increase their revenue from the unregulated commercial service might contribute to 
their internal cost efficiency. As 1 have mentioned in note 5 of this chapter, how BAA 
changed its management style of some unregulated services would also be another 
interesting issue for ftirther research. The point as to the effect of a 'single-till' 
approach will be revisited as one of the implications in the next chapter. 
So far I have analysed the effect of the price rebalancing in terms of BAA's airport 
charges and commercial 'price' caused by the change of constraint. The model did not 
include capacity constraint, which might limit the ability to predict the price structure 
changes. However, one of the purposes of this chapter is to focus on the effect due to 
the idiosyncrasy of 'Airport Average Revenue' constraint. 
These predictions can be applied for empirical analysis using price data. However, 
unlike the comparison between airport charges, the data regarding the unregulated 
commercial 'price' is difficult to obtain. There are possibilities of testing the 
predictions regarding the price ratio between airport charge and some unregulated 
commercial service's 'price', only where one has specified a particular area of 
commercial service with data availability. 
As a preparation to the next chapter's analysis, I sununarise in Table 4-7 the level 
change of each price ratio from the concluding predictions in this section. 
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Table 4-7 Summary of the predictions from section 4-5 
[meaning of the signs] 
+: higher than before 
-: lower than before 
(Q) (QG) (QG) ---* (AAR) 
(1) pp, peak passenger charge 
PF2 off peak passenger charge 
+ 
(2) Ppl (ofl) peak passenger charge 
p PR (ofo peak runway charge 
+ 
(3) peak runway charge 
off peak runway charge 
+ + 
(4) pp, (oft) peak passenger charge Tý' U commercial 'price' 
+ 
(5) pM - 
(off) peak runway charge + T u _ commercial 'price' 
+ 
In Table 4-7 the plus sign in the category (1) in the column (QG) )(AAR), for 
example, means that the level of the price ratio P--' is predicted to be higher under PP2 
(AAR) than under (QG). In (1) the price ratio level once dropped under (QG) and was 
raised again under (AAR). However, the levelof price ratio level under (AAR) is 
predicted as higher than under (Q). Similarly, in the cases of (2) and (4) the level of 
price ratio under (QG) is predicted to be higher than under (Q) and after constraint by 
(AAR) it is predicted to become lower than (QG). However, in both cases (2) and (4), 
the level of price ratio under (AAR) is predicted to be even lower than under (Q). 
Therefore, as a rough guide to the next chapter's empirical study, price ratio level 
change after privatisation can be summarised in Table 4-8. Here again, the plus sign 
means the level is higher after privatisation and the minus sign means the level is lower 
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after privatisation. 
Table 4-8 Summary of the predicted price ratio level change after privatisation 
-after priý after privatisation 
ppi peak passenger charge + Tlýý off peak passenger charg-e 
(2) pp, (off) peak passenger charge 
p pm (off) peak runway charge 
(3) P" 
p 1+2 
peak runway charge 
off peak runway charge 
+ 
(4) pp, (off) peak passenger charge Tu commercial 'price' 
5pW, (oM peak runway charge ( ) ffu commercial 'Price' 
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Appendix (1) Outcome of the interdependency 
demand model: peak versus off-peak 
In this Appendix I use demand interdependency between passenger service and 
crunway' output, and I focus on the differences between peak and off-peak airport 
charges. The comparisons in terms of relevant price ratios in this Appendix correspond 
to Table 4-6-(1), 4-6-(2) and 4-6-(3) in section 4-4. 
As I have explained before in the previous section in the context of 'elasticity of airport 
charge to the supply' of a flight, we can consider the airport charge as a part of the 
cost of operating a flight, and airport charge can be looked upon as a kind of 'two-part 
tariff. Therefore how the increase of passenger charge would affect an airline is 
different to how the increase of runway charge would influence it in its decision as to 
whether or not it should operate a flight and/or the decision as to what kind of aircraft 
and slot it should use. More realistically, one needs to take the interdependent 
relationship between passenger charge and runway charge into consideration. 
As I use interdependent demands, the demand functions set in this section are as 
follows: 
qp, = qp, (ppl) 
qp2 = qp2 (pp2) 
q W, =qW, ýp WI, qp, (ppj)ý 
qgý2 = qW2ýpTy2, qp2(pp2)y 
The specification of qU is so designed that the demand of the commercial service is a 
function of its own 'price', except in Appendix (2). This is only for simplicity, because 
it does not affect the results in the calculation as to peak and off-peak price ratios. As 
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the main interest in this section is in the comparisons which include only passenger 
charges and runway charges, the simplified specification of qU makes the analysis less 
complicated. 
In order to show the calculation results in a less complicated form, I use the following 
notations: 
, ýQ: Lagrange multiplier for the constraint applied to (Q) 
ý, QG: Lagrange multiplier for the constraint applied to (QG) 
ý,: Lagrange multiplier for the price constraint applied to (AAR) 
y: Lagrange multiplier for Ramsey rule constraint (same as before) 
a=P (same as before) 1+y 
1 
Q 
_1 QO 
1) 
(v> 1) 
ej: own price elasticity of service i in the absolute term 
aq' R'L) 
ap, qi 
(same as before) 
aq,,, pp, 
PPI 1: cross-el asti city of price PpI in relation 
to q WI, i. e., EI app, qw, 
(also expressed as the absoiute term) 
F-2: cross-e I asti city of price pp2 in relation to q U2, 
i. e., F- 
aq ý, 2 PP2 2ý -qw2 a P2 
(also expressed as the absolute term) 
B (Bi > 1) also (BWI > Bpf/2 because of the previous 
assumption eW, <e K) 
a 
Pi 
== I 
'i 
, 
(Pj > 
assumption eW, 
that 0<a< 
k, aqp, 
k2 aq, 2 
1) also Owl ý' PK2 because of the previous 
eK, and PWI < BWI, Pg? < Bqý2 from the 
fact 
A= qt-1 + qt-2 (this denotes the total passenger numbers 
in the 
PI p 
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previous year) 
capital input in period t 
use several assumptions as to some of the notations above: 
k, > 0: the increase of passenger numbers in peak period would not 
reduce the runway output 
k2 > 0: the increase of passenger numbers in off-peak period would not 
reduce the runway output 
k, < k2: the degree of the increase (decrease) of the runway output due 
to the increase (decrease) of the passenger numbers during the peak 
period will be smaller than the equivalent degree during the off-peak 
period. The reason for this is that the capacity required in the 
runways, aprons and taxiways, etc. is tighter during the peak period 
than during the off-peak period. In the BAA's London airports (whose 
change of outcomes under the effect of different constraints is the 
main interest in this section), this assumption seems to be justified 
because of the slot problems. 
": ý E2: whilst the peak hours' operations are more often related to 
scheduled flights (slots are rigid) or the flights that passengers are 
more likely to use for their business purposes, the flights that are 
operated during the off-peak hours are more likely to be charter flights 
or for leisure demand. Therefore, the degree of the reduction of the 
runway output caused by the increase of the passenger charge during 
off-peak hours is presumed to be larger than the degree of the 
reduction of the runway output affected by the increase of the peak 
passenger charge8. 
Each passenger charge under (R), (M), (Q), (QG) and (AAR) can be expressed (after 
rearranging each first order condition of the constrained maximisation shown above) as 
the following: 
(R) p 
(cpi-kipwicwi) (4-52) 
) ki 
pi 
I- 
epi )+(I-a 
7 
(M) ppi = 
(c, i-kiB 
I 
, icwi) (4-53) (1- 
epi 
) 
(Q) ppi = 
[c, i-kiBwicwi-d(I-kiBwi)] (4-54) 
epi 
wi)+ 
(QG) ppi = 
[cpi-kiBwicwi-v( 
I 
1-kiB 5A (4-55) 0 
epi 
) 
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(AAR) ppi = 
(c, i-kiBwi (I 
--eLpi-) 
(4-56) 
Each runway charge under (R), (M), (Q), (QG) and (AAR) is the same as in section 
4-5 (see the equations (4-42) to (4-46)). 
It is less straightforward to compare the price ratios than when the simple model was 
used as in the previous section. This is because of the complication caused by the 
cross-effect due to the interdependency demand model I introduced here. The results 
are shown below. I use the prices applied during peak period in the comparison case 
(2) where each price ratio is expressed as the ratio of passenger charge to runway 
charge, because of the focus of this section. (Each equation in (2) is interchangeable 
into off-peak version, when one changes the suffix (attached to each p) from I to 2. ) 
(1) Between regulated services both inside the constraint's denominator 
(R1) peak passenger charge to off-peak passenger charge under 
Ramsey rule: 
a )+! -'(I-a)ý [cpj-kjflwjcw, ] PPI ep2 E2 
PP2 
a )+! -'(I-a)ý 
[CP2-k2pW2CW2] 
epi &I 
(Ml): peak passenger charge to off-peak passenger charge under 
unconstrained monopolist's pricing 
PpI 
_ 
(I-eP2 
W1 Cw] 
TP2 I 
-k2Bw2cw2] 
(I-ep, [CP2 
(Q1): peak passenger charge to off-peak passenger charge under output 
maximisation 
P,, 
(I- 
e' ) [c,, -d-k, Bwl(cw, -d)] P2 
PP2 (I-eýpj ) [CP2-d-k2Bw2(cpv2-d)] 
(QG1): peak passenger charge to off-peak passenger charge under 
output maximisation with passenger growth 
P" (I- ý' ) [c,, -v-k, Bwi 
(C 
Wl -Vý 
+ 
5A 'P2 
TP2 
0- 1) [c, -v-k2B, (cw2-v)+ epl 5A 
(AARl): peak passenger charge to off-peak passenger charge under 
Airport Average Revenue constraint 
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(I- I) pp, eP2 
PP2 I) 
ep, 
. cpj-k, B,,, cw, -, ýý)' 
[CP2-k, B, c, -AjT] 
(2) Between regulated services, one included in the constraint's denominator, 
the other not in the denominator 
(R2) peak (off-peak) passenger charge to peak (off-peak) runway charge 
under Ramsey rule: 
PP, CPI (1--Fw-') - klBWI (where ba a)! -w) PWI CW1 (1_ a) (I-ep', )[ ewl qp, 
(M2): peak (off-peak) passenger charge to peak (off-peak) runway 
charge under unconstrained monopolist's pricing 
pp, c" 
- kBWI Pwi Cwl 
(Q2): peak (off-peak) passenger charge to peak (off-peak) runway 
charge under output maximisation 
P,, e W' [cpi-d-k, B,,, (c,,, -d)] W1 PWI (I-epl [c,,, -dl 
(QG2): peak (off-peak) passenger charge to peak (off-peak) runway 
charge under output maximisation with passenger growth 
P" 
(I 
-e 5W'; l [c, -v-k-, B,,, (c , -v) + ý, ] 5A- PWI (1- 
epl 
[C. 
1 -V] 
(AAR2): peak (off-peak) passenger charge to peak (off-peak) runway 
charge under Airport Average Revenue constraint 
I- I)- PPI ewl cll - kBWI - 'ýP PWI I)I CW] CW] epi 
(3) Between regulated services both not included in the constraint's 
denominator 
(R3) peak runway charge to off-peak runway charge under Ramsey rule: 
PWI CWI W2 
pa CPV2 
eWl 
(M3): peak runway charge to off-peak runway charge under 
unconstrained monopoiist's pricing 
P11 
- 
('-eJf-2 
CIIII 
Pw2 (I- I CW2 
eWl 
(Q3): peak runway charge to off-peak runway charge under output 
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maximisation 
P Wl 
(I 
- eý'2 cwj-d PW2 0-Ic,, 
2-d ew, 
(QG3): peak runway charge to off-peak runway charge under output 
maximisation with passenger growth 
PWI eý-, CW, -V 
PW2 1 CW2-V 
eWl 
(AAR3): peak runway charge to off-peak runway charge under Airport 
Average Revenue constraint 
Pwl eW2- CW, 
P JV2 1 CW2 
eW, 
Apart from comparison (3), it is unfortunate that the price ratio results under the 
Ramsey solution cannot be used as useful references to compare the results of (Q), 
(QG) and (AAR). In both (1) and (2), the ratios under Ramsey rule are not clear-cut. 
Although it is obvious by definition that each price under Ramsey rule is smaller than 
the equivalent price under the unconstrained monopolist's setting, the relationship 
between (RI) and (MI) and the relationship between (R2) and (M2) cannot be clearly 
generalised because of the cross-effect due to the interdependency demand model. In 
the case of (1), because of the inclusions of both ki and P_i, one cannot judge the 
degree of P-` The first fraction depends on both the degree of the passenger PP2 * 
demand's elasticity and the degree of average passenger numbers per runway output, 
between peak and off-peak period (-L = -1-' where I denotes 
! 
-` which is the Ei e, ,i qpi 
inverse of the average passenger numbers per runway output). Though the first half of 
the right hand term of (RI) is always smaller than the value (I-ep, ) of 
(M I), the 
second half fraction of (RI) is either bigger or smaller than that of (MI), due to the 
complex relationship between ki and P Wi and also between ki and B Wi. In the case of 
(2), the first half fraction of (R2) is always smaller than the first half fraction of (M2). 
However, the value inside the second large bracket of (R2) is larger than that of (M2). 
therefore the result is not conclusive regarding the price ratios' values. Such being the 
case,, I use (M), (Q), (QG) and (AAR) to compare the price ratios of (1), (2) and (3). 
In the price ratio comparison case of (1), in order to carry out the comparison among 
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(M 1), (Q 1), (QG 1) and (AAR 1), one needs to look into several key factors in relation 
to the cross-effect, due to the interdependency in the demands. The summary of the 
cases clustered by each factor are shown in Table 4-9. In order to make the expression 
simpler let us call cpi - kjB Wic Wi 'real' marginal cost of cpi, which means this is the 
marginal cost of passenger service in period i including the cross-effect caused by the 
interdependent runway demand. I use the notation "cpi to denote epi - kjB Wic Wi. 
Table 4-9 comparison among (Ml), (Q1), (QG1) and (AAR1) 
(a): (a)-1: if (a)-1-1 -I Is effect 5A (Ql)>(Ml)>(AAR1)>(QG1) 
kiBWicWi+v(l - kjBWj) <I 5A 
f 
ýpj 
> 
j-kjBfyj 
'= 1-kB C 
cpj-d(1-k, Bwj) 
> ýp-d(l-k2Bv-) 
(a)-1-2 -L's effect 5A not possible situation P2 II'2 
(Ql)>(QG1) kiBwicwi+v(l - kiBwi) >I 5A 
(Ql)>(Ml) (a)-2: if 
(a)-2-1 I Is effect 5A 
not possible situation 
kiBwicwi+v(l - kiBWi) <I 5A 
? p, -d(1-kjBjyj) (a)-2-2 -L's effect 5A (AAR1)ý! (QG1)>(Q1)>(M1) 
(QG1)->(Ql) kiBwicwi+v(l - kjBwj) >1 5A 
(b): (b)-1: if (b)-1-1 -L's effect 
when -L' > 
Cwl+d(]+Bw, ) 
k, Cw-, +d(1+Bw, ) 
5A 
(Ml)>(Ql)>(AAR1)>(QG1) 
if CP, < 
- 1-kB '& 
cp, -d(I-k, Bki,, ) >1 ? p2-d(1-k2B,,, 2) kiBWicWi+v(l - kiBWi) < 
when _L, < 
Cwj+dQ+Bn,, ) 
k, Cjr+d(I+BII'2) 
w, P2 5A 
(Ql)>(QG1) (Ml)>(AAR1)>(Ql)>(QG1) 
(b)-1-2 -L's effect (Ml)-<(Ql) 5A not possible situation 
kiBwicwi+v(l - kjBwj) >I 5A 
(b)-2: if 
(b)-2-1 -ýA-'s effect 5A (Ml)>(AAR1)>(QG1)>(Ql) 
kiE3wicwi+v(l - kiE3wi) <1 5A 
-&pj-d(1-kiB, y0 7 < (b)-2-2 -L's effect . ap2 d(1-kBjv2) 5A (AAR1): ý(QG1)>(M1)>(Q1) 
(QG1)>-(Ql) kiBwicwi+v(l - kjBWi) >I 5A 
Because the numerator of ppi's expression under (M) must be positive (and also 
cpi <c Wi as per our assumption), it must be that kjB Wi <I holds. As d>1, the 
numerator of the right-hand side of (4-54) is always smaller than that of the numerator 
on the right-hand side of (4-53), which means that passenger charge under (Q) is 
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always lower than under (M) in both peak and off-peak cases. As ýT > 0, it always 
holds that ppi -under (AAR) is lower than that under (M). However, under (QG) each 
passenger charge is even higher than the charge which an unconstrained monopolist 
would set in the case where the effect of the passenger numbers growth rate 
incorporated in the constraint applied to (QG), i. e., the value of I, is higher than the 5A 
value v(1 -kB Wj). This particular case where the effect of -L is overpowering the i 5A 
effect of v(l - kjB Wj) was already mentioned in section 4-5 where I explained that the 
case where v<I holds produces an unusual outcome. Each passenger charge under 5A 
(Q 1), (QG 1) and (AAR 1) is lower than the unregulated monopolistic level except in 
this particular situation of (QGI). In this particular situation, the price ratio under 
(QGl) is always lower than the price ratio which would be realised under (M I), which 
means that both peak passenger charge and off-peak passenger charge are higher than 
the equivalent monopolistic level of charge, and also the ratio of peak passenger charge 
to off-peak passenger charge being lower than the unconstrained monopolistic price 
ratio implies that the (QG) constraint would have worked as a pressure for the then 
British Airports Authority to relatively suppress peak passenger charge and relatively 
escalate off-peak passenger charge. When the value -L becomes larger, the value 5A 
v becomes smaller, which enhances the effect of -L on both the price ratio ý, QG 5A 
distortion and each price's increase. 
In the case where condition (a)-2 or (b)-2 is held, the significance of the cross-effect is 
so large that the 'real' marginal cost of peak passenger service with the constraint's 
effect, i. e., 'cpl - d(I - k, BWI) is smaller than the 'real' marginal cost of off-peak 
passenger service plus the constraint's effect ^c-p2 - d(l - k2B W2). In this situation, it 
is possible that the actual price ratio of peak passenger charge to off-peak passenger 
charge would become less than 1. This situation seems unlikely. Therefore, after 
eliminating all possible situations under the category of (a)-2 or (b)-2, the 
likely 
scenarios one can deduce in terms of the price ratio order among (Q1), 
(QGI) and 
(AARl) may have been either (Ql)>(AAR1)>(QGI) or (AARI)>(Ql)>(QGI). 
In both 
cases throughout the operation of the then nationalised British 
Airports Authority the 
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price ratio seems to have been continuously raised since 1983/84 and after privatisation 
it is assumed to have risen again, yet the price ratio level is now lower than that under 
an unconstrained monopolistic price setting. This means that we can predict that firstly 
(Ql)>(QGI), implying that since 1983/84 the price ratio dropped during operation 
under the then nationalised British Airports Authority, and secondly, (AARI)>(QGI) 
following the privatisation of this organisation. 
However, if one uses a simple model where all demands are independent (as in section 
4-5) (in this case the notations kig 6i5 Bp Pi, and cWj should be dropped from the 
summary (1) above), the result is as follows: 
if (a) v> -L, (Rl)<(Ml), (Ml)<(Ql), (Ml)<(QG1), (Ml)<(AARl) and 5A 
if d>v- 5A if d<v- -L 5A 
(Ql)>(QG1) (Ql)<(QG1) 
if APF >v- SA if v- 5A if ýPF >v- -L 5A if v- 5A 
(AAR1)>(QG1) (AAR1)<(QG1) (AAR1)>(QG1) (AAR1)<(QG1) 
(Ql)>(QG1) (Ql)>(QG1)>(AARI) (Ql)<(QGI)<(AARl) (Ql): ý(QG1) 
(AAR1)>(QG1) (AAR1)<(QG1) 
if (b) v< -L, (Rl)<(Ml), (Ml)<(Ql), (Ml)-:?: (QG1), (Ml)<(AARI) and, 5A 
(Ql)>(QG1) and (AAR1)>(QG1) 
Thus clearly when interdependent demand specification is introduced, the rather 
abnon-nal case of (b) above where -L is so effective that both passenger charges are 5A 
higher than the unconstrained monopolist's setting seems to be realistic. It is because 
one cannot identify the size of k-i and Bi. What generally one can predict if the simple 
model is used is that the stronger the constraint effect, the larger the price ratio in 
question tends to be, e. g., if the constraint (QG) is relatively more effective than that of 
(Q), the price ratio (QGI) tends to be higher than (QI), and if the constraint (AAR) is 
relatively more effective than that of (QG), the price ratio (AARl) tends to be higher 
than (QGI). Therefore without the knowledge of the constraint's strength, the price 
ratio prediction cannot be made. As shown in the summary table above in the normal 
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case (v > -L), one cannot state how the price ratio might have been changed from 5A 
(Q), (QG) to (AAR) because in this case there exists all the possible orders. 
In the case of the price ratio comparison (2), it always holds that (AAR2)<(M2). It also 
always holds that (AAR2)<(QG2). However, the relationships between (a) (Q2) and 
(M2), (b) (QG2) and (M2), (c) (Q2) and (QG2) and (d) (Q2) and (AAR2) depend on 
many conditions as follows. 
(a)-l if c P' <IkB WI: (Q2)<(M2) CW1 I 
(a)-2 if cP, > klBWI: (Q2)>-(M2) Cwl - 
(b)-1 if the value of -L, is higher than the value v(I - klBwi): 5A 
(QG2)>(M2) 
(b)-2 if cPl <I-k, BW, (QG2)<(M2) Cwl 5vA 
(b)-3 if cp' >I- klBWI - (QG2)>(M2) Cwl - vA 
(c)-l if cpi-d(l-k, Bw, ) <I-k, BWI + (QG2)<(Q2) cw, -d 5(d-v)A' 
-1 
(c)-2 if - 
cpi-d, (I-kB,,, ) >- I-k, BWI + (QG2)>(Q2) cwl -d 5 (d-v)A 
(d)-l if ý, )5- > d(I - k, BWI): (Q2)>(AAR2) 
(d)-2 if ýT < d(l -kIB Wj): (Q2)<(AAR2) 
Unlike the comparison (1), the use of the simple model (as in section 4-5) without any 
interdependency demands would not make the analysis less complicated. In order to 
make the analysis less complicated, I put aside the comparisons (a) and (b) above, and 
focus on the relationships (c) and (d) above. Regarding the relationship between (Q2) 
and (QG2) the condition depends on the strength of the constraint attached to (QG). 
When the constraint is strong the value v is smaller and at the same time the value 5A 
is larger than when the constraint is weak, which means that the stronger the constraint 
of (QG) is, the more likely that (QG2)<(Q2). In terms of the relationship between (Q2) 
and (AAR2), when the constraint of (A-AR) becomes stronger, i. e., p- is raised, then. ý 
also becomes larger, where ), )T becomes large enough to make the condition (d)-1 
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hold, it is likely that (Q2)>(AAR2). The then nationalised British Airports Authority 
always achieved its financial targets during the period between 1983/84 and 1986/87 
where the financial target was set linked to the passenger numbers growth rate. Thus 
one can assume that (QG)'s constraint was tight, and presumably it can be justified to 
consider that (Q2)>(QG2) was the case. Therefore the relationship between (Q2), 
(QG2) and (AAR2) might have been in the order of (Q2)>(QG2)>(AAR2), which 
means that the price ratio of passenger charge to runway charge has been continuously 
lowered. 
The comparison of price ratios in the category (3) is not affected by the introduction of 
demand interdependency. The result is exactly the same as in section 4-5. 
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Appendix (2) Outcome of the interdependency 
demand model: airport charges versus unregulated 
commercial 'price' 
This section's purpose is to try to predict how the changes in the constraints might 
have affected the price ratios between airport charges and the unregulated commercial 
6price', in both the then nationalised British Airports Authority and privatised current 
BAA. In this section, not only do I use demand interdependency between passenger 
service and 'runway' output (as in the previous section), but I also introduce the 
demand function of unregulated conu-nercial output which is dependent on passenger 
numbers, as well as on its own unregulated output's 'price'. This is as I have 
explained in section 4-4, i. e., the payment method for commercial services is closely 
related to the passenger numbers. This fact is also linked to the explanation regarding 
the input selection of revenue used in the empirical analysis of productive efficiency 
given in Chapter 6 (where I assume that a part of the input to produce the total 
revenue from the 'operational activity' is, in effect, the passenger numbers at an 
airport). I focus on the comparison of the price ratio between passenger charge and 
commercial 'price' and the price ratio between runway charge and commercial 'price', 
under different constraints which are used in section 4-5, i. e., the following constraints: 
(M): Unconstrained monopolist's pricing 
(R): Ramsey pricing rule 
(Q): Output maximisation 
(QG): Output maximisation with passenger growth 
(AAR): Airport Average Revenue constraint 
The price ratio between passenger charge and commercial 'price' and the price ratio 
between runway charge and commercial 'price' correspond to Table 
4-6-(4) and 
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4-6-(5) shown in section 4-4 respectively. 
The demand functions set in this section considering the interdependency are as 
follows: 
qpl qpl (ppl) 
qp2 qp2(pp2) 
q W, =qW, ýp WI, qpl (ppj)ý 
qff, 2 = qff2ýpg, 2, qp2(pp2)ý 
qU = qUýpU 
, 
qpl (ppl), qp2 (pp2)ý 
In order to show the calculation results in a less complicated form, I add the following 
notations as well as the notations used in previous section: 
F,, U: cross-e I asti city of price pp, in relation to qU, i. e., F'jU 
aqu pp, 
VP1 a qu 
(expressed as the absolute term) 
F-2U: cross-e I asti city of price pp2 in relation to qU, i. e., 
aquPP2 
E2U apP2 qu 
(expressed as the absolute term) 
S c9q u 
i3qp, 
s2 
aqu 
c9qP2 
Additional assumptions regarding the added notations in this Appendix are: 
I 
Bu U>I "U 
flu Ua> 
eU 
BU < Bpi, BU < BWi (from the assumption eU > epi and eU > eWj as 
in the section 4-4) 
si >0 (passenger numbers' increase alwaYs increases the volume of 
total commercial output) 
For convenience and because of the focus of this section I use peak passenger charge 
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to represent passenger charge in the comparison between passenger charge and 
unregulated conu-nercial 'price', and I also use peak runway charge for comparison 
purpose as a representative variable for runway charge. 
Each unregulated commercial 'price' under (R), (M), (Q), (QG) and (AAR) is the 
same as shown in the equations from (4-47) to (4-5 1) in the main chapter. 
Each passenger charge under (R), (M), (Q), (QG) and (AAR) (after rearranging each 
first order condition of the constrained maximisation problems) is different from the 
equivalent shown in section 4-5 (which are (4-37) - (4-41) because of the additional 
interdependency specification of qU. They are expressed as follows: 
(R): ppi 
(c, j-kipwicwi-sipucu)_ (4-57) k- 
ýp -a) 
( 
Fý 
'U 
epi F-, 
+ 
F-, 
'ý 
M ppi 
(c, j-kjB,, jcj-sjBucu) (4-58) 
epi 
(Q) ppi 
[c, i-kiB,, icwi-siBucu d(l-kiBwi-siBu)] (4-59) 0- 
epi 
) 
(QG) ppi 
[cpi-kiB,, ici-siBucu-v(l-kBwi-siBu)+-31, -] (4-60) 
epi 1 
(AAR) ppi 
(ci-kiB,, icwi-siBuc (4-61) 
epi 
Each runway charge under (R), (M), (Q), (QG) and (AAR) (after rearranging each 
first order condition of the constrained maximisation problems) is exactly the same as 
(4-42) - (4-46). 
The results are shown below. 
(4) Between service regulated and included in the denominator and unregulated 
service 
(R4) peak (off-peak) passenger charge to commercial 'price' under 
Ramsey rule: 
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ppl Au cpl k, P,,,, c SOO Pu cu CU 
el 
(M4): peak (off-peak) passenger charge to commercial 'price' under 
unconstrained monopolist's pricing 
PP, =ý CPj 
kjBwjcwj 
_ sjB PU 0- 1) CU CU Uý ,? PI 
(Q4): peak (off-peak) passenger charge to commercial 'price' under 
output maximisation 
pp, [cp, -d-k, Bw, (Cwi-d)-s, B, (c, -d)] eU PU (1- 
ep, 
ICU- 
A 
(QG4): peak (off-peak) passenger charge to commercial 'price' under 
output maximisation with passenger growth 
p, = 
(I-eu) [cp, -v-k, Bw, (cw, -v)-s, B I(CU-V)+ 5A PU 0-, 
ý, 
) [CU-V] 
PI 
(AAR4): peak (off-peak) passenger charge to commercial 'price' under 
Airport Average Revenue constraint 
PP, ý-ýýPj k, Bwtcwl - sIBU - 
ý'P 
PUCUCU (1-11)(1-epl CU 
(5) Between service regulated but not included in the denominator and 
unregulated service 
(R5) peak (off-peak) runway charge to commercial 'price' under Ramsey 
rule: 
(1_ ) 
CWJ PWI eu 
PU a) CU 
ewl 
(M5): peak (off-peak) runway charge to commercial 'price' under 
unconstrained monopolist's pricing 
Pwj 
. _(l-e]U) 
CWI 
PU 0- 
ewl 
) CU 
(Q5): peak (off-peak) runway charge to commercial 'price' under output 
maximisation 
P Wl -e-ýU- 
[C 
Wl 
Pu (I-eW, [CU-; 
L 
(QG5): peak (off-peak) runway charge to commercial 'price' under output 
maximisation with passenger growth 
Pwl 
PU 
ICU-; 
L 
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(AAR5): peak (off-peak) runway charge to commercial 'price' under 
Airport Average Revenue constraint 
PWI (I-e'U) cw, 
Pu (1-1ý)(I-eW'j ) CU 
Regarding comparison (4), the relationship between (R4) and (M4) is inconclusive. 
The value inside the large bracket of (R4) is larger than the value inside the large 
bracket of (M4) though the first fraction of (R4) is smaller than the first fraction of 
(M4). Thus (R4) is not useful for the purpose of a reference benchmark, and I use 
(M4) as a main benchmark to compare (Q4), (QG4) and (AAR4). 
In order to compare the price ratios for (4) among (M4), (Q4), (QG4) and (AAR4) in 
a less complicated way, and to avoid any confasion, I use an alternative set of price 
ratios in which the demand that is interdependent on passenger charge is only the 
commercial output demand. The above equation of each price ratio under (4) shows 
the results of the maximisation problems using the following demand specification as I 
have defined at the beginning of this section: 
" qpl = qpl (ppi) 
" qp2 = qp2(pp2) 
" qm qmýpwj, qpj(pp& 
0 qw2 qpr2ýpp2, qp2(pp2)ý 
0 qu quýpugpi(ppl), qp2(pp2)ý 
However, instead I use here the following simplified demand specification: 
o qpl 
o qp2 
o qpm 
o qR2 
qpl (ppi) 
qp2 (pp2) 
qm (pm) 
q R2 (p K) 
qu = quýpuqpj(ppj), qp2(pp2)ý 
Then the result of each price ratio under comparison category (4) can be expressed as 
follows: 
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Between service regulated and included in the denominator and 
unregulated service (simplified version) 
(R4)' peak (off-peak) passenger charge to commercial 'price' under Ramsey rule: 
PpI = 
(I- 
eau CPI-SIPUCU 
PU 0- 
pal )+(I -a) E;,,, u CU 
(W)': peak (off-peak) passenger charge to commercial C price' under 
unconstrained monopolist's pricing 
RE 
LI = 
cpj-slBucu 
PU CU (1-ep, ) 
(Q4)': peak (off-peak) passenger charge to commercial 'price' under 
output maximisation 
PPI -e-LU- [cpj-d-sjBu(cu-d)] 
PU (I-ep, [cu-d] I 
(QG4)': peak (off-peak) passenger charge to commercial 'price' under 
output maximisation with passenger growth 
Ppi [ep, -v-s, Bu(cu-v)+ '] eu 5A 
PU I [C 
U-Vj 
0- 
ep, 
) 
(AAR4)': peak (off-peak) passenger charge to commercial 'price' under 
Airport Average Revenue constraint 
PPI c, -s, B, c, -ý, T 
CU PU 
In order to make the comparisons less complex, I denote -cpl as expressing 
cpl -s1B Uc U. However, unlike in the case where we can deduce a relationship that 
I- kjB Wi <0 which is related to the cross-effect as to runway demand, one cannot 
assume if 1-s jB U<0 or not, because in order to deduce any definite size range of 
the term s jB U one would need an assumption as to the relationship between the size of 
cpl and cU. I avoid making any assumption regarding the relationship between the 
size of cpl and cU as the 'price' of the unregulated commercial output varies 
depending on the type of the output. 
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The relationships between (a) (Q4)' and (M4)', (b) (QG4)' and (M4)', (c) (Q4)' and 
(QG4)1, (d) (Q4)' and (AAR4)', (e) (AAR4)' and (M4)' and (f) (AAR4)' and (M4)' 
depend on each comparison's condition(s). The possible orders of the price ratios 
between (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f) above are as follows. 
(a)- I if 'P, >I-s BU: CU 
(Q4)'>(M4)' 
(a)-2 J if 'ýPl <I-sIBU: cu 
(Q4)'<(M4)' 
(b)- 1 c PI >IsIBU- CU 
(QG4)'>(M4)' 
5vA 
(b)-2 if 25PI <sBU cu -1 - 
(QG4)'<(M4)' 
5 vA 
(c)- 1 if Zpl-d(I-s, Bu) < 
cu-d 
I -s, BU+ (QG4)'>(Q4)' 5 (d-v)A 
(c)-2 if Zpl-d(l-s, Bu) > 
cu-d 
I -sIBU+ 
I (QG4)':: ý-(Q4)' 5 (d-v)A 
(d)-l -1 if d(I - sIBU) > ý. T and ý, cU- d>0: (AAR4)'>(Q4)' 
(d)-l -2 if d(I -sIB U) > ýpF and ýc U-d:! ý 0, and 
case (l): if 
Zpl-d(l-sBu) 
> llg-d(I-s, Bu) (AAR4)'<(Q4)' 
cu-d Xcu-d 
case (11): if 
zpl-d(I-s, Bu) < 
ýg-d(l-s, Bu) (AAR4)'>(Q4)' 
cu-d )xu-d 
(d)-2-1 if d(I - s, BU) < ),, pF and XcU -d>0, and 
case (1): if 
Zp, -d(I-SjBu) > 
ý, g-d(l-s, Bu) : (AAR4)'>(Q4)' 
cu-d ), cu-d 
case (11): if 
Zpl-d(I-sBu) < 
cu-d 
IIT-d(I-sBu) : (AAR4)': ý-(Q4)' 
Ilcu-d 
(d)-2-2 if d(l -sIB U) < ý, T and 11c U-d<0: 
(AAR4)<(Q4)' 
(e)-l-1 if v(l -s, BU) + -L > AT and AcU- v>0: 
(AAR4)'>(QG4)' 
5A 
(e)-l -2 if v(l -s IBU) + -L 5A > 
ý, pF and ýxU -v<0, and 
case v(l-s, 
Bu)+-L 5A (l): if 
ý, T-v(l-s, Bu)+ > 5A : (AAR4)'<(QG4)' 
cu_v 
ý, C U-v 
-v(l-sBu)+-3'A- 11): if 2ýpl 5A 
ýT-v(l-sB 1> < U)+ 51A : (AAR4) _(QG4)' case ( Cu-v ýCu-v 
(e)-2-1 if v(l - sIBU) +< AT and AcU -v>0, and 5A - 
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Zp, -v(l-s, Bu)+--ý- ý, T-v(l-sjBu)+ case (1): if Cu-v 
5A > 
ýCu-v 
5A (AAR4)'>(QG4)' 
Zpi-v(l-s, BU)+ 54L ý)T-v(l-s, Bu)+-5l case (11): if Cu-v k, -v 
AL (AAR4)':: ý-(QG4)' 
(e)-2-2 if v(l - sIBU) + -L < ý, pF and )LcU -v<0: (AAR4)':! ý-(QG4)' 5A 
(f)-l if ZPI > 11P (AAR4)'>(M4)' ý7u Cu 
(f)-2 if ZPI < )LP (AAR4)'<(M4)' ý -u - Cu 
In terms of (f), the case (f)-2 is an impossible situation as -cpl is larger than 'ýP7 , and 
it is proved that (AAR4)'>(M4)' always holds. However, the comparisons (a) and (b) 
involve the comparison between cpl and cU, therefore unless one can identify a 
particular unregulated commercial service, the relationships are inconclusive. The 
comparison (c) involves the degree of each constraint of (Q) and (QG). If the 
constraint of (QG) becomes tighter, as the distance between d and v becomes larger, 
one can justify that the case (c)-2 is more likely to be expected, which means that the 
price ratio under (QG4)' is lower than that under (Q4)'. The comparisons (e) and (f) 
are both inconclusive. as the tightness of the constraint of (AAR) can make (AAR4)' 
either smaller than (QG4)' (or (Q4)') or larger than (QG4)' (or (Q4)'). 
As to the comparison category (5), i. e., the price ratio of runway charge to the 
unregulated commercial 'price', it is clearly shown that the outcome is not affected by 
the introduction of demand interdependency. Thus the conclusion of the results in 
comparing the price ratios (5) is exactly the same as I have explained in the section 4-5 
of Chapter 4. 
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Appendix (3) Lagrangean forms with regard to (M), 
(QG) and (AAR) 
Below I show the related Lagrangean form for each category of constraint that I have 
used in Appendix (1). The forms are all relevant to the simple models I have used in 
section 4-4 and 4-5. However, in terms of the calculations in section 4-4 and 4-5, the 
demands are all independent. Therefore the only difference between the forms used in 
section 4-4 and 4-5 and the forms used in Appendix (1) is the specification of qWj. In 
section 4-4 and 4-5 q Wi is qwj(p Wj) rather than q Wj(p Wippi). 
(M): Unconstrained monopolist's pricing 
The firm maximises ri under no constraints: 
Fl = pp, qpl (ppl) + pp2qp2 (pp2) 
+pW, qW, (pW,, ppl) +pTf2qK(pTf2, pp2) +pUqU(pU) 
-cpl qpl (ppl) - cp2qp2 (pp2) 
-c W, q W, (p Wl, ppl) -c g2q g2 (p K, pp2) -c Uq U(p U) -F 
(R): Ramsey pricing rule 
The Lagrangean function f-(, ) to be optimised 
is as follows: 
00 PPI PP2 
(R) "::: - 
f 
ppp I 
qpl (ppl)dppl + 
fPP2 
qp2(pl>2)dpp2 
p 
+f 
pp, 
wi p 912 
wl 
q W, (p Wl, ppl)dp Wl +f 
ppw, 2 
qq2(pg2, pp2)dPp2 
F] 
q W, (p Wl, ppl)dpp, 
p Pl 
p, 
0 PP2 
q ff 2 (p U, ý2, p p2 ) dpE2 
PP2 
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0 PU 
+ 
fpu 
qU(pU)dpU 
+pplqpl(ppl) +pp2qp2(pp2) 
+p Wl q W, (p Wl, ppl) +p U/2q K2 (p W2, pp2) +p Uq U(p U) 
-ep, qpl (ppl) - cp2qp2 (pp2) 
-c W, q W, (p Wlppl) -c py2q U2 (p py2, pp2) -C Uq U(p U) -F 
+y[pp, qpl (ppl) + pp2qp2(pp2) 
+pW, qW, (pW,, ppl) +pU2qpp2(pU2, pp2) +pUqU(pU) 
-cpl qpl (ppl) - cp2qp2 (pp2) 
-c W, q W, (p Wl, ppl) -c pp2q U2 (p pp2, pp2) -C Uq U(p U) -F- 
(Q): Output maximisation 
The Lagrangean function X(Q) to be optimised is as follows: 
X (Q) = qp, (ppI )+ qP2 (PP2) 
+q W, (p Wl, ppl) +q U2 (p K, pp2) +q U(p U) 
+, ýQ[ppj qp, (ppl) + pp2qp2 (pp2) 
+pWjqWj(pWj, ppj) +pq2qU2(pff2, pp2) +pUqU(pU) 
-cpj qp, (ppl) - cp2qp2 (pp2) 
-c W1 q W1 (p Wl, ppl) -c U2 q U2 (p K, pp2) -c Uq U(p U) 
-F - 0(1) - 1] 
(QG): Output maximisation with passenger growth 
The Lagrangean functionf-(Q, ) to 
be optimised is as follows: 
X 
(QG) : -- qp, (pp, )+ qp2 (pp2) 
+q W, (p Wj, ppj) +q U2 (p U2, pp2) +q U(p U) 
+ý' QG [pp, qpj (ppl) + pp2 qp2 (pp2) 
140 
+p W, q W, (p Wl, ppl) +p pp2q p2 (p U2, pp2) +p Uq U(p U) 
-cpl qpl (ppl) - cp2qp2 (pp2) 
-c W, q W, (p W1, ppl) -c Kq p2 (p K, pp2) -c Uq U(p U) 
-F - Ot-I (I) -I 
I-- (qt-I + qt-l)ý] I , _, ýýqpj(ppj)+qp2(pp2) 5 (ql- +q, 2 j 
Pi P2 
Pi 
(AAR): Airport Average Revenue constraint 
The Lagrangean functionX(AAR) to be optimised is as foliows: 
x (AAR) =-- pp, qpl (ppl) + pp2qp2 (pp2) 
+p W, q W, (p Wl, ppl) +p 42q q2 (p K, pp2) +p Uq U(p U) 
-cpl qpl (ppl) - cp2qp2 (pp2) 
-c Wl q W, (p Wl, ppl) -c Kq ff2 (p U2, pp2) -c Uq U(p U) -F 
+, ý[Týqpj (ppl) + qp2 (pp2)ý 
-ppl qpl (ppl) - pp2qp2 (pp2) 
-pWlqWl(pW,, ppl) -pKqff2(pK, PP2)1 
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Appendix (4) Revenue maximisation (an alternative to 
the output maximisation model) 
In Appendix (1) and Appendix (2) where I compared the price ratios under different 
constraints using demand interdependency, I used output maximisation as the objective 
of the then nationalised British Airports Authority. However, it is also possible to look 
upon the objective of this organisation as revenue maximisation. In this appendix I 
show the predicted outcomes of each price ratio considered in Appendix (1) and 
Appendix (2). 1 use the following terms for the constraints: 
(RV): Revenue maximisation 
(RG): Revenue maximisation with passenger growth 
They correspond to (Q) and (QG) in section 4-5, Appendix (1) and Appendix (2), i. e., 
instead of (Q) and (QG) we could say that the then nationalised British Airports 
Authority's constraints were (RV) and (RG) of which (RG) was applied to the period 
between 1983/84 and 1986/87. 
(RV): the firm maximises total revenue TR 
s. t. TR - TC >- 0-I 
where TR = 
Ei 
ppiqpj(ppi) + 
El 
p Wiq Wj(p Wi, ppi) +P Uq U 
and the constraint is 
ppiqpj(ppi) + 
Ei 
pWjqWj(pWj, ppj) +pUqU 
cpiqpi(ppi) -EI. cWjqWj(pWj, ppi) - cUqU(pU) -F>0-I 
(same as (4-34)) 
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(RG): the firm maximises total revenue TR 
s. t. TRt - TO 
where the constraint is 
01-1 
1-1 it qp 
1 
ppiqpi(ppi) + pWiqWi(pWi, ppi)+pUqU-I] cpiqpi(ppi) 
zi 
c Wiq Wi (p Wi, ppi) -c Uq U(p U) 
(qp, +qP2)-(qpll+qP2' F>0 It +Lx 5 qp, +ql-l P2 
(same as (4-35)) 
The results are as follows: 
(RV1): peak passenger charge to off-peak passenger charge under 
revenue maximisation 
PP, [c,, -k, B PP2 [cP, -kA,, cý,, ] , P) 
(RG1): peak passenger charge to off-peak passenger charge under 
revenue maximisation with passenger growth 
pp, I) [cpl-k, Bwlcwl+ I- 'P2 5A. 
1 
PP2 I 
eýpj 
) [CP2-k2B, c, + 
!A 
5A 
(RV2): peak (off-peak) passenger charge to peak (off-peak) runway 
charge under revenue maximisation 
PP, 
=[ cP] kB PWI 0- 1) CW] 1 W1 ep, 
(RG2): peak (off-peak) passenger charge to peak (off-peak) runway 
charge under revenue maximisation with passenger growth 
PP, cP' 
- k, BWI +II PWI C. 1 5Acw, ep, 
(RV3): peak runway charge to off-peak runway charge under revenue 
maximisation 
PWI 
(1-eý, 
CW, 
Pw2 (1- 1 CW2 
eWl 
(RG3): peak runway charge to off-peak runway charge under revenue 
maximisation with passenger growth 
Pwi 
= _(I-epp, 
2) CW, 
Pw2 (I- I) Cff'2 
ew, 
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(RV4): peak (off-peak) passenger charge to commercial 4price' under 
revenue maximisation 
Ppl 
- 
(1--e-IU-) 
ý CPI k, B,, c,, sB Pu 0- epl ) Cu cu 
(RG4): peak (off-peak) passenger charge to commercial 'price' under 
revenue maximisation with passenger growth 
PP, 0--eLu) C 
P, k, B,,, c SIBU+ PU O-ep, ] CU CU 5Ac, 
(RV5): peak (off-peak) runway charge to commercial K price' under 
revenue maximisation 
PWI 
_ 
(I-eU) 
CWI 
PU O-OW11 ) CU 
(RG5): peak (off-peak) runway charge to commercial 'price' under 
revenue maximisation with passenger growth 
PWI 
=: 
(I-eIU) 
CWI 
PU 0- 
ewl 
) CU 
It is interesting that the results of the price ratio'under (RV) are always the same as the 
ratio under an unconstrained monopolist setting in any category of comparison. 
However, each price level is lower than the equivalent price under an unconstrained 
monopolist's level (as the term T 
)URV 
contained in each price p 
Iýf V Ci 
+X,, I) (1+ý, 
RV) 
(1--Fi-) 
is cancelled out when expressed as price ratios; where )"RV denotes the Lagrange 
multiplier to the (RV)'s constraint and 0 ": ý ýR V "ý- I-) 
144 
Appendix (5) International and Domestic Charge 
Differences 
It is possible to compare the price ratios between the international passenger charge 
and the domestic passenger charge. Although it is normal that an airport does not set 
different charges for international flights' landings/parkings and domestic flights' 
landings/parkings, the charges imposed on international passengers are often different 
from the charges imposed on domestic passengers. This is due to the apparent cost 
difference in the terminal area's service between the two categories of passengers. For 
instance, passengers for international flights are required to get through customs and 
sometimes immigration, which imposes additional costs on the airport operator. 
In this section I compare the following price ratios under different constraints which I 
have already considered in section 4-5 (and 4-6) in this chapter, i. e., (R), (M), 
(QG) and (AAR): 
(A) price ratio of international passenger charge to domestic passenger 
charge 
(B) price ratio of international passenger charge to runway charge 
(C) price ratio of international passenger charge to unregulated 
commercial 'price' 
In terms of (B) and (C) above, I use international passenger charge for convenience. 
The results are interchangeable; the subscript I in the expressions below can be 
changed into D in order to see the ratio of domestic passenger charge to runway 
charge and the ratio of domestic passenger charge to unregulated commercial 'price'. 
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The notations I use are as follows: 
qj: international passenger numbers 
qD: domestic passenger numbers 
qW. runway output numbers 
cj: marginal cost related to each international passenger 
cD: marginal cost related to each domestic passenger 
cW. marginal cost i*ncurred by the landing, taking-off and aircraft parking 
of each aircraft 
cU: unit cost of commercial activity (same convention I used in section 
4-3 to 4-6) 
Specifications for the demand functions used here are as follows: 
q, qj(pj) 
qD qD(PD) 
qW = qW(PWPIPD) 
qU = qU(pU) 
When the comparison categories (A) and (B) are examined, for simplicity and because 
of the focus of the analysis, the demand of the unregulated commercial service qU is 
not dependent on p, and PD and is the function of pU only (which is the same 
convention I used in section 4-5), because this simplification doesn't affect the result. 
However., where the comparison category (C) is examined, I use the following 
specification instead in order to avoid complexity, which follows the same convention I 
introduced in category (4)' in section 4-6: 
q, qj(pj) 
qD qD(PD) 
qW = qW(pW) 
qU = qU(PUPI, PD) 
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I use this specification in order to focus on the price ratio of international passenger 
charge to the unregulated commercial service. 
The notations to show the results are as follows: 
. ZQ: Lagrange multiplier for the constraint applied to (Q) (same as 
before) 
, ýQG: Lagrange multiplier for the constraint applied to (QG) (same as 
before) 
/I: Lagrange multiplier for the price constraint applied to (AAR) (same as 
before) 
y: Lagrange multiplier for Ramsey rule constraint (same as before) 
a= 11 (same as before) I+Y 
d= -I- (d > 1) (same as before) A2 
v= --L (v > 1) (same as before) ý6 QG 
ej: own price elasticity of service j I, D, W, U) in the absolute term 
aqj pj 
apj qj 
ejT: cross-elasticity of price p, in relation to q W, i. e., Fj -_ 
aqw 2, (also 
ap, qw 
expressed as the absolute term) 
in relation to qW, i. e., ,-O! l-wRD- (also 8D: cross-el asti city of price PD F-D ---qw ap D 
expressed as the absolute term) 
P, IU: cross-e I asti city of price p, in relation to q U, i. e., Ej, - 
c9qu 
_p, (also c9p, qu 
expressed as the absolute term) 
8DU: cross-el asti city of price PD in relation to q U, i. e., 6DU - 
aqu 
' 
PD 
ap 
D qU 
(also expressed as the absolute term) 
(B 
ej 
(pj 
ej 
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k, = 
ýýw 
aq, 
kD ýýw = aqD 
SI - 
aq, 
aq, 
'D = c9q, 
c9 qD 
t- I A=q, + qt-1 (= qt-I + qt-1) (this denotes the total passenger D Pi P2 
numbers in the previous year) 
T capital input in period t 
I use several assumptions as to some of the notations above: 
k, > 0: the increase in international passenger numbers would not 
reduce the runway output. 
kD > 0: the increase in domestic passenger numbers would not reduce 
the runway output. 
kj ---. kD: unlike k, and k2, 
aq' 
and -ýY-w do not have a time related aq, DqD 
factor and I assume these proportions are more likely to be relevant 
to aircraft manufacturing technology, whereas an ordinary airport is 
concerned with a mixture of both international and domestic flights. It 
seems reasonable to assume that k-I is roughly the same as kD, 
unless a special airport, such as one specialising in domestic flights or 
cargo flights is in question. 
ej < eD: elasticity of international passenger charge is smaller than that 
of domestic passenger charge. The passengers using domestic flights 
have many more competitive transport modes available than in the 
case of the international passengers who have less variety of 
transport modes to select. 
Because of this assumption, also B, > BD, PI > PD can be assumed. 
ej > eW and eD .> eW. elasticity of runway charge is smaller than that of 
passenger charge in both international and domestic flights. 
ej < eU and eD < eU: elasticity of passenger charge (for both 
international and domestic) is smaller than that of commercial service 
cprice'. 
eW < eU: elasticity of runway charge is smaller than that of commercial 
service 'price' 
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81 ýý' sD: the degree of the increase (decrease) of unregulated 
commercial service output due to the increase (decrease) of 
international passenger numbers is larger than the equivalent degree 
due to the increase (decrease) of domestic passenger numbers, 
because of the existence of some unregulated services only available 
to international passengers such as duty/tax-free shops. International 
passengers on average also spend longer inside a terminal than 
domestic passengers, because international passengers use the 
airport for changing planes more often than domestic passengers. 
CI -'ý' cD: the marginal cost related to each international passenger is larger than the marginal cost related to each domestic passenger. 
According to MMC2, BAA's internal cost calculation report published 
in 1983 (that I mentioned in the context of cost assumption in section 
4-4) estimated the terminal cost related to the international flight per 
passenger to be at least double the cost related to the domestic flight 
per passenger. 
cW > c, and cW > cD: the marginal cost (short-run) of landing, taking-off 
or aircraft parking incurred by each aircraft is larger than the marginal 
cost related to each passenger (in both international and domestic). 
Under each set of objective function and constraint from (R) to (AAR) that I described 
in section 4-5,1 have arranged the first order conditions and made summaries of the 
price r los. 
(A) International passenger charge vs domestic passenger charge (similar to 
the result of (1) between regulated services both inside the constraint's 
denominator) 
(R(A)) international passenger charge to domestic passenger charge 
under Ramsey rule: 
[c, -k, &cý, ] Pf el 6D 
PD a )4'-(I-a)ý 
[CD-kDPWCW] 
eD El 
(M(A)): international passenger charge to domestic passenger charge 
under unconstrained monopolist's pricing 
P, 
(1- 
e' 
) [c, -kBwcw] D 
PD (1--eL, ) [c, -kDBwcwl 
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(Q(A)): international passenger charge to domestic passenger charge 
under output maximisation 
P, (1-7ý-) [c, -d-kBý, (cw-d)] D PD (1 41-) [c, -d-k,,, Bw(cw-d)] 
(QG(A)): international passenger charge to domestic passenger charge 
under output maximisation with passenger growth 
P, [c, -v-k, Bw(cw-v)+ '] eD 5A PD I- [c,, -v-k, BW(CW-V)+ 5A 
(AAR(A)): international passenger charge to domestic passenger charge 
under Airport Average Revenue constraint 
P, 
(I-Ieý-) rc, -kBwcw4, pF] D- )5D (1--el-I-) [CD-k,, B, cw-; L)T] 
(B) International passenger charge vs runway charge (similar to the result of (2) 
between regulated services, one included in the constraint's denominator, the 
other not in the denominator) 
(R(B)) international (domestic) passenger charge to runway charge 
under Ramsey rule: 
P, C1 kjBW (where a- (I - a)-l-w) PW CW (1_ a q, 0 el )I ew 
(M(B)): international (domestic) passenger charge to runway charge 
under unconstrained monopolist's pricing 
(1---L) 
-P-1 - 
eW [-L- 
- kjBW] PW (I--eLl) CW 
(Q(B)): international (domestic) passenger charge to runway charge 
under output maximisation 
-P, 
(1- 
eW) [c, -d-kBw(cw-d)] 
PW (1--eýj-) [c,. -d] 
(QG(B)): international (domestic) passenger charge to runway charge 
under output maximisation with passenger growth 
(I 
- -e-LW- [c, -v-kBw(cw-v)+5A 
, 
PW (I- 41- 1C, -v] 
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(AAR(B)): international (domestic) passenger charge to runway charge 
under Airport Average Revenue constraint 
kIB W- 
AP 
PW (1--eLl-) 
1 
CW cw 
(C) International passenger charge vs unregulated commercial 'price': (sim i lar to 
the result of (4)' between service regulated and included in the denominator 
and unregulated service (simplified version)) 
(R(C)) international passenger charge to commercial 'price' under 
Ramsey rule: 
A CI-SIPUCU 
PU 
_Aj )+(I-a) CU CIU 
(M(C)): international passenger charge to commercial 'price' under 
unconstrained monopolist's pricing 
PL 
=ýc, -sB, c,. ý Pu (1--eLl ) CU 
(Q(C)): international passenger charge to commercial 'price' under 
output maximisation 
P, 
- 
(I-TýU--) [c, -d-sB, (cu-d) 
Pu O-ell) [cu-d] 
(QG(C)): international passenger charge to commercial 'price' under 
output maximisation with passenger growth 
Pi 
- 
(1--e! 
U-) [c, -v-sBU(CU-V)+ 5A Pu (1--eLI ) ICU-vl 
(AAR(C)): international passenger charge to commercial 'price' under 
Airport Average Revenue constraint 
Pi 
(1--e! 
U-)_ ý ci-sB uc u-)LT PU 
e'l 
) cu 
As to (A), (R(A)) is not useful for reference purposes for the same reason explained in 
section 4-5 and I focus on the comparison among (M(A)), (Q(A)), (QG(A)) and 
(AAR(A)). Where one can use a strong assumption that k, = kD, it can always be 
held that (M(A))<(Q(A)) and (M(A))<(AAR(A)). Also where I eliminate a special case 
(as I mentioned in section 4-5) where the effect of the passenger numbers growth rate 
is so large that 
I> v(I - kBW) holds, it is always the case that (Q(A))<(QG(A)) 5A 
and that none of (Q(A)), (QG(A)) or (AAR(A)) are lower than (M(A)). Whether 
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(QG(A)) is larger than (AAR(A)) depends on the effect of (AAR)'s price cap 
constraint, i. e., (a) if ý)T > v(I - kIB W) - --L, then (AAR(A))>(QG(A)) holds, but 5A 
(b) if ý. p7 < v(I - kjB W) - -L then (AAR(A))<(QG(A)) holds. Being summarised, 5A' 
the order of the price ratios will be (Q(A))<(QG(A)), and (QG(A))ý: (AAR(A)) where 
. ý)T's effect is not strong, whereas the order will be (Q(A))<(QG(A))<(AAR(A)) where 
, ýg's effect is strong. In this latter case, if ýT >< d(l - kjB W), then 
(Q(A))ý(AAR(A)), depending on the relative strength of the constraints of (Q) and 
(AAR). Therefore where (AAR) constraint was effective, as under the then nationalised 
British Airports Authority, the price ratio may have been raised since 1983/84 and after 
privatisation the ratio may have dropped. However, where the effect of -L is so high 5A 
that both international passenger charges and domestic passenger charges are even 
higher than the level which an unconstrained monopolist would set, it would be the 
case (a) that the price ratio (QG(A)) is lower than (M(A)), (b) that (Q(A))>(QG(A)) 
holds and (c) that (QG(A))<(AAR(A)), whether (Q(A)) is larger than (AAR(A)) 
depending on the effect of (AAR) constraint, i. e., if Z)T <> d(l - kjB W), then 
(Q(A))><(AAR(A)). 
Regarding (B), exactly the same analogy applies as in the comparison category (2). 
The relative price ratios are expected to be in the order of (Q(B))>(QG(B))>(AAR(B)) 
if all the constraints are binding. 
The comparison (C) is also analogous to comparison (4)' and therefore the examination 
involves many conditions related to the comparison of each constraint's strength and is 
inconclusive. 
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Appendix (6) Summary of price mark-ups under 
different constraints 
In section 4-5 of this chapter, I used price ratios in order to carry out comparisons of 
airport charge structures under different constraints (the unregulated commercial 
services are not an issue here). In this appendix I show the calculation results in the 
form of price mark-ups by the simple modelling used in section 4-5. In the summary 
table below the service types are expressed as i=1,2. i denotes airport charge which 
is either peak passenger charge, off-peak passenger charge, peak runway charge or 
off-peak runway charge (or as in Appendix (5) either international passenger charge or 
domestic passenger charge). Two simple cases in the table are shown so that the 
results can be comparable with the examination Waterson used (in section 4-2) in 
relation to the equation (4-3) as the predicted outcome under ordinary Average 
Revenue constraint. 
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Table 4-10 Summary of price mark-ups under different constraints 
Mi general rule nL m2 case 1: el < e2, CI C2 ý-- case 2eI e2, CI< C2 
0 1-) Ml e2 
A M2 0- 
C, 
ý_7 
(R) mark-up is proportional to the 
price mark-up for pI 
Ml 
inverse elasticity, but a smaller 
is higher than P2. 
M2 
mark-up than (M) 
however, both mark- 
ups are smaller than (M) 
AI M, O-el, ) 
C, M2 0_ 1 
1 1 
Ml 
mark-up is proportional price mark-up for p, 
M2 
to the inverse elasticity is higher than P2 
Ml e2 I M2 
_jý_) ILI 12 
(Q) 
A 
JO 
C 
Ml 
-- 
'2 cl 
(1--e'2 
, 
C, M2 Id 
I, cz 
the ratio of the mark-ups 
is higher than what would be 
realised under (M) 
A _0 -V+ l C (i) if v<I , I-e , C, 5Aci (i) between passenger charges: 
5A 
where is passenger charge 
(I__L)(j__L_+ /) 
MI e2 cl 5Acl 
(j__L)(j__! '_) MI > e2 cl 
M2 I) 
el c2 5'4c 
(I__eLj)(1-c2) 
A 
-0 
V 
C 
2 
(QG) , 
I-Ji C, (ii) between runway charge the ratio is higher than 
where is runway charge pI and passenger charge P2 (M) and (Q) 
(service that is not directly MI ý2 c2 (ii) the ratio is higher than 
related to passenger 
M2 We'l )0-_CZj__+SA1 
cl under (M) and also higher 
numbers) 
higher than (M) than (Q) 
Continued to the next page 
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Table 4-10 (continued) 
general rule case 1: ei < e2, CI =-- C2 case 2: e e2, CI> C2 
as Tff I= lff2ý 
(AR)* b(Tff j-1)] 
M, 
(I-e'2) 
as < M2ý Ci = 
MI> M2 
same as (M) 
(i) between passenger (i) among the services whose 
charges: as Tff I= Tff 21 quantities enter in the (AAR)'s 
rn, 0- -7'2 denominator, the service 
(i) passenger charge: 
M2 (I-el) 
facing higher cost will have 
A01 b(-ff i-1)] Ci 
same as (M) 
a higher mark-up than the (AAR) (ii) runway charge p, and 
(ii) runway charge: service that is produced with 
PI I 
-0+ b) 
passenger charge P2: lower cost (same as (AR)*) 
0- 
_eLi MI F2 I+b 
M2 (1--FLI) [1-b(Mi-1)] (ii) regardless of the cost 
the ratio is higher by bTff I than difference, > 
1, because M2 
the mark-up ratio under(M) 
I+b 
M2 1 +b-b c, 
' 
(RV) 
XRI" P, ýO where (p C, I- I 1+XRI' 
as MI M2 
__L 0 same as in (M) 
same as in (M) 
+I 
Ci 1--L 5Acj MI < 1: the ratio 11 (i) between passenger charges: (1__eLj) 
where i is passenger charge same as in (RV) of the mark-ups is lower than 
A- 
_9 C, 1_1 (ii) between runway charge p, what would be realised under 
(RG) 
where i is runway charge and passenger charge P2: (M) and (RV) 
(service which is not 2 
5AC2 eL (ii) the ratio is lower than 
M2 (I-e'[ 5Ac2+1 
directly related to passenger ml 
under (M) and also lower 
is lower than M M2 
numbers) 
than (RV) 
(AR)* denotes the ordinary Average Revenue Approach. 
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Notes to Chapter 4 
I- There is another type of regulation similar to the Average Revenue Approach 
applied to AT&T in the USA. Some called this 'lagged Average Revenue Regulation' 
See Cowan (1997a). 
2. In the UK airports' case it is called the Revenue Yield Approach, rather than the 
Average Revenue Approach. 
3. The context was used in terms of regional gas supply. 
4. Tariff Basket Approach would not require this kind of adjustment caused by 
forecasting the yield. This is one of the advantages of the Tariff Basket Approach, 
which was stressed by the NERA's report. 
5. It is also interesting to consider how the payment methods of some of the 
6 commercial- side' activities would change under different objectives of the airport 
operator. The price setting behaviour of the operator can be looked upon as a strategy. 
BAA used to receive some percentage of the turnover from the concessionaires of 
tax-free/duty-free shops. However since the early '90s it has owned the business and 
pays a management fee to the concessionaires. This is mentioned in the MMC4 report. 
According to Doganis (1992) there is a tendency in general for the commercial airport 
operator to increase the percentage of the turnover from the concessionaire as the profit 
margin of the concessionaire's business increases. 
6. In the rest of this chapter the airport charge related to this runway' output is called 
crunway' charge. Runway charge as defined here means the airport charge other than 
passenger charges, whilst at some airports such as Manchester, the charge imposed on 
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the airline per landing or taking-off is called 'runway charge'. Therefore, in the context 
of Manchester, our crunway' charge implies the airport's runway charge plus aircraft 
parking charge. 
7.1 show an example of the share of each airport charge category in the table below. 
Each number shows the proportion of the revenue to the total airport charge revenue. 
The data are for 1990/91 and 1994/95 and this is the only data in the public domain 
available from the MMC reports. 
1990/91 
% Heathrow 
90/91 
Gatwick 
90/91 
Stansted 
90/91 
Manchester 
90/91 
Passenger charge 58.6 60.7 50.1 51.7 
Landing ýchar, ge 27.8 19.5 32.9 46.9 
Parking charge 13.6 19.8 17 1.4 
Total airport charge 100 100 100 100 
1994/1995 
% Heathrow 
94/95 
Gatwick 
94/95 
Stansted 
94/95 
Manchester 
94/95 
Passenger charge 60 65 56 57 
Landing charge 26 18 32 41.9 
Parking charge 14 17 12 1.1 
Total airport charge 100 100 100 100 
8. Toms (1994); See section 3-2 in Chapter 3. 
9. Charter airlines tend to offer a single type of fare product, whereas there are 
innumerable variations existing in non-charter flights, due to the yield management 
practised by the airlines, as suggested in the previous section. 
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Chapter 5 
Empirical Analysis of Airport Charges 
5-1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate whether there exists any evidence to 
indicate the likely outcomes of price structure changes that were predicted in the 
previous chapter. Comparing the price marginal cost mark-up ratios between different 
airport charges under different constraints would be ideal. The summary of the price 
mark-up ratios using the simple model (no demand interdependency) has been shown 
in Appendix (6) of the previous chapter. However, in order to carry out the 
comparisons using price marginal cost mark-ups it would be essential to have an 
estimation of marginal costs in each category of airport charge. In the next section I 
explain some of the problems in estimating marginal costs. In section 5-3 1 explain the 
alternative method which I have used in this chapter in an attempt to find any evidence 
as to how the predictions in Chapter 4 fit the actual trend of airport charge structures. 
In section 5-4 1 show the results of the analysis and conclude in section 5-5 with some 
implications. 
5-2. Cost estimation problems 
So far as I am aware, the only estimation of marginal cost in the UK in an attempt to 
separately identify both peak and off-peak passenger service was in the investigation 
regarding the cost of the passenger charges at Heathrow and Gatwick carried out by 
the then nationalised British Airports Authority following the conflict which led to 
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MOU as I have described in Chapter 4. The method of estimation and the actual 
estimated values are unknown to me as the reports on the investigation are not in the 
public domain. 
Since the regulatory reform followed by the Airports Act 1986, so-called 'Regulatory 
Accounts' have been submitted by the airports where they were required to ask the 
CAA for permission to levy airport charges. The accounts are available from 1988/89 
onwards. It is normal for the CAA to propose an accounting condition upon the 
application for a permission by a regulated airport (not only 'designated' airports). The 
accounting condition requires the airport (a) to describe the broad principles as to how 
its costs have been allocated between the activities directly related to airport charges 
and other 'operational activities' and (b) to show both total revenue and total 
expenditure associated with the activities that are related to airport charges. 
The regulated airports' total expenditure figures that are available in the 'Regulatory 
Accounts' are aggregate figures. In order to tease out the marginal cost figure from the 
'Regulatory Accounts', one would need the information which can be used in 
estimating a cost function such as landing numbers and passenger numbers broken 
down into peak and off-peak. BAA now has a brief annual report for each of the three 
London airports published for the purpose of explaining the following year's airport 
charge level to the users. Each report includes pe ak passenger numbers and off-peak 
passenger numbers for both international and domestic flights, peak landing numbers 
and off-peak landing numbers 1. However,, before the year 1992, this kind of report 
was never published, and the counting of each demand quantity separately has never 
been a custom (apart from 1989/90 and 90/91 data at Heathrow. shown in the MMC2 
report). 
Because (a) there have been 18 airports continuously submitting their 'Regulatory 
Accounts' each year from 1988/89 to 1997/98 there was a panel of 18 x 10 = 180 
data which I could use and (b) at least traffic statistics had been published by the CAA 
for both terminal passenger numbers and aircraft landing numbers broken down into 
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international and domestic2. I tried to calculate marginal costs for international 
passenger service, domestic passenger service, international landing service and 
domestic landing service, after estimating the coefficients of the regression mode13 in 
which air-side total cost was a dependent variable, using the form of 
TC = J(qJ, qD, q WI, q WD). The independent variables are: international passenger 
numbers (qI), domestic passenger numbers (qD), international landing numbers (q WI) 
and domestic landing numbers (q WD). TC here means the 'air-side' total cost and I 
used the figure of airport charge related expenditure obtainable from the 'Regulatory 
Accounts' (after inflation adjustment). The use of panel data matched the concept of 
obtaining the short run costs, as the time length was 10 years. One could use time 
series data for each airport of the then nationalised British Airports Authority and 
current BAA (which are available unlike those of the then local authority airports and 
currently regulated airports either private or still under local authority management), 
there would be a problem of scale, i. e., the confusing mixture of long run cost and 
short run cost would be unavoidable. 
I used a variety of functional forms such as linear functional forms, power functional 
forms, log linear functional forms or two-step estimation such as the first step 
estimation being TC = J(q WI, q WD), followed by the second step estimation of 
qj = g(q WI) and qD =h (q WD). None of the results were consistent with the logic 
as to the relative size of marginal cost of landing and marginal cost of passenger 
service, or the relative size of marginal cost of international passenger service and 
marginal cost of domestic passenger service. It was always the case that some airports, 
regardless of their scale, showed non-significant coefficients. Even when the panel of 
180 airports' data was separated into several groups with the same scale of size to 
make each model stable, none of the results of the models with which the F-test was 
passed were meaningful in obtaining the airports" marginal cost estimates. The main 
reason for the failure of the estimation attempt lies in the fact that the number and the 
types of independent variables are irrelevant to the total cost of 'air-side' operation, 
i. e., 
there are many more unknown factors affecting the size of TC. However, more 
importantly, there is a crucial drawback in any attempt to estimate the costs using 
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panel data for different airports in that the method of cost allocation is different from 
one airport to another. The CAA merely requires the regulated airports to describe their 
own method used to allocate the costs between 'air-side' activities and 
'commercial-side' activities within the total costs incurred by the 'operational 
activities'. The CAA does not provide any particular benchmark for the cost allocation. 
It approves the application by a regulated airport for permission to levy its airport 
charges by judging the 'reasonableness'. There may be some airports whose allocation 
method varies from some years to others. Such being the case, the cost estimation 
attempt that I tried to carry out failed. 
5-3. Data, methodology and hypotheses 
(1) Data availability in relation to the price structure comparisons 
Airport charges' data from 1978/79 to 1997/98 is available regarding the then 
nationalised British Airports Authority and the current BAA for each of their airports. 
However, the airport charges information before the regulatory reform other than for 
BAA's airports is not available. It has proved difficult to obtain airport charges 
infonnation prior to the reform for those airports which were previously owned and 
managed by local authorities. In so far as I was able to ascertain, there were no records 
for Luton and there were several years missing at Birmingham. Most of the data is also 
missing at Manchester. Therefore I have used the airport charges data for Heathrow, 
Gatwick and Stansted which are designated and subject to AAR price cap regulation, 
also Glasgow, Edinburgh and Aberdeen which are non-designated and not subject to 
price regulation. As to the first three London airports, it is possible to use the airport 
charges data to test the price ratios which were previously under the constraint of (Q), 
(QG) and after privatisation under the (AAR) constraint. As for the three Scottish 
airports, the airport charges can be regarded as moved from under the constraint of (Q) 
to under (M) after privatisation as they can now be looked upon as an unconstrained 
monopoly without any direct price regulations. They were irrelevant to (QG) constraint 
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as shown in Table 2-1. During the period when the three London airports were subject 
to financial target with passenger growth rate, the Scottish airports had been under 
break-even constraint. The predicted relationship between the price and the related 
marginal cost of each service during that period for each of the three Scottish airports 
would have been exactly the same as under (Q). 
The data I use here are for two kinds of airport charges, i. e., landing charge and 
passenger charge. In order to calculate aircraft parking charge one would need to 
specify both the type/weight of aircraft and the hours of parking. On the other hand the 
revenue from parking charge is relatively small compared to the revenue from 
passenger charge and landing charge (See note 7 in Chapter 4). Therefore I have used 
landing charge as a surrogate for the 'runway' charge that I defined in the previous 
chapter. 
As to the unregulated commercial 'price', none of the price data for any of the relevant 
services is available covering both the period when the then nationalised British 
Airports Authority was in charge and the period after the regulatory reform. Thus my 
analysis addresses the price ratio changes that involve only passenger charges and 
landing charges. As to the comparison between peak and off-peak landing charges, I 
have used two types of aircraft namely B767-300 (hereafter B767) and B737-300 
(hereafter B737). This is because these aircraft are used for both international and 
domestic flights and therefore suitable for the comparison of international charges and 
domestic charges. The maximum capacity and weight are 250 passengers and 158 
tonnes for B767 and 145 passengers and 64 tonnes for B737. Also both aircraft types 
are categorised by the International Civil Aviation Organization (hereafter ICAO; the 
international regulatory body for civil aviation) in so-called 'Chapter 3' and they are not 
sub ect to any additional penalty due to noise4. j 
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(2) Methodology 
There are two interesting papers related to the empirical evidence on the tariff structure 
changes of the UK privatised public utility industries. Giulietti and Otero (1998) used 
the cw-nulative sum of residuals (hereafter CUSUM) test in order to find the timing of 
any structural changes in the industries. They analysed the changes of the ratio P' at Ppi 
three London airports of BAA using the same data set I use (i. e., airport charge from 
1978/79 to 1997/98) and using several types of aircraft sizes. Based on the CUSUM 
test they found that the strongest evidence of structural breaks was observed for large 
aircraft of the B747-400 type. In the case of B747-400 at Heathrow the structural 
change's timings seem to be 1983/84 for peak period, and 1985/86 for off-peak period. 
For B747-400 at Gatwick the peak period's ratio showed 1983/84 as a possible 
structural break. For the other types of aircraft and all aircraft at Stansted, the timings 
of structural breaks for both peak and off-peak were rather inconclusive. 
Giulietti and Waddams Price (2000) analysed the directions and levels as to the 
rebalancing of prices of the UK regulated industries after price cap regulations were 
imposed, and they included the three London airports of BAA using the same price 
data I use (i. e., airport charges from 1978/79 to 1997/98). Their emphasis was put on 
(a) the rebalancing of standing charges and average bills, where, in the three London 
airports case they regarded landing charge plus parking charge as a standing charge 
while passenger charge was regarded as an average bill, (b) the difference of the total 
airport charge averaged per passenger between where the total cost was high (when a 
large aircraft was used and the operation was during the peak period) and where the 
total cost was low (when a small aircraft was used and the flights was during the 
off-peak period), and (c) the rebalancing of peak and off-peak charges. They used a 
two-sided Mest with 5% significance level and assumed that there was a structural 
break at 1985/86 based on the findings above by Giulietti and Otero (1998). In both 
(a) and (b) ((c) is the same examination as (b)) they used a time series trend with 
dummy variables with I after 1985 for both slope and interception and investigated if 
the null hypothesis that the trend in 1985-1998 is the same in 1978-1984 would be 
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rejected or not. They showed results which significantly rejected the null hypothesise. 
In terms of (a), they compared the ratios of P--" in peak and off-peak for both Ppi 
mternational flights and domestic flights, and observed that at Heathrow and Gatwick 
the ratio revealed a decrease in most cases and that Stansted's ratio was inconclusive. 
As to (b) and (c), they compared the ratios of off-peak average airport charge per 
passenger to peak average airport charge per passenger. At Heathrow, as a whole, they 
observed an increase of the ratio of off-peak to peak charge, but at Stansted the ratio 
seemed to have decreased. Gatwick's ratios' direction was mixed and inconclusive. 
I have used the same method which Giulietti and Waddams Price (2000) used, i. e., 
observing the trend of the price ratios with dummy variables over the time in question. 
The purpose of the empirical analysis I carry out here is to examine whether a 
particular price ratio's level for the period under nationalisation (i. e., before the 
constraint (AAR) was imposed on BAA) is different in the predicted way to the price 
ratio's level after privatisation (i. e., after the constraint (AAR) was imposed on BAA). 
I measured the coefficients of a linear regression model for each price ratio over the 
period with dummy variables. The dummy variables are two kinds. One is for the 
intercept and the other is for the slope. The regression model for each price ratio Y 
using time trend X as explanatory variable is as follows: 
Y= a, +P, X+D(a2- a, )+ DW2 - POX 
for the period before (AAR) constraint was imposed 
D=1 for the period after (AAR) constraint was imposed 
Thus the model is explaining the two regressions with two different periods: 
period before (AAR): Y=aI+P lX 
period after (AAR): Y= a2 -4- P2X 
For each model I used a two-sided Mest with a 5% significance 
level to investigate if 
each coefficient is significant and if the coefficient value (and the sign) 
for the latter 
period is significantly different from the value for the former period. 
In this procedure 
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the hypotheses H and H' :aI were tested. This type of dummy 01`: -- P2 0= a2 
analysis would allow us to observe any changes in both the intercept coefficient and the 
slope coefficient. One of the drawbacks for the other kinds of stability tests such as the 
F-test is that they can only test the regression models as a whole. This drawback can 
be avoided by adopting dummies for both intercept coefficient and slope coefficients. 
The empirical analysis I carried out in this chapter is an investigation of different trends 
over time, i. e., price ratio changes (in both the sizes and directions) over time. 
However, the predictions in the previous chapter were based on the level differences 
which do not include the concept of changes over time, i. e., the results from the 
predictions in Chapter 4 are atemporal. Therefore there is a problem as to how one can 
link the previous chapter's predictions to the results in this chapter. In order to interpret 
the results in this chapter I considered the possible variations of the regression results. 
There would be roughly three types in the form of difference between the regression 
result for the period before (AAR) constraint was imposed and that for the period after 
(AAR) constraint was imposed. In the illustration below, case (A) shows the situation 
where HO :PI `-- P2 is not rejected but a1#a2- In this case the the slope for both 
periods is the same. The interpretation is that there was a sudden jump after the (AAR) 
was imposed (in the illustration, the dotted line means that at this point (AAR) was 
imposed and I have marked the point as 'structural change' for simplicity), but there 
was no apparent change in price ratio itself after (AAR) was imposed. Case (B) 
illustrates the situation where both PI#P2 and a1#a2 hold. I interpret this type of 
change as evidence of price ratio level change. Case (C) is slightly more complicated 
than (A) and (B). In this type of situation, although the directions of two periods' slope 
coefficients are different, the price ratio level at the end of the latter period reverted to 
the same level as at the beginning of the former period. There were two kinds of 
constraints during the period of nationalisation, i. e., (Q) and (QG) as I explained 
in 
Chapter 4 where I predicted the relationship of price ratio level among 
(Q), (QG) and 
(AAR). In cases such as , 
P" and 
2--' the price ratio level under constraint (QG) PP2 PWI PU 
was predicted to be either the lowest or the highest among the 
levels under (Q), (QG) 
and (AAR). In section 5-4 where I explain the results of the trend analysis, 
I take the 
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effect of (QG) constraint into consideration. 
possible variations of the regression results 
(. 
pnce 
level 
(B) 
clikulge 
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structiral tý-ne 
change 
C) 
pnce 
level 
cliange 
The focus of this empirical testing is to investigate (a) if the price ratios after the 
regulatory reform would be significantly different from the ratios before the constraint 
(AAR) was placed on the three London airports and (b) if the price ratios after 
becoming monopolistic without any price regulations would be significantly different 
under the constraint of (Q) or the break-even constraint (both of which produce the 
same price ratios as I mentioned above) in the case of the three Scottish airports of 
BAA. 
One of the questions as to the regulatory reform's effect put by both Giulietti and 
Otero (1998) and Giulietti and Waddams Price (2000) was whether the effect might 
have already begun before the actual organisational change or price constraint's change 
was introduced. They are conscious of the possibility that the managers might have 
been influenced by the knowledge that the ownership/constraint form was to be 
changed, as already in 1983 the Conservative Government had announced in the 
Queen's Speech that 'as many as possible of Britain's airports shall become private 
sector companies'. 
As I have already mentioned, the constraint (QG) seems to have been introduced as an 
incentive for managers to increase efficiency because of the preparation for the 
ownership change (see Chapter 3). Also the break-even target as a constraint imposed 
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on the Scottish airports of the then nationalised British Airports Authority seems to 
have been in preparation for the ownership change. Thus my interest lies in how 
(AAR) was effective after the regulatory reform in the case of London airports, and 
how (M) became effective after the reform in the case of Scottish airports, rather than 
when the influence of regulatory reform might have been observed. Although I have 
tested all the years after which the slope coefficients were significantly different from 
the previous period for each category of price ratios, the year 1987 which is the first 
year after the regulatory reform turned out to be one of the most frequent years in 
terms of the number of the results where the null hypothesis was significantly rejected. 
The only exception was the results on price ratios between passenger charges at 
Stansted where the break point year seemed to be 1991/92 at which the significant 
results appeared most frequently. At Stansted the new terminal was opened in March 
1991 and it seems that this opening was the trigger for the change to passenger charge 
ratios. Such being the case, in order to see the effect of (AAR) I have selected 1987 as 
the structural break for Heathrow, Gatwick, Glasgow, Edinburgh and Aberdeen for the 
all price ratio categories I carry out, and 1991 for the ratios involving passenger 
charges and 1987 for other ratios at Stansted. 
(3) The price ratios I compare and the hypotheses 
Considering the data availability one can test the following predictions I have made in 
the previous chapter: 
(1) ratio of peak passenger charge to off-peak passenger charge 
(section 4-5) 
(2) ratio of peak (off-peak) passenger charge to peak (off-peak) runway 
charge (section 4-5) 
(3) ratio of peak runway charge to off-peak runway charge (section 4-5) 
(A) ratio of international passenger charge to domestic passenger 
charge (Appendix (5)) 
(B) ratio of international passenger charge to runway charge (Appendix 
(5)) 
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I avoid the ratio comparison (2) above, as there is a difficulty in the interpretation of 
price ratio comparison in that (a) as the 'yield management' technique is employed by 
the airlines, the effect of the ratio of runway charge to passenger charge would not be 
of great issue to the airlines, but (b) rather this ratio would affect the selection of the 
type of aircraft and the destination/origin of a route. However, this comparison would 
have a meaning if one's focus is placed on the fairness issue between a larger aircraft 
with a long distance route and a smaller aircraft with a short distance route. For the 
same reason I do not carry out the ratio comparison of (B) in Appendix (5). 
Hypotheses as to the ratios (1), (3) and (A) above according to the previous chapter's 
prediction (as a summary see Table 4-8) are as follows: 
(1)-1 the three London airports: 
if the price cap constraint is effective, the price ratio of peak passenger 
charge to off-peak passenger charge would be raised after 1987 
(1)-2 the three Scottish airports: 
the price ratio of peak passenger charge to off-peak passenger charge 
would be decreased after 1987 
(3)-1 the three London airports: 
if the price cap constraint is effective, the price ratio of peak landing 
charge to off-peak landing charge would be raised after 1987 
(3)-2 the three Scottish airports: 
the price ratio of peak landing charge to off-peak landing charge would 
be raised after 1987 
(A)-l the three London airports: 
if the price cap constraint is effective, the price ratio of intemational 
passenger charge to domestic passenger charge would be raised 
after 1987 
(A)-2 the three Scottish airports: 
the price ratio of international passengercharge to domestic passenger 
charge would be decreased after 1987 
The assumptions regarding the hypotheses above are the same as in section 
4-5 of 
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Chapter 4 and they are: 
(a) that the constraint (Q) which was supposed to be imposed on the then nationalised British Airports Authority was not effective. As described in Chapter 2, financial targets were quite often missing in 
several years and in some periods 'cash limits' overruled the 
organisation's constraint (See Table 2-1) and 
(b) that the constraint (QG) which was introduced duriný the period from 1983/84 to 1986/87 was effective, but the value of -3A- (explained in 
section 4-5 of Chapter 4) was lower than the value of v so that each 
price level did not exceed the level of unconstrained monopolist 
setting. 
5-4. Results 
I show the results here as summaries from Table 5-1 to Table 5-5. The results marked 
with asterisks in the tables are the ones which are significant in slope coefficients 
and/or intercept coefficients, i. e., the case where both HO :PI ---": P2 and 
I H6 :aI= a2 are rejected, the case where HO :PI ý-- P2 is rejected but 
I H6 : a, = a2 cannot be rejected, and the case where HO :PI` P2 cannot be 
rejected but H61 :aI=a2 is rejected. The values shown in the brackets in the tables 
are t-values. In Table 5-1 to Table 5-5 the regressions are expressed as Y=aI+P IX 
for the period before the change and Y= a2 + P2X for the period after the change, as 
I have explained in section 5-3 (2). In many cases the t-values' sign is opposite to the 
coefficients' sign. However, this is due to the inclusion of dummy variables, i. e., the 
t-value shown under each P2 is actually the t-value for 92 -P1. This is same as in the 
case of the t-values for each a2- 
The summary of the results for Scottish airports as to the price ratio of peak landing 
charge to off-peak landing charge is missing, because none of three Scottish airports 
have differentiated peak and off-peak in the landing charge. As to the result in 
summary (Table 5-2) of the ratio of peak international passenger charge to off-peak 
international passenger charge, Glasgow airport once set a higher international 
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passenger charge for passengers using larger aircraft (heavier than 125 metric tonne) 
during the period from 1990 to 1992. Because there was a sudden jump due to this 
policy in 1991,1 used the ratio for passengers using B737 in Glasgow's case. B737 is 
not the aircraft categorised as "larger aircraft". 
There are four variations of peak and off-peak charges. The notations for them are as 
follows: 
spdp: seasonal peak (including weekly peak) and daily peak 
spdo: seasonal peak and daily off-peak 
sodp: seasonal off-peak and daily peak 
sodo: seasonal off-peak and daily off-peak 
Therefore, in terms of their variation of peak/off-peak ratios, the following four kinds 
exist: 
(1) spdp/spdo (ratio of daily peak/off-peak within peak season (or peak 
week)) 
(2) spdp/sodp (ratio of seasonal peak/off-peak when applied to peak 
hours in a day) 
(3) spdo/sodo (ratio of seasonal peak/off-peak when applied to off-peak 
hours in a day) 
(4) sodp/sodo (ratio of daily peak/off-peak within off-peak season) 
The difference between peak and off-peak does not exist in any year at Scottish 
airports, therefore there are no results regarding the hypothesis (3)-2 in the last section. 
Differences between international landing charge and domestic landing charge existed 
until 198 15 but since May 1981 it has not been the practice at any of BAA's airports. 
Therefore it is not meaningful to calculate the ratio regarding the change of price ratio 
of international landing charge to domestic landing charge. 
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Table 5-1 Ratios of peak passenger charge to off-peak passenger charge at London 
airports (corresponding to the hypothesis (1)-j in the last section) 
HEATHROW INTERNATIONAL 
78-86 87-98 
spdp/spdo Y=2.489 + 0.979X Y= 15.578 - 0.646X R2= 0.886 
(3.406) (7.539) (8-597) (- lO. 503) DW = 0.978 
spdp/sodp Y=6.095 + 0.457X Y= 15.578 + 0.646X R2= 0.814 
(6.845) (2.876) (5.089) (-5.826) DW = 0.929 
spdo/sodo Y=2.005 - 0.146X y=1.000 + 0. OOOX R2= 0.594 
(10.652) (-4.354) (-2.563) (3.655) DW 
* 
= 1.225 
sodp/sodo sodp=sodo 
HEATHROW DOMESTIC 
on 78-86 87-98 
spdp/spdo Y = 1.774 + 0.304X Y=7.398 - 0.279X R2= 0.689 
(3.642) (3.512) (5.542) (-5.651) DW = 1.417 
spdp/sodp Y = 3.176 + 0.101X Y=3.142 - 0.095X 
R2 
= 0.604 
(4.655) (0.833) (-0.024) (-1.359) DW = 1.952 
spdo/sodo Y = 1.503 - 0.073X y=1.000 + 0. o0ox 
R2 = 0.594 
(15.964) (-4.354) (-2.563) (3.655) DW = 1.225 
sodp/sodo Y = 1.000 - 
(2.7E - 16)X Y=4.164 - 0.142X R2 = 0.615 
(2.594) (-3.9E - 15) (3.940) (-1.742) DW = 2.213 
GATWICK INTERNATIONAL 
78-86 87-98 
spdp/spdo Y=1.529 + 0.553X Y= 12.616 - 0.519X 
R2= 0.909 
(3.622) (7.369) (12.605) ( -11.988) 
DW = 1.379 
spdp/sodp Y 4.263 + 0.157X 
Y 12.646 - 0.676X R2= 0.672 
(5.406) (1.120) (5.083) (-4.046) DW = 1.138 
spdo/sodo Y 1.987 - 0.143X y 
1.000 + 0. o0ox R2 = 0.596 
(10.789) (-4.375) (-2.573) (3.672) DW = 1.175 
sodp/sodo sodp=sodo 
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GATWICK DOMESTIC 
78-86 87-98 
spdp/spdo Y=1.427 + 0.187X Y=5.828 - 0.230X 
R2 
= 0.815 
(5.449) (4.025) (8.063) ( -7.522) DW = 1.181 
spdp/sodp Y=2.523 + 0.029X Y=5.828 - 0.230X R2= 0.568 * 
(5.657) (0.361) (3.556) (-2.736) DW == 1.104 
spdo/sodo Y-1.494 - 0.072X y=1.000 + 0. o0ox 
R2 
= 0.596 
(16.217) (-4.375) (-2.573) (3.672) DW = 1.175 
sodp/sodo sodp=sodo 
STANSTED INTERNATIONAL 
ý 78-90 91-98 
spdp/spdo Y=1.241 + 0.004X Y=8.449 - 0.316X 
R2 
= 0.826 
(4.488) (0.104) (5.506) ( -3.969) DW = 1.055 
spdp/sodp Y=0.794 + 0.134X Y=8.449 - 
0.316X R2= 0.720 
(2.345) (3.148) (4.775) (-4.568) DW = 0.920 
spdo/sodo Y=0.684 + 0.094X y=1.000 + 0. 
Goox R2= 0.871 
(8.404) (9.176) (0.820) (-3.973) DW = 1.164 
sodp/sodo sodp=sodo 
STANSTED DOMESTIC 
78-90 91-98 
spdp/spdo Y=1.140 - 
0.004X Y=5.040 - 0.187X 
R2 = 0.789 
(8.125) (-0.215) (5.869) (-4.483) DW == 1.155 
spdp/sodp 
Y=0.776 + 0.104X Y=5.040 - 0.187X 
R2 
= 0.675 
(4.034) (4.286) (4.679) (-5.193) DW =: 0.936 
spdo/sodo 
Y=0.684 + 0,094X y=1.000 + 0. o0ox R2 = 0.871 * 
(8.404) (9.176) (0.820) (-3.973) DW =-- 1.164 
sodp/sodo sodp=sodo 
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Table 5-2 Ratios of peak passenger charge to off-peak passenger charge at Scottish 
airports (corresponding to the hypothesis (1)-2 in the last section) 
INTERNATIONAL the case for B737 aircraft 
78-86 87-98 
spdp/spdo Y =: 1.000 - (1. OE - 15)X 
(24.391) (-1.4E - 13) 
Y=1.061 - 0.013X 
(0.709) (1.471) 
R2 
= 0.871 
DW = 1.641 
_spdp/sodp 
spdo=sodp=sodo 
spdo/sodo spdo=sodp=sodo 
_ 
_sodp/sodo 
spdo=sodp=sodo 
GLASGOW 
DOMESTIC 78-86 87-98 
spdp/spdo 
Y=1.000 + (2.6E - 17)X 
(118.601) (1.7E - 14) 
Y=0.893 + 0.009X 
(-6.116) (5.083) 
R2=0.884 
DW = 1.026 
spdp/sodp spdo=sodp=sodo 
spdo/sodo spdo=sodp=sodo 
sodp/sodo spdo=sodp=sodo 
EDINBURGH INTERNATIONAL 
78-86 87-98 
spdp/spdo Y=1.000 + 
(I. 4E - 15)X 
(36.293) (2.8E - 13) 
Y=1.063 + 0.006X 
(1.099) (0.967) 
R2 
= 0.832 
DW = 1.668 
spdp/sodp spdo=sodp=sodo 
spdo/sodo spdo=sodp=sodo 
sodp/sodo spdo=sodp=sodo 
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ABERDEEN Not relevant as spdp=spdo=sodp=sodo 
_INTERNATIONýýý87ý-q T 
ABERDEEN DOMESTIC 
78-86 87-98 
spdp/spdo Y == 1.000 - (2.6E - 16)X 
(77.768) (-1.2E - 13) 
Y=0.823 + 0.015X 
(-6.602) (5.372) 
R2 
= 0.891 
DW = 1.006 
spdp/sodp spdo=sodp=sodo 
spdo/sodo spdo=sodp=sodo 
sodp/sodo spdo=sodp=sodo 
Table 5-3 Ratios of peak runway charge to off-peak runway charge at London airports 
(corresponding to the hypothesis (3)-l in the last section) (international 
charge=domestic charge) 
HEATHROW B767 
78-86 87-98 
spdp/spdo Y=1.000 - 
(I. 9E - 15)X Y=1.462 - 0-004X 
R2 0.899 
(18.566) (-2. OE - 13) (4.115) (-0.343) 
DW 2.617 
spdp/sodp Y =: 2.417 - 
0.150X Y=1.825 - 0.032X R2 = 0.702 * 
(14.683) (-5.129) (-1.727) (3.398) DW = 1.481 
spdo/sodo 
Y=2.417 - 0.150X y=1.000 + 0. o0ox 
R2 
= 0.848 * 
(17.012) (-5.942) (-4.786) (4.987) DW = 1.361 
sodp/sodo Y =: 
1.000 + (2.2E - 16)X y=0.637 + 0.028X 
R2 = 0.465 * 
(14.577) (1.8E - 14) (-2.538) (1.904) 
DW = 1.003 
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HEATHROW B737 
78-86 87-98 
spdp/spdo Y=1.000 - (I. 5E - 15)X Y=1.462 - 0.004X 
R2 
= 0.899 
(18.5 6 7) (-1.6E - 13) (4.118) (-0.345) DW = 2.618 
spdp/sodp Y=2.417 - 0.150X Y=1.824 - 0.032X R2 = 0.702 
(14.683) (-5.128) (-1.727) (3.398) DW = 1.481 
spdo/sodo Y=2.417 - 0.150X y=1.000 + 0. o0ox R2 = 0.848 
ý 
(17.012) (-5.942) (-4.786) (4.987) 
* 
DW = 1.361 
sodp/sodo Y=1.000 - (2.9E - 16)X Y= -0.362 + 0.028X 2 R=0.465 
(14.596) (-2.4E - 14) (-2.539) (1.905) DW =: 1.001 
GATWICK B767 
78-86 87-98 
spdp/spdo Y= 1.000- (1.9E-16)X Y= -0.008 + 0.134X R2= 
0.886 
(5.449) (-5.9E - 15) (-2.638) (3.452) 
DW = 1.411 
spdp/sodp Y=1.702 + 0.096X Y=1.478 + 0.067X R2= 0.567 
(8.372) (2.665) (-0.531) (-0.686) DW == 1.524 
spdo/sodo Y=1.702 + 0.096X Y=2.008 - 0.048X 
R2 
= 0.892 * 
(12.083) (3.845) (1.040) (-4.850) DW = 1.409 
sodp/sodo sodp=sodo 
GATWICK B737 
78-86 87-98 
spdp/spdo 
Y=1.000 - (9.6E - 17)X Y=0.932 + 0.125X 
R2 = 0.921 
(4.298) (-2.3E - 15) (-0.140) (2.545) 
DW = 0.672 
spdp/sodp 
Y=1.910 + 0.029X Y=2.878 + 0.064X R2 = 0.727 
(4.196) (0.362) (1.022) (0-366) DW = 0.694 
spdo/sodo Y=1.910 + 
0.029X Y=1.977 - 0.040X 
R2 
= 0.941 
(26.181) (2.257) (0.444) (-4.452) DW = 1.265 
sodp/sodo sodp=sodo 
STANSTED BM7 spdp==spdo, sodp=sodo 
On 78-86 87-98 
sp/so 
Y=1.029 + 0.1 OOX Y=2.417 - 0.018X 
R2 = 0.590 
(4.404) (2.397) (2.851) (-2.382) DW = 1.232 
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STANSTED B737 spdp=spdo, sodp=sodo 
78-86 87-98 
sp/so Y=1.029 + 0.100X Y=2.417 - 0.018X R2=0. 590 
(4.404) (2.397) (2.851) (-2.382) DW == 1.232 
Note: Although the actual landing charges are different between B767 and B737, the ratio has been set exactly the 
same at Stansted. 
Table 5-4 Ratios of international passenger charge to domestic passenger charge at 
London airports (corresponding to the hypothesis (A)-1 in the last section) 
HEATHROW 
78-86 87-98 
spdp Y=2.812 - 0.044X Y=1.809 - 0.008X R2= 0.142 
(4.284) (-0.382) (-0.733) (0.381) DW = 2.452 
spdo Y=1.309 - 0.045X Y=0.164 + 0.065X R2= 0.629 * 
(11.100 ) (-2.139) (-4.660) (4.395) DW = 1.481 
sodp Y=1.000 - (2.7E - 16)X Y=0.876 - 0-107X R2= 0.529 * 
(4.384) (-6.7E - 15) (-3.947) (2.218) DW = 1.027 
sodo Y=1.000 + 
(4.4E - 17)X y=0.164 + 0.065X R2= 0.465 
(9.737) (2.4E - 15) (-3.907) (2.986) DW = 1.001 
GATWICK 
78-86 87-98 
spdp 
Y=1.776 + 0.028X Y=2.138 - 0.005X R2= 0.474 
(23.152) (2.039) (2.270) ( -1.990) 
DW = 1.377 
spdo 
Y=1.306 - 0.044X Y=0.633 + 0.029X 
R2 
= 0.549 
(16.938) (-3.237) (4.188) (4.451) DW = 0.903 
sodp 
Y=1.000 + (4. OE - 16)X Y=0.633 + 0.028X 
R2 =: 0.622 
(19.355) (4.4E - 14) (-3.407) 
(2.588) DW = 0.710 
sodo sodp=sodo 
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STANSTED 
78-90 91-98 
spdp Y=1.037 + 0.012X Y=0.793 + 0.056X R2=0.874 
(12.722) (1.132) (-0.631) (1.866) DW = 1.391 
spdo Y -- 1.000 + (l. 6E - 16)X Y=0.205 + 0.050X R2 = 0.717 
(29.157) (3.6E - 14) (-4.893) (5.060) DW = 0.856 
sodp Y -- 1.000 + (l. 6E - 16)X y=0.205 + 0.050X R2 :=0.717 
(2 9.15 7) (3.6E - 14) (-4.893) (5.060) DW = 0.856 
sodo sodp=Sodo 
Note: Although the actual passenger charges are different between international spdo and sodp and also between 
domestic spdo and sodp, the ratio of international spdo to domestic spdo and the ratio of international sodp to domestic 
sodp have been set exactly the same at Stansted. 
Table 5-5 Ratios of international passenger charge to domestic passenger charge at 
Scottish airports (corresponding to the hypothesis (A)-2 in the last section) 
GLASGOW the case for B737 aircraft 
78-86 87-98 
spdp Y=1.278 + 0.026X Y=1.639 + 0.005X 
R2 = 0.891 
(28.851) (3.297) (3.915) (-2.272) DW = 1.490 
spdo &so Y=1.278 + 
0.026X Y= 1.395+0.001X R2=0.474 
(34.186) (3.907) (1.500) (-3.176) DW = 1.564 
EDINBURGH 
78-86 87-98 
spdp Y=1.278 + 
0.026X Y=1.624 - 0.004X 
R2 = 0.854 
(41.953) (4.795) (5.449) (-4.580) DW = 1.511 
spdo & so Y=1.278 + 
0.026X Y=1.387 + 0.001X R2 = 0.470 
(33.880) (3.872) (1.384) (-3.072) DW = 1.552 
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ABERDEEN 
78-86 87-98 
spdp Y=1.278 + 0.026X Y == 1.559 - 0-005X 
R2 
= 0.783 
(50.815) (5.808) (5.361) (-5.786) DW == 1.543 
spdo &so Y=1.278 + 0.026X Y=1.492 + 0.017X R2 = 0.847 
(38.801) (4.435) (0.313) (-1.341) DW = 1.378 
Below are a few representative diagrams illustrating some typical results among all the 
results shown with asterisks in the above tables, i. e., the results with significant 
coefficients. 
diagrams related to the results in Table 5-1 
Heathrow: International passengers spdplspdo 
12 
-8 
2- 
-4 
0- vAI\ -0 
-2.1 ... 78 80 82 84 88 90 92 94 96 48 
1- Residual ------- Actual ---- Fitted 
The above pattern is similar to Gatwick International spdp/spdo. 
_//- 
- 
Heathrow: International passengers spdp/sodp 
12 
------- -10 
-8 
-6 
4 
2- 
...... ..... ...... . ........... 0 --- ---- ---- 
0- 
--- ------------- -2- 
-3 1......... 
78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 
Actual Fitted 
The above pattern is similar to Heathrow Domestic spdp/spdo, Gatwick International spdp/sodp, 
Gatwick Domestic spdp/spdo and Gatwick Domestic spdp/sodp. 
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Heathrow: International passengers spdo/sodo 
0,6- 1.0 
0.4- 
0.2 - 
0.5 
0ý0-ý 
-0.2- . ..... ..... .... ......... ... - --------- - ----------- - ----- 
-0.4 
78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 
- Residual ------- Actual ---- Fitted 
The above pattern is similar to Heathrow Domestic spdo/sodo, 
Gatwick International spdo/sodo and Gatwick Domestic spdo/sodo. 
Stansted International spdp/spdo 
5 
-4 
-3 
1.5 2 
----------- 1.0 - --------------------- 
1 
M-- --------- ------ --- -- ------- --------- -------------------- ----- 
-0 
0.0-ý 
-0.5 - ------ -- ---- - ------------------------ 
-1.0 
11..... 
78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 
1- Residual ------- Actual ---- Fifted 
The above pattern is similar to Stansted Domestic spdp/spdo. 
Stansted International spdp/sodp 
5 
-4 
-3 
----------- 2 
1.5 ---------------- 
I 
1ý0- -0 
0.5 - -------- . ......... - --------- ------ - ------ ---- 
0.0 
--- -------------- - 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 
1- Residual ------- Actual Fitted 
The above pattern is similar to Stansted Domestic spdp/sodp. 
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Stansted International spdo/sodo 
-2.5 
-2.0 
0.4- 
------- 1.0 
0.2- 
. ... .................... 0.5 
0.0 - 
-0.2- 
---------- ------------ -- --------- 
-0.4- 
78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 
Residual ------- Actual - 
L 
The above pattern is similar to Stansted Domestic Spdo/sodo. 
diagrams related to the results in Table 5-2 
Glasgow Domestic spdp/spdo 
1 10 . 
-1.06 
-1.04 
-1.02 
---------- -1.00 
0.02- 
-0.98 
0.01 - - ------ 
0.00 
0.01 
.... .......... 
-0 02 
-0 03 ý4 ' i6 88 90 92 94 ' 9'6 ' 98 78 80 2 
Residual ------- Actual ---- Fitted 
The above pattern is similar to Edinburgh Domestic 
spdp/spdo and Aberdeen Domestic spdp/spdo. 
diagrams related to the results in Table 5-3 
Heathrow B767 spdp/spdo 
1.8 
-1.6 
-1.4 0.3- 
-1.2 0.2- 
0.1- 
-- -- ---- -------- --------- ------------------- 
-0.8 0.0- 
-- -- --------- --- - ---- --- -0.1- 
-0.2- - 
78 ýO ' ý2 ' 84 A 88 90 92 
ý4 ' ý6 98 
Residual ------- Actual - 
The above pattern is similar to Heathrow B737 spdp/spdo. 
181 
Heathrow B767 spdp/sodp 
--2.5 
--------- -2.0 
-1.5 
0.6- 
1 ýO OA- 
0.5 0.2 - ---------------- - ----- -------- - -- - -- -- - --------- - -- -------- -- - ------- - -- 
0.0- 1 
-0.2 ..... ...... .......... --- ----- ............... . .... ... ......... 
78 80 82 84 86 88 90 9ý ý4 ý6 98 
1- Residual ------- Actual ---- Fifted I 
The above pattern is similar to Heathrow 8737 spdp/sodp. 
Heathrow B767 spdo/sodo 
----------- -2.0 
-1.5 
0.6- 
--- --- 1.0 
0.4- 
-0.5 0.2 - .1......... --- - ----------- 
-0.2- 
V- 
... ........... ... --------- - --- ------- 
0 
---- ---- ------ -- 
78 80 82 M 86 88 go , 9,2 , 9'4 , 46 98 
1- Residual ------- Actual ---- Fifted 
The above pattern is similar to Heathrow B737 spdo/sodo. 
_ 
Heathrow B767 sodp/sodo 
1.5 
- 1.4 
-1.3 
0.3- 
-------------- -1.0 0.2- 
0.9 
0.1 - ---------------- --- ----- . .. 
0.0-- -- 
------------ ----- -------- - --- 
-0.1 - ------------------ -- ---- -- - --------- - --- ---- - 
4- 
-0.2 71ý' ýO ' 8'2 8'4 ' ý6 ' ý8 ' 90 92 94 96 98 
1- Residual ------- Actual ---- Rifted 
The above pattern is similar to Heathrow B737 sodp/sodo. 
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Gatwick B767 spdplspdo 
-3.5 
3.0 
-2.5 
1.0 --------- -2.0 
-1.5 
-1.0 
0.0- 
::: ý 
- 0.5 
-0.5- 
-1.0 
78 .810812' Eý ' 86 88 ' 9'0 ' 9ý ý4 ' 9ý ' 98 
1- Residual ------- Actual Fitted 
The above pattern is similar to Gatwick B737 spdp/spdo. 
Gatwick B767 spdo/sodo 
3.0 
-2.5 
-- ------ -2.0 
0.4- -1.5 
1.0 0.2 -......... . .... . ......... . ..... ------ ................ .. --------------------- /\ 
ý- 
I'\ - 0.5 
-0.2 - ---------- 
\-- 
---- --- - .... ....... - ----- -- ---------- - ------------------------ -- ---- - 
-0.4 
78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 
1- Residual ------- Actual ---- Fitted 
The above pattern is similar to Gatwick B737 spdo/sodo. 
Stansted B767 spdp/sodp 
2.5 
- ------------------ ý--'- 
-------------- 
---------- 
-1.0 
0.5- -0.5 
---------- ----- - -- - ----- - -------------- ............ 
0.0 - 
-0.5- 
-1.0 
78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 
1- Residual ------- Actual ---- ý Fitted 
The above pattern is similar to Stansted B737 spdp/sodp. 
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diagrams related to the results in Table 5-4 
Heathrow spdo 
-2.0 
1.4 
0.4 
- ------------- -1.0 
0.2 . . ................ ........ -0.8 
0.0 
-0.2- ---------- - ----- --- ---------- ---------- ----- ------ 
-0A 
78 80 82 84 86 B8 90 92 94 96 98 
1- Residual ------- Actual - 
The above pattern is similar to Gatwick spdo. 
Heathrow sodp 
2 0 - . 
to- - --------------- -0.5 
-0.0 
0.5- 
-- ---------- ----- -- --- 0 0- - . -0 5 -------------------------------- . ... . ......... .- ----------- --- ---- --- ý 78 ' ýO ' ý2 ' 8'4 ' 86 ' 8'8 90 92 94 96 1 98 1- Residual ------- Actual - 
The above pattern is similar to Gatwick sodp. 
Heathrow sodo 
2.0 
-1.6 
0.4 - ----------- 
0.2 - -0.8 
0 0 . 
-0.2- - ------- ------- 
0 4 1 
. - 78 8 ýO ý2 84 8'6 
ý8 ' 40 ' 92 ' 9'4 9'6 '9 
Residual ------- Actual Fitted 
The above paftern is similar to Stansted spdo 
and Stansted sodp. 
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Gatwick spdp 
- 2.4 
. 2.2 
0.3- -------- - 2.0 
0.2- 11.8 
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diagrams related to the results in Table 5-5 
Glasgow spdp 
-1.6 
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Glasgow spdo 
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The above pattern is similar to Edinburgh spdo. 
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Edinburgh spdp 
1.7 
---- - ----- 
-1.4 
-1.3 
0.05 . ....... ....... .... - 
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The above pattern is similar to Aberdeen spdp. 
The results of the tests to see if the hypothesis (I)- I (see Table 5-1) is the case in 
reality are mixed, i. e., as to whether the price ratio of peak passenger charge to 
off-peak passenger charge seems to be raised after (AAR) had been imposed on BAA. 
One cannot rely on the result of Heathrow's international ratios, because at Heathrow 
the differential between the peak passenger charge and the off-peak passenger charge 
for international flights has had to be reduced gradually during the period from 1995 to 
1998 by international obligation (by the 'Exchange of Notes' 1994 mentioned in 
Chapter 2). However, at Gatwick the patterns of the price ratio trends are very similar 
to those at Heathrow as shown in the diagrammatic representations. At Heathrow and 
Gatwick, none of the results seem to support the hypothesis (I)-I. On the contrary, on 
most of the cases, the directions of the slope coefficients turned out to be the opposite 
to the predicted price ratio level change. At Heathrow the difference between peak and 
off-peak passenger charges for domestic flights are not relevant to the international 
obligation, yet the trend shows the decreasing ratio in daily peak time. At Stansted 
spdp/spdo ratio for both international and domestic is rather different. However, in 
these cases, the factor which makes both the average price ratio for the period before 
1990 and that for the period after 1991 different is the sudden jump at 199 1. The slope 
coefficient after the year 1991 is negative, but there is a big difference in intercept 
coefficients between the two periods. The related type of trend to this Stansted 
spdp/spdo case was mentioned earlier in section 5-3 in the form of illustration 
(A). The 
type of trend such as (A) is not evidence for the price ratio level change. The sudden 
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jump of the price ratio is better explained as the related jump of the peak passenger 
charge along with the sudden cost jump due to the opening of the new terminal at 
Stansted. 
As to the Scottish airports' result for the ratio of peak to off-peak passenger charges 
(see Table 5-2), the trend shown is that it was raised at least for domestic passengers, 
which is opposite to the prediction. It is worth noting that at Glasgow and Edinburgh 
BAA has introduced a 'voluntary R-PI-3' price cap since 1993. It is supposed to be 
evidence that BAA has been under an implicit threat from the CAA, in case it might 
impose price regulation on the two airports. Condie (2000) showed that as the result of 
this 'voluntary RPI-3', the airport charge revenue per passenger at Scottish airports has 
been reduced. If the effect of this voluntary (AAR) constraint is effective, the ratio of 
peak passenger charge to off-peak passenger charge would be predicted to rise. 
However, the main reason for the ratio being raised seems to be the sudden jump in 
1988/89 which is one year after the regulatory reform, and since 1988/89 the ratio 
seems to be constant for both Glasgow and Edinburgh. 
The results from the test of (3)-l (see Table 5-3) are mixed. The results for Gatwick in 
terms of spdp/spdo for both B767 and B737 seem to have the price ratio raised after 
1987. Regarding the result of Heathrow as to sodp/sodo, for both aircraft types, as far 
as one can see from the diagrammatic representation, there is no change apart from the 
last two years, 1997 and 1998. One cannot therefore rely on this result as an evidence 
for the prediction. Another quite unusual case which shows the average price ratio was 
raised during the period between 1987 and 1998 is the case for spdp/spdo for B767 
and B737 at Heathrow. The price ratio level was raised continuously in 1987 and 
1,988, but the slope coefficient for the period between 1987 and 1998 is not 
significantly different to that for the previous period. It is arguable whether this 
Heathrow's spdp/spdo case provides us with any evidence for the prediction. 
In any 
other cases the results show the opposite to the predicted price ratio change. 
Regarding the results from the test (A)-I and (A)-2, i. e., the difference 
between 
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international passenger charge and domestic passenger charge, the predictions for both 
London airports and Scottish airports seem to fit the actual trends, apart from the result 
of the Gatwick's spdp case. The ratios for all three London airports' other than 
Gatwick's spdp (see Table 5-4) seem to have been raised since 1987 as in the 
hypothesis (A)-I. The results in Table 5-5 show that at two Scottish airports the 
decrease in the slope coefficient after the reform was observed as in the hypothesis 
(A)-2. As to Heathrow it is worth noting that there was a complaint against 
Heathrow's peak domestic passenger charge in 1988 by the airlines which specialised 
in domestic flights (British Midland, Dan-Air, Air UK and Manx)5. As the CAA judge 
any complaints on the basis of whether the price setting was against section 41(3) of 
the Airports Act 1986, i. e., whether this conduct unreasonably discriminates against 
any class of users of the airport, the CAA concluded this price setting was not against 
41(3). These airlines complained that the peak passenger charge for domestic airlines 
increased at twice the rate of that for international airlines. If the (AAR) constraint was 
effective the ratio of international passenger charge to domestic passenger charge 
would have shown an opposite direction. As I mentioned before, the constraint of (QG) 
is quite similar to (AAR) in that the manipulative factor of current year's passenger 
numbers is included inside the constraint. This is the reason why (QG(A)) can be 
larger than (AAR(A)) if the effect of the (QG) constraint is strong (as described in 
Appendix (5)). 
It would need further analysis for the difference between 'what the traffic would bear', 
i. e., the price elasticity, and the costs with the effect of constraints for both the 
international passenger service and the domestic passenger service, and for both peak 
passenger service and domestic passenger service, in order to examine the precise 
effect of the constraint's change. The results of the price ratio of international 
passenger charge to domestic passenger charge and the results of the price ratio of 
peak passenger charge to off-peak passenger charge might have been influenced more 
by the change of elasticity difference since 1987 than by the constraint's effect. This 
may be the case if the domestic transport modes are becoming more competitive 
relative to the international transport modes. 
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5-5. Implications 
BAA recently stated in its MMC4 report that throughout the second quinquennium 
(1992-1996) it had been constrained by the Heathrow and Gatwick price caps, but the 
system price cap (a cap relevant to the three London airports' total airport charge 
revenue) had not been binding. Therefore during the second quinquennium at least at 
Heathrow and Gatwick the (AAR) constraints were binding. However, the results of 
the empirical tests except for the price ratio of international passenger charge to 
domestic passenger charge show that the predictions were not supported. Apart from 
the possible change in the demand elasticity difference, there are several factors which 
work as implicit constraints that BAA might have been more conscious of than the 
visible constraint of price regulation. The two most important factors to consider with 
regard to the matters that BAA may have taken into account are: 
(1) the process through which the airport charge revenue is determined 
as the amount that the airport operator can earn, which is 'single-till' 
and 
(2) international obligations 
As to (1) above, 'the single-till' is the general practice of airports in the UK and 
overseas (in the case of Britain, this is also reinforced by 'Bermuda 2' as I described in 
Chapter 2). Under this practice, the level of profits from the 'commercial-side' that is 
used to offset the level of airport charges is irrelevant. In theory this could then lead to 
a negative airport charge. All that matters is that the total cost of the airport should be 
covered by the sum of the revenue from the 'commercial-side activities' and the 
revenue from the 'air-side activities'. Therefore the process of determining the level of 
X requires the designated airport operator to show the regulator (and the MMC) the 
projections of the total cost of both air-side and commercial-side, followed by the 
projections for the commercial-side revenue, based on the forecast passenger numbers. 
Finally the difference between the total cost of the 'operational activities' and the 
projected revenue from the 'commercial-side activities' is 
forecasted. This difference is 
the allowed revenue from the 'air-side' and is related to the 
decision on the level of X. 
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This process needs in-depth investigation concerning the cost of capital at an early 
stage of the regulatory review. The level of the projected total cost is linked to the 
overall profit and there is room for the operator to manipulate the capital base to 
increase profits. This problem is related to a well-known tendency for a regulated firm 
to inflate the cost of capital when the fin-n is subject to the rate of return regulation. 
The CAA once turned down the recommendation by the MMC on the level of X 
during the second quinquennium, and set a higher series of X values than the MMC's 
X. insisting that BAA's three London airports' rate of return should be 7% rather than 
8%. 8% was the figure estimated to be reasonable by the MMC. BAA was concerned 
about the X values that the CAA had set, and tried with the help of the user airlines to 
persuade the CAA to change them. One of the major reasons why BAA disapproved of 
the CAA's announcement was that BAA was uncertain about the CAA's future action 
in terms of setting X for the construction of Terminal 5. At the time of the review, it 
was known that Terminal 5 would be constructed during either the 3rd or 4th 
quinquennium. depending on the public enquiry. The terminal 5 construction issue was 
not of immediate relevance during the second quinquennium., nevertheless BAA was 
wary that the way the CAA had acted in setting the X values might have an influence 
on the way the CAA would set the X values in the 3rd or 4th quinquennium. This 
incident can be regarded as a good example of the possibility that a regulated airport 
operator may be interested in securing the long run capital base by trying to manipulate 
the setting of X in the short term, i. e., a price capping for five years can be 
looked 
upon by the operator as just a regulatory lag. 
It has also been pointed out that the tendency for over-investment under 
the rate of 
return regulation can be realised through distortion of the price structure. 
6 By reducing 
the peak price, depending on the elasticity, it may 
be possible that the expansion of the 
capital base is justified through the increased peak 
demand. It is quite difficult to carry 
out any empirical analysis to find out if there 
has been any reduction of peak airport 
charges, particularly for passenger charges 
(in the case of BAA's London airports the 
option of building additional runways has 
been non-existent as described in the 1985 
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White Paper (see Chapter 2)) with the intention of increasing the peak demand in order 
for the operator to be able to justify the seemingly proper cost projection during the 
reviews. However, it is worth mentioning that at Gatwick, when the passenger charge 
applied to the same time period and same day for each year is compared, it is clearly 
indicated that the period allocated as the peak months has been getting wider, at the 
same time the difference between the seasonal (monthly) peak charge and the seasonal 
(monthly) off-peak charge has been reduced gradually since 1991/92 for both 
international flight passengers and domestic flight passengers7. 
As for (2) above, the international agreement that is of particular importance as a 
constraint to BAA's London airports is the 'Exchange of Notes 1994' which is an 
arbitration settlement cancelling the 1983's MOU. Under this agreement BAA is 
obliged to phase out the difference between international peak passenger charge and 
international off-peak passenger charge. However, in reality both at Gatwick and 
Stansted the differential between peak passenger charge and off-peak passenger charge 
have been phased out in a very similar way to the differential which has been phasing 
out at Heathrow over the same period. This may mean that BAA chose to avoid any 
future penalty against the other two airports. It is becoming 'normal' for a regulator of 
a utility industry to 'informally advise' the companies to carry out a particular form of 
rebalancing of charges. It is not known if the CAA has informal contacts with the 
regulated airports or not, yet this kind of contact is possible. The 'voluntary RPI-X' on 
their airport charges at Glasgow and Edinburgh could have been the BAA's strategy to 
avoid the CAA's 'infon-nal' contact in advance. It would be interesting to see how the 
fact that the CAA is also the regulator of the airline industry (i. e., the user side of the 
airport industry) affects the risk perceived by the designated airports of the possible 
imposition of penalties. 
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Notes to Chapter 5 
1. BAA calls them 'charging parameters'. 
2. The 18 airports are Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted, Glasgow, Edinburgh, Aberdeen, 
Manchester, Birmingham, Luton, Newcastle, East Midlands, Bristol, Leeds-Bradford, 
Cardiff, Teesside, Norwich, Blackpool, and Bournemouth. 
3. There was an analysis of airports' cost structures in a Part of a report by Doganis 
and Thompson (1973). Regression models were used to identify the long run cost of 
air-side operations. Their principal model of the cost functional form was as follows: 
InTC =A+ bI - InQ + b2 - InINT + b3 - DVT + b4 - ATC, 
where TC is the total cost of air-side operation, Q is output measured in terms of Work 
Load Unit (this is a conventional measure to combine both passengers and freight; this 
report's conversion unit was I Work Load Unit as either one terminal passenger or 
100 kg of freight or mail, see Doganis (1992)). INT denotes the percentage of the 
passengers on international flights to the total passenger numbers, DVT is a dummy 
variable to any existence of a major development programine (either 0 if none, or I if a 
major development programme existed in the Past ten years) and A TC denotes a 
dummy variable as to the airport's involvement in the air traffic control operation 
(either 0 if the airport was responsible for air traffic control, or I if not). They used 
cross-section data for the estimation of TC. 
4. Recently categorisation by noise levýel of aircraft was introduced by ICAO. BAA's 
airports recently introduced penalties on noisy aircraft. Basically 
'Chapter I or 2' 
aircraft types are the noisiest and 'Chapter 4' type aircraft are regarded as the quietest. 
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'Chapter 3' aircraft are relatively quiet and at BAA's airports there is no noise penalty 
charge for landing the 'Chapter 3' aircraft. The noise factor in airport charge 
regulation, however, is not an issue in this thesis. 
5. Civil Aviation Authority docw-nent 'APD3'. 
6. Shennan (1985) and Bailey and White (1974). 
7. The tables below show the actual international passenger charge's seasonal trends 
for the period between 1978/79 and 1986/87 and the period between 1987/88 and 
1998/99, i. e., before and after the regulatory reform respectively. The charge is applied 
to the international passengers who depart on Saturdays or Sundays during the time 
period between 9: 00 AM and 15: 00 PM. The horizontal axis shows months from April 
to March. Using the same notation as in this Chapter, the comparison showing the 
tables are between the price categories of spdp and sodp. The tables show that (1) 
particularly from 1983/84 (when the new traffic growth related financial target was 
introduced) the 'peakiness' has been sharpened and (2) from 1990/91 the difference of 
the charge between peak months and off-peak months has been gradually reduced. 
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Gatwick's seasonal trend of international passenger charge: before the regulatory 
reform 
Gatwick internat ional passenger charge 78-86 
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Gatwick's seasonal trend of international passenger charge: after the regulatory 
reform 
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Chapter 6 
UK Airport Industry: Productive Efficiency 
6-1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to seek evidence concerning differences in productive 
efficiency for the different types of airport operators under different sets of objectives 
and constraints. As we have already seen, the regulatory reform following the 1986 
Airports Act changed the ownership of and constraints on UK airports, and four 
categories of airports under different 'institutional arrangement' were established as 
, described in Chapter 3. In this chapter, I address the issue of changes in efficiency 
from the point of view of productivity. As I have analysed in Chapter 3, the main 
changes we can see in the UK airport industry are as follows: 
(1) from nationalised to privatised with price regulation 
(2) from nationalised to privatised without price regulation 
(3) from direct local authority management to local authority plc with price 
regulation 
(4) from direct local authority management to local authority plc without 
price regulation 
In Chapter 31 have used a basic regulatory model and have predicted different levels 
of both cost-reduction and investment for each of the above four types in the period 
before and after the regulatory reform. The differences were mainly caused 
by changes 
in objectives and in the style of constraints. The following tables are summaries of the 
predictions from the regulatory models I used in Chapter I 
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(1) BAA's 3 London airports 
-82/83 83/84-86/87 87/88- 
nationalised growth related f. t. * privatised 
cost reduction effort -c, =+1 (3-3) -cx =+1 (3-11) -cx =a (3-18) 
level of investment -Ck = O(k)ýI - 77(k-)ý (3-4) -Ck =0 (k) (3-12) -- F-ck =r (3-7) 
* f. t. denotes financial target 
(2) BAA's Scottish airports 
-86/87 87/88- 
nationalised privatised 
cost reduction effort -c, = -L± 'I 
+1 (3-3) -C, =a (3-18) 
level of investment -Ck =O(k)ýI - ift)ý (3-4) -Ck =r (3-7) 
(3) Manchester Airport 
-86/87 
direct local authority management 
87/88- -7 
Pic 
cost reduction effort -c., =I- 1-1 (3-15) -c., a (3-24) 
level of investmen r- Gk - (3-16) Ck r +, y (3-25) 
(4) local authorities' airports other than Manchester 
-86/87 
direct local authority management 
87/88- 
PIC 
cost reduction effort -c,, =1- 
d-1 (3-15) 
11 -c, 
=p (3-21) 
level of investment -Ck =r- 
Gk - jpT (3-16) -Ck =r+6 (3-22) 
Benchmarks 
cost reduction effort -c., =1 (3-6) 
level of investment -Ck =r (3-7) 
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Regarding categories (1) and (2) above, i. e., BAA's London and Scottish airports, the 
improvement in both cost-reduction and level of investment is predicted after 
privatisation (from (3-3) and (3-4) to (3-18) and (3-7) respectively). The main impact 
of the privatisation of the then British Airports Authority is considered to be the 
pressure of the capital market, rather than pressure through competition among 
airports. I have assumed in Chapter 3 that value a is smaller than b, because of the 
stronger monitoring of the managers placed upon their managerial effort. Where a<b 
holds, it is always the case that b-I +I>a holds as to the cost-reduction effort A 
when comparing (3-3) with (3-18). During the period between 1983/84 and 1986/87 
(when a unique traffic growth related financial target forin was imposed each year) 
there seems to have been stronger pressure on management to raise their cost-reduction 
effort, as analysed in Chapter 3, via an increased value of A. However, as long as 
a<b, the amount of x input as the cost-reduction activity in this period cannot have 
been greater than the amount which is realised after privatisation. Regarding the 
investment level, the model result in Chapter 3 predicts that BAA's airports after 
privatisation are efficient in the sense that the marginal benefit of reducing the 
non-capital cost due to investing in capital stock is equal to the opportunity cost of 
capital as -ck = r. Under nationalisation, (3-4) implies that the investment level of 
capital stock is either too large or too small compared to the optimum, depending on 
whether O(k)ýI - 77(k)ý is less than or greater than the cost of capital r (there was no 
guarantee that O(k)ýl - 77(k)ý = r). During the period between 1983/84 and 1986/87, 
the investment condition was directly determined by the traffic growth related financial 
target and indirectly determined by the output as shown by (3-12) as -ck = O(k) 
(although in the case of Scottish airports this constraint is considered to be irrelevant, 
as explained in section 5-3-(1) they were subject to a break-even constraint during this 
period). There may be, again, either over-investment or under-investment, depending 
on whether O(k) is less than or greater than r. As the financial target in each year 
during this period was met, the financial target constraint was binding each year and 
the value of 0 is considered to become larger via the value of 
ý as the traffic was 
growing increasingly during this period (as mentioned 
in Chapter 3). Thus at least it is 
reasonable to make a hypothesis that compared to the period 
between 1983/84 and 
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1986/87, the investment level had been changed from under-investment toward the 
optimum after privatisation. Combining the effect of both changing the cost-reduction 
effort level deten-nined by -cx = 
b-1 +1 to the level determined by -cx =a and 
changing the investment level determined by _ck = O(k)ýl - q(k)ý (and -'k = O(k) 
just before privatisation) to the optimal level, it is considered as a hypothesis that the 
productive efficiency of the then British Airports Authority was improved after 
privatisation. as BAA. 
As to the categories (3) and (4) which are local authority airports, it is difficult to 
predict how the cost-reduction effort may have been changed, because the comparison 
between (3-15) and (3-24) and the comparison between (3-15) and (3-21) would 
require us to know the strength of the constraint of (3-13). However, at least in so far 
as political pressure towards providing employment within the local community was 
removed after the regulatory reform, we can assume d>a>I and d>P>I- Thus 
it is likely that the marginal cost to the managers of the local authority airports of the 
cost-reduction activities would be smaller after the regulatory reform than before. The 
change in the level of investment was clear. It was predicted, by the comparison 
between (3-16) and (3-22) (in Manchester's case by the comparison between (3-16) 
and (3-25)), that the tendency towards over-investment was reduced as the constraint 
of the central government grant was removed and only the capital borrowing limit was 
left, meaning that they are facing an under-investment problem. Overall it can be 
predicted that productive efficiency in local authority airports was improved after the 
regulatory reform. 
In the next section I explain the framework for the efficiency measurements I carry out 
in this chapter. In section 6-3 the data and the methodologies regarding the two types 
of efficiency measurements I use in this chapter are described. 
Section 6-4 and 6-5 are 
the results of the two empirical efficiency measurements. 
I summarise in section 6-6 
the results of productive efficiency tests including those of 
BAA which were carried 
out by other researchers and compare them with my result. 
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6-2. Framework for technical efficiency measurement 
I use Data Envelopment Analysis (hereafter DEA) which originated from Farrell's 
work (1957) on frontier analysis and developed by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes 
(1978). DEA enables us to measure the efficiency of each 'decision making unit 
(hereafter DMU)' based only on the observed most efficient units. Assessments can be 
carried out by DEA as to the relative efficiency of a set of DMUs producing a set of 
outputs using a set of inputs. One of the advantages of DEA is that one does not need 
to specify any production functions so that only the observed data is relied upon. 
Another advantage of DEA is that it is not based on the process of 'averaging' data 
unlike regression analysis. DEA is based on the construction of the technology frontier 
and calculation of the efficiency score for each unit and can be made using the frontier 
as a benchmark of a 100% efficiency level, i. e., the efficiency score is measured by the 
distance from the frontier. DEA efficiency measurement can be looked upon as the 
combined efficiency caused both by any cost-reduction effort and by any improvement 
in investment level in the context of Chapter 3's models. 
Suppose there are five organisational units that belong to an industry that uses two 
inputs, xI and x2, and produces one output, y. All units produce exactly the same 
amount of the output which is The important assumption is that if one combines 
existing units using non-negative multiples of their input output levels, the resulting 
input output levels are feasible in principle. Thus after plotting the actual levels one can 
make a boundary as shown in Figure 6-1, which is a boundary below which no 
combination of two inputs can produce the amount of -y. This is called the efficiency 
boundary. For instance, the unit operating with an input-output mix of (xOj, x2O, )T) is 12 
plotted as a, and is considered as input efficient, while the unit expressed as e using 
(X 1 
5X 
1 y) is not efficient compared with a. Unit b and d are also efficient. 
The 
12 
technical input efficiency of a, b and d is 1, while that of e is measured as oa/oe. 
In 
the case of c, the measurement of efficiency is oVoc. 
Where T shows the lowest input 
levels unit c could have used to produce -y. In the context of 
Figure 6-1, a unit can be 
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said to be efficient if no other individual unit or combination of units can reduce at 
least one of its input levels without requiring either a lower level on at least one of the 
outputs, or a higher level of at least one other input. 
Figure 6-1 an efficiency boundary 
) 
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%J X2 7' 2 --2 
The general method for seeking the efficiency of unit mo is as follows: 
t 
max eo - 
"='wjyj' 
fi-, vixi. 
S. t. 
si=, wiyjm <12 wj, viý F, Ei--1 vixim 
where 
yj,, = amount of outpu j from unit ný 
xi,, = amount of input i from unit 
wj = the weight given to output j, 
vi = the weight given to input i, 
n= the number of units, 
t= the number of outputs, 
s= the number of inputs, 
E=a smaH positive number. 
(6-1) 
m===I,..., rýV i and ý 
tPut The above model starts from a concept of efficiency which is Ou . Since typically input 
an organisational unit operates with more than one input and output, efficiency measure 
can be defined as wei 
. ghted sum o outputs )f 
weighted sum of inputs 
To solve the model (6-1) it is necessary 
to convert it into linear form so that the methods of linear programming can be applied. 
The linear programming version of the model (6-1) is as follows: 
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t 
max eo w jyj., 
s S. v ix im 
VýX- 
, i-- II im w ýyj" 
s; j=1,.., t; vi, wj > 
(6-2-P) 
The fractional programming problem of (6-1) is equivalent to the linear programming 
problem (6-2-P). 
For any linear programming model it is possible to formulate a partner model using the 
same data. The solution to either the original linear programming model (the primal) or 
the partner (the dual) provides the same information about the problem being modelled. 
The dual formulation of (6-2-P) model can be arranged as follows: 
min 00 
S. t. 
En. 
1 ximAm 
+ Ooximo >0 
-.. dm 
Y n= I Yjm, ým ý: Yjmo am >0; 00 unconstrained 
(6-2-D) 
00 and Zm are related dual variables. When slack variables are defined as: 
d-i = OOx 
yn ; tm (dý : the slack in the ith input, i. e., the Xim imo , M=1 
'surplus' of input amount, the difference between the actual input use 
and the input availability) and 
d +- = 
En 
'ým - Yjmý 
(d+ : the slack in thejth output, i. e., the 
j m=1 
Yim j 
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'lack' of output amount, the difference between the output amount which is possible to be produced and the realised output amount), 
the problem (6-2-D) is expressed as follows: 
min 00 
n 
S. t. Em=l Xim, ým + d-i = OOxjmO 
n. Zm - dt = yjmO , EM I 
YjM1 j 
11m, d-j, dt > 0; 00 unconstrained j- 
(6-2-D)' 
The primal model (6-2-P) has n+s+t+I constraints whilst the dual model (6-2-D)' 
has s+t constraints. As the number of n, the total number of units, is usually larger 
than s+t, the number of inputs and outputs, the primal model has many more 
constraints than the dual model. The less the constraints, the easier to solve a linear 
pr ogramming model, and thus it is usual to solve the dual DEA model rather than the 
primal. The DEA optimal solution set consists of the optimal solution (0 *, 'ý 
*1, 
.., ý'n*) 
and the optimal slacks (d-, * dsý*, d+, * dt*) If 0* =I and all slacks are zero I I.., I I.. It* 
the DMU is defined as efficient (as 100% efficient). 
The above model is often called the CCR model named after the initials of Chames, 
Cooper and Rhodes (1978) who introduced the technique of DEA. One of the 
postulates that justify the construction of the production possibility set for the CCR 
formulation is called the 'Ray Unboundedness' postulate. Because of this postulate the 
production possibility set under the CCR model is constructed on the assumption of 
constant returns to scale. When one uses simple input-output configurations, (Xm, Ym), 
where Xm = (x I m'. .. x im, ..., xsm) 
is a vector of observed inputs (X c Rs) and 
YM = (YiMI-I YiM, - .., ytm) 
is a vector of observed outputs (Y E=- Rt) for DMU m, 
the production possibility set T under the CCR forinulation can 
be defmed as follows: 
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TCCR = ýW 1ý IX ý-> XMk, Y< YMkq k> Oý where k denotes a non-negative 
(column) vector of dimension n. 
The 'Ray Unboundedness' postulate, is an assumption that if (X, 1) E-= T, then 
(kY, kI) E=- T for any k>0. This assumption enables one to extrapolate the 
performance of the most efficient DMUs with efficient scale sizes. 
Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984), developed another model in which they deleted 
this postulate 'Ray Unboundedness' thus adding a new constraint 
n ýM =I to 
EM=l 
(6-2-D). Adding this constraint Y" ým =I requires that the weights of the 
comparison group sum to be one. Therefore they developed an efficiency measurement 
procedure that assigns an efficiency rating of I to a DMU if and only if this DMU lies 
on the efficient production surface, i. e., the efficiency measurement procedure where 
comparison is by interpolation between DMUs only. This model is often called the 
BCC model named after the initials of Banker, Chames and Cooper (1984). The BCC 
model's production possibility set is as follows: 
T,,, = ý(X, 1) 1X> Xmk, Y< Ymk, ek = 
1, k> Oý where e= (I 1 1). 
The dual and the primal of the BCC formulation are as follows respectively: 
min 00 
En=, xim, ým + Ooximo S. t. 
M 
n 
Yjm, ýM YjMo 
dM 
EM ýM 
... dm=l 
, 
ýM > 00 unconstrained 
(6-3-D) 
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t 
max eo Wjyj rn 0+ co 
s 
S. t. 
Eiý--l 
vixim, 
-Es 
t 
wjyj" + a) vixim + 
s; j v,, w 
(o unconstrained 
(6-3-P) 
The new variable a) in (6-3-P) is a dual variable related to the new constraint 
m 
M==I 
I in (6-3-D). Since T CCR and T, cc are ýdifferent, the efficiency frontier 
under the BCC formulation is different to that under the CCR formulation. Figure 6-2 
diagrammatically shows the difference. In the figure 6-2 four DMUs, a, b, c and d are 
shown and each DMU produces one output using one input. The efficiency frontier 
under the CCR formulation is formed as the line which passes through the origin and 
the point b. Because of the constraint 
5-11 
'ým = 1, the efficiency frontier under the 
BCC formulation is forined as the boundary when all four points a, b, c and d are 
joined up. Therefore, the production possibility set under the CCR formulation is 
defined as the area (A) + (B) + (C), whereas the production possibility set under the 
BCC fonnulation is defmed as the area (C) and it is a polyhedral set. The efficiency 
frontier under the BCC formulation in this one-input-one-output example is constructed 
by the set of supporting lines of -v*x + w*y + 0)* = 0. The efficiency frontier in the 
case of DMUs producing multiple outputs using multiple inputs is constructed by the 
set of supporting hyperplanes instead of lines. In the case of (6-3-P), the supporting 
hyperplane in (s + t)-dimensional Euclidean space is given by 
t 
+ 0)* V Xi + W*y 
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Figure 6-2 different efficiency frontiers 
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In the one-input-one-output example, each supporting line constructing the BCC 
efficiency frontier is written as y= -wK! *-x - -wOL*. The intercept is - 
'W* 
. The sign of o) 
is useful as the reference regarding whether an efficient unit E= (xE, YE) (by 
definition E is also on the frontier) is operating on increasing returns to scale, constant 
returns to scale or decreasing returns to scale. When the efficiency frontier is 
constructed by the three efficient DMUs A, B and C as in Figure 6-3, when ('EYE) is 
on the frontier between A and B., increasing returns to scale are present. DMU B is 
operating on constant returns to scale. When (IE, YE) is on the frontier between B and 
C, decreasing returns to scale are present. In the general multiple-input-multiple-output 
case, when a unique supporting hyperplane of 
-S Oxi + 
it *+ co* =0 passes through an efficient point (XE, YE), 
Ed 
i-- II 
E"= 
I 
W) Yj 
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" increasing returns to scale is present at (XE, YE) t: * o) >0 
" constant returns to scale is present at (XE, YE) <=> o) *o 
" decreasing returns to scale is present at (XE, YE) : =* o) <0 
Figure 6-3 DEA's returns to scale concept in T., 
output 
co <0 
10 = 
out 
0 
As Tgcc is convex, if the DMUs A= (xA, yA) and B= (xB, YA) as shown in Figure 
6-4, the efficiency score under BCC formulation for the DMU A would be measured 
as 
IM (= OXB ), whilst under CCR formulation the DMiJ A's efficiency score is 
1W OXA 
measured as AM. The DMU B would not be scored as efficient with the productivity AIM 
possibility frontier under CCR formulation,, but B is scored as a unit measured as 
efficient with the production possibility frontier under BCC formulation. All DMUs' 
efficiency scores under BCC formulation are either the same as, or higher than, under 
CCR formulation because of the additional convexity constraint under BCC 
formulation. 
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Figure 6-4 efficiency scores under BCC formulation 
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Another difference between the CCR formulation and the BCC formulation is that the 
efficiency score of a DMU measured based on the input minimisation model as in 
(6-2-D) is corresponding straightforwardly to the efficiency score of a DMU based on 
the output maximisation model in the case of the CCR formulation. The concept of the 
output maximisation model is basically to look for the maximum amount of output 
using the input available (in the case of input minimisation model one looks for the 
minimum amount of input in order to produce the output that is theoretically possible). 
Using the illustration of Figure 6-4, the efficiency score of the DMU A in the CCR 
formulation as to the input minimisation model is expressed as 
Mv ý2x-, v ), and as MAr OXA 
0 
to the output maximisation model is expressed as 
JA Y). As the CCR JK OYK 
efficiency frontier is linear, the efficiency score of a DMU under the output 
maximisation model is the same as the efficiency score obtained under the input 
minimisation model. However, under the BCC formulation, the efficiency score of A 
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efficiency frontier 
using the input minimisation model which is '7vM (= -ýx-' ) is different to A's efficiency MAr OXA 
score using the output maximisation model which is JA (== JL OYL 
DEA can also be used to measure input allocative efficiency incorporating the input 
price data for the inputs. Strictly speaking, 'productive efficiency, as a concept is a 
combination of 'technical efficiency' and 'input allocative efficiency'. In order for 
'input allocative efficiency' to be calculated, reliable data for the inputs' prices over 
different DMUs is required. However, the data regarding inputs' prices are not 
available for the UK airport industry. Thus the focus in this chapter is on the technical 
efficiency of production, which is a limitation in the efficiency analyses. 
In the next section I explain the two kinds of technical efficiency measurements. 
6-3. Efficiency measurements: types, data and methodology 
(1) Two types of measurement carried out in this chapter 
There are two types of measurements (A) and (B) I carry out in this chapter. 
Measurement (A) 
Comparing the efficiency scores for each airport in each year as a DMU among all the 
airports involved, i. e., the four categories I described in section 6-1 as (1) to 
(4) would 
be ideal. Unfortunately, the then nationalised British Airports Authority had not 
published the data regarding capital inputs for each airport before 1987/88. 
Therefore, 
analysing efficiency scores before that year is not possible. Treating a group of airports 
which has belonged to this organisation is possible, thus the 
first measurement is 
carried out in order to investigate whether BAA, rather than 
its individual airports, as 
an organisation had changed in terms of technical efficiency over 
time, including the 
time when this organisation was nationalised under the name of 
the then British 
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Airports Authority (measurement (A)). The purpose of this measurement is to 
investigate whether the hypothesis, as described in section 6- 1, that the productive 
efficiency of the then British Airports Authority was improved after privatisation as 
BAA is supported. 
There is a specific problem in the DEA measurement which is undertaken on 
observations at different points in time. BAA might have expected to have been 
affected by technological change over the period of observation. This means that there 
might have been a shift (or multiple shifts) of the production frontiers during the 
observation period. Where improvements in technology made the frontier shift towards 
higher productivity the results would be biased in favour of the DMUs which belong to 
the improved production possibility set. Technical efficiencies measured by DEA 
cannot themselves detect whether an inefficient DMU was at a stage where the 
organisation was catching up with the new frontier or at a stage where the organisation 
was operating on the old frontier. 
There are several ways to tackle this problem. One method is to use an index called 
the 'Malmquist index'. Where there are two DMUs observed in different periods t and 
t+I and if one can assume that due to the productivity growth the efficiency frontier 
in the period t+1, sayft+,, is different to the efficiency frontier in the period t, sayft, 
the efficiency score of the DMU in period t can be revalued using ft+ 1, and the 
efficiency score of the DMU in period t+1 can be revalued using ft. The Malmquist 
index is a geometric mean of the two revalued efficiency scores of the two different 
DMUs. A good example of using the Malmquist index to decompose the efficiency 
effects of privatisation both in frontier shift effect and in pure technical efficiency can 
be seen in Waddams Price and Weyman-Jones (1996) where they investigated whether 
there was a shift towards productive efficiency in the UK natural gas industry. 
A drawback of this method is that it is difficult to justify the evaluation of a 
DMU 
observed in the period t using the efficiency Erontier realised 
in the period t+1, though 
there would be no problem in evaluating a DMU observed 
in the period t+I using the 
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efficiency frontier in the period t. The managers in the period t would have no access 
to the technology which would be realised in the period t+1. If it was used to 
compare different regions or different countries, the Malmquist index method would be 
a useful technique (Waddams Price and Weyman-Jones (1996) mentioned above used 
a rich panel data consisting of time series of 15 years and 12 different regions). 
However, if applied to a single organisation using observations at different points in 
time, it would have the serious drawback of not being realistic in its assumptions. In 
my calculation of BAA's efficiency I did not use this method for this reason. Another 
reason for not using this method is that one cannot assume with certainty that the 
efficiency frontier after the regulatory reform (period t+ 1) was shifted towards a more 
efficient direction compared to the efficiency frontier before the regulatory reform 
(period t). The airport industry is not typically renowned as a fast growing industry for 
technological growth. 
Another way of tackling the problem in using DEA in time series is to incorporate 
technological change as one of the inputs. The work by Boussofiane, Martin and Parker 
(1997), which I will mention later in section 6-6, as a part of their calculations used a 
linear time trend variable to capture technological improvements. As the authors 
mentioned 'its crudity is seýflevident' because the variable was not based on specific 
information on the technology of each industry whose efficiency scores they calculated 
in time series. Thus they did not put great emphasis on the result. Although their trial 
gives us a useful insight as a method, incorporation of any variable which is basically 
an estimation constructed on the data outside the managers' control should be treated 
with caution. In the calculation I carried out in this chapter I have avoided such data. 
Measurement (B) 
The second measurement (measurement (B)) is to investigate whether there was any 
significant performance difference between privatised airports 
(i. e., BAA's airports) 
and local authority airports after the regulatory reform. As 
I mentioned in Chapter 2, 
the accounting methods of local authority airports 
before they became plcs were 
different to the current accounting methods which are used 
for plcs. After 1988/89 
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there are 'Regulatory Accounts' available (as I mentioned in Chapter 5) for each 
regulated airport. Therefore for the period from 1988/89 (when the first 'Regulatory 
Accounts' were published) to 1995/962 the airports efficiency scores were calculated 
as a panel comparison between local authority airports and private airports. 
As to the cost-reduction effort, i. e., the input amount of x in the predictions carried out 
in Chapter 3, it is assumed that I<a<a and I<a<P, and therefore there is 
assumed to be greater cost-reduction effort attached to the privatised airports' 
managers than to the local authority airports' managers. This is because of the stronger 
pressure placed upon the management of privatised airports. Unlike the case of BAA's 
airports or other privatised airports, local authority airports' managers are still sheltered 
from the pressure of shareholders and from the takeover threat. Regarding the 
investment level of capital stock, the models in Chapter 3 predict that after the 
regulatory reform local authority airports suffer from under-investment due to the 
borrowing limit constraint, whereas privatised airports' investment level in capital stock 
is predicted to be optimum. Therefore, as one can (a) compare -cx =a with -cx =a 
or -cx =P and (b) compare -ck =r with -ck =r+y or -ck =r+6, the 
productivity of the privatised airports is considered to be greater than that of the local 
authority airports, which is the hypothesis to be tested in measurement (B). 
(2) Data for measurements (A) and (B) 
Physical data is most reliable in terms of efficiency measurement by DEA. As to 
inputs, physical data such as 'staff man-hours', 'runway capacity' or 
'area of the 
terminals owned' would be desirable. However, there is no consistently available 
data 
for all airports, i. e., these figures are neither constantly published 
(such as terminal size 
or staff man-hours) nor counted by the UK airports. 
As to inputs I use only pecuniary 
data: (a) staff costs and (b) capital employed as the 
inputs for the calculations. In the 
case of the staff costS3 the data was deflated 
by the RPI. The local authority airports 
publish their staff costs each year. Capital 
input was calculated as the total tangible 
assets minus current liabilities from modified 
based historic cost accounts (including 
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revaluation), which were in the Public domain as the data was taken from the annual 
report of each airport. The implication of using this pecuniary data is that (1) the effect 
of cost-reduction effort would be shown only in the form of staff related input, and 
would not, for example, be measured as an improvement in the efficient use of space. 
Also (2) as the staff costs consist of both the wages and staff numbers, it might be 
possible that there would be a distortion caused by the wage level difference among 
different airports as they are located in different regions. The use of capital employed 
would make the airports which have less of an over-investment problem be measured 
as efficient to a greater degree than if capital were not directly used as the input. One 
of the predictions made in Chapter 3 (-Ik =r was the benchmark) concerned whether 
the investment level was reduced toward the more efficient level after the regulatory 
reform in both the BAA and local authority airports' cases (although the prediction 
with regard to the local authority airports after the regulatory reform was the problem 
of under-investment), thus the use of capital as an input is acceptable. 
The then nationalised British Airports Authority used to publish both CCA (current 
cost accounts) and HCA (historic cost accounts). From an opportunity costs' point of 
view CCA data is better. However, the then nationalised British Airports Authority 
stopped publishing its CCA data after 1986 (see Table 2-1), 1 have therefore used 
HCA. 
Regarding the outputs, physical data such as total passenger numbers, Air Transport 
Movement (hereafter ATM), and tonnes of cargo and mail carried by airports are 
available. There are two problems. Firstly there are strong correlations between the 
data. Secondly this data referring to passenger numbers, ATM and tonnes of cargo and 
mail is only relevant to the 'air-side' operation. Therefore there 
is a problem as to how 
to express the output of the 'commercial-side'. As a method one can use only one 
output which is the total turnover. The drawback 
in using only one output in the airport 
industry is in ignoring that there are two categories of operations. A useful question 
is: 
what do the operators want to maximise as to their output? 
As to the use of 'air-side' 
operation the likely answer to this question 
is in the number of aircraft landed and 
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taken-off. As to the 'commercial-side' the likely answer is the commercial revenue. 
One can regard passenger numbers as the measure of the inputs for the commercial 
operation, as I explained in Chapter 4 in the context of how to treat c commercial -side'. 
The trade off is that if passenger numbers are used as the input (in which case ATM 
cannot be used as the result of correlations between passenger numbers and ATM) the 
feature of 'air-side' efficiency (which is related to the question; what the airport would 
like to do to maximise its efficiency? ) would be ignored. I experimentally tried 
adopting the ratio of passenger numbers per aircraft but this did not work as it 
distorted the results. As a compromise, I decided to use the following output data; (1) 
ATM and (2) commercial revenue (after being deflated by the RPI). 
(3) methodology 
I call the efficiency measurement method under the CCR formulation as expressed in 
(6-2-D) 'constant returns to scale method' (hereafter CRS) and the method under the 
BCC formulation as in (6-3-D) 'variable returns to scale method' (hereafter VRS). I 
use VRS and deduce efficiency scores based on input minimisation. This means that I 
search for the minimum input level required to produce a chosen level of output. The 
reason for choosing input minimisation VRS is that in the case of the airport industry 
the demand has been forecasted in advance and is less likely to be influenced by 
demand fluctuation. Unlike the airline industry the airport industry enjoys a more or 
less natural monopoly at least locally. Each airport faces a predeten-nined objective in 
the presence of limited resources (this tendency was even more so during the period 
when there was capital rationing constraint). The model I use is, therefore written as 
follows: 
a set of n DMUs (here any airport operation in a financial year), 
m=n 
each DMU uses 2 different inputs; 
amount of ith input being xim, i=1,2 to produce 
2 different outputs; amount of jth output being yjm, j=1,2. 
214 
Input Minimisation Model: 
max eo 
2: 
wzjm 
0+ 
S. t. 
i: 
viximo =15 
-Z vixim +Z wjyjm +CO <0m=l,..., n 
Vi, W>0 vili i- (M) 
Regarding the measurement (A) the calculation of each year's technical efficiency is 
straightforward using the model (M). 
Measurement (B)'s purpose is to compare efficiency between private airports and local 
authority airports. Each technical efficiency measurement is carried out using the model 
(M). However, in order to investigate whether there is any significant difference in 
efficiency between management under private ownership and that under local authority 
ownership, measurement (B) additionally involves breaking down the result of the 
overall technical efficiency measurement into two groups and comparing the results for 
the efficiency measured within the group of data which the DMU belongs to, with the 
result for the overall technical efficiency. This method was originated from a useful 
technique by Chames, Cooper and Rhodes (1981) to disentangle managerial efficiency 
and policy efficiency, which can be achieved by breaking down technical efficiency4. 
'Managerial inefficiency' is defined here as technical inefficiency measured relative to 
the most efficient DMUs within the same type of ownership, whilst 'policy 
inefficiency' is defined as inefficiency that is attributable to policy constraints within 
which management is required to operate due to the type of ownership the DMU 
belongs to. 
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Figure 6-5 disentangling 'managerial efficiency' and 'policy efficiency' 
xl 
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In the illustration given by Figure 6-5 where there are two efficiency boundaries, P-P' 
is the efficiency boundary which is formed by a reference set from the total set of data. 
S-S' is the efficiency boundary that is formed by another reference set which is 
deduced from a separate data set containing only one type of ownership group. In this 
example, the overall technical efficiency of e is measured by the distance between b 
and e, so that it is calculated as the ratio of OB10E. On the other hand, 'managerial 
efficiency' of e is measured by the distance between a and e, so that it is calculated as 
the ratio of OA/0E. Tolicy efficiency' is measured by the distance between a and b, 
OBIOA, and thus can be calculated by dividing overall technical efficiency by 
'managerial efficiency', i. e., OB / OA .I will use this technique 
in order to compare the OE OE 
efficiency between private airports and local authority airports. 
6-4. Results of the time series efficiency measurement of the 
then nationalised British Airports Authority and BAA 
The results of the efficiency scores5 of the measurement 
(A) is shown in Table 6-1 
and also shown graphically in Figure 6-6. The results also show the target reduction 
rates of both inputs with which efficiency would have 
been achieved. I show in Table 
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6-2 the major constraints' changes and other events which are outside the control of 
BAA's management. Figure 6-7 shows the comparison between the efficiency scores 
and the real GDP, and Figure 6-8 shows the comparison between the efficiency scores 
and the real GDP growth rate per year. Figure 6-9 shows the relationship between the 
efficiency scores and the real fuel price index. 
Table 6-1 the then nationalised British Airports Authority and BAA 
efficiency scores from 1966/67 to 1995/96; time series result 
YEAR efficiency reduction to reduction to 
VRS scores achieve efficiency achieve efficiency 
Capital Stuff cost M 
66/67 1 0 0 
67/68 0.989 1.1 1.1 
68/69 0.995 0.5 0.5 
69/70 1 0 0 
70/71 1 0 0 
71/72 1 0 0 
72/73 1 0 0 
73/74 0.999 0.1 0.9 
74/75 0.984 1.6 2.6 
75/76 1 T 0 
76/77 0 0 
77/78 0 0 
78/79 0:: 8 71 12.9 12.9 
79/80 
E E 
1 1 0 0 
80/81 0.808 19.2 19.2 
81/82 0.808 19.2 19.2 
82/83 0.873 12.7 12.7 
83/84 0.98 2 2 
84/85 0.982 1.8 1.8 
85/86 1 0 0 
86/87 959 4.1 4.1 
87/88 
88/89 
- 89/90 
- 90/91 
- 91/92 
92/93 - 
93/94 
1 
0.906 
0.848 - 
0.7ý7 
0.915 
0.8-ý4- 
0.991 
0 
9.4 
15.2 
21.3 
8. b 
10.6 
1 
0 
9.4 
15.2 
21.6 
26.5 
10.6 
1 
0 
1194/95 195/96 
1 0 
0 0 
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Table 6-2 policy constraints and events which were out of BAA's control 
YEAR VRS policy events outside BAA's control 
score constraints 
66/67 1 establ i shed 
67/68 0.989 nationalised industries White Paper 
68/69 0.995 
69/70 1 
70/71 1 
71/72 1 
72/73 1 
73/74 0.999 Maplin project rejected oil crisis 
74/75 0.984 oil crisis 
75/76 1 
76/77 1 
77/78 1 
78/79 1 0.871 airport policy White Paper recession 
79/80 1 recession / oil crisis 
80/81 0.808 recession 
81/82 0.808 recession 
82/83 0.873 Queen's Speech 
83/84 0.98 
84/85 0.982 deregulation: airline ind-istry inside EU 
85/86 1 airport policy White Paper 
86/87 0.959 the Airports Act privatisation of BA / mrger of BA/Bcal 
87/88 1 PF=ISED 
88/89 0.908 
89/90 0.848 
90/91 0.787 Gulf war 
91/92 0.915 Stansted. new terTdnal Gulf war 
92/93 0.894 tighter X (8%) 
93/94 0.991 tighter X (8%) night flight restriction -in 
London area 
94/95- 1 heavier security burden 
95/96 1 
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Figure 6-6 graphic illustration of Table 6-1 
BAA EFFICIENCY SCORESi VRS INPUT NI INIMISATION WITH INPUT AMOUNT THAT 
SHOUD BE REDUCED REGARDING INEFFICIENT YEARS 
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Figure 6-7 efficiency scores and real GDP 
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Figure 6-8 efficiency scores and real GDP growth rate 
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Figure 6-9 efficiency scores and real fuel index 
VRS efficiency scores and real fuel index 
1600 
77777 0.9 
1400 0.8 
1200 
03 
1000 0.6 
13 ýp 00 
Ip E3 (3 0 
CL 
13 0.5 
C 800 
E ý0.4 
EL 600 REALFU 13 
0.3 
400 efficiency 
0-2 
ZI a 
200 0.1 
0 
0 
Oj Ch ýb \Ib 
0 I ,* ýb % ,, 
4 zý %- 
0.9 
I19 
0.8 
11 1aI%- 0.7 
CIE] 0.6 
100 -c). - 
GDP growth rate 
C3 
cl 
-. 0-efficiency 
0 3 
CD co J-4 N IM LO r*_ CD CY) LO to rl- r- N, N I, - 00\ Oro co co 00 C] cp 0) 
. 
0 2 n co CD C14 0,1 10 (10 at 
r.. 
- f, -'WO 
, I'm", qcl CCOO Owl) 
Q-(,; ) . 
0.1 
77777 
ol 
I 
I 
E3 ýP .0 C] 0 
(3 13 
op zi cl 
220 
The efficiency scores after privatisation (from 1987/88 to 1995/96) do not seem to 
show any appreciable productivity improvement of BAA compared to the scores in the 
period between 1966/67 and 1986/87. However, the results show that there is a close 
relationship between the efficiency score's trend and the factors related to the business 
cycle of the airline industry, particularly after the late '70s. The tendency for low 
efficiency scores during the recession period, around the time of oil crisis and the Gulf 
War can be seen from the figures above. The correlation between the efficiency scores 
and these environment changes, which are mainly outside the control of airport 
management, such as recession, oil crisis and wars make it difficult to tease out 
whether or not the efficiency scores are due to the change in ownership of the airports 
and other economic constraints. Yet, after taking the Gulf War (from 1990/91 to 
1991/92) and the Lockerbie terrorist bomb on Pan Am (1988/89) (because of which 
BAA had to increase the number of security stafo into consideration, the continuous 
inefficient scores from 1988/88 to 1993/94 do not seem to support the hypothesis that 
the productivity would rise as a consequence of privatisation. 
During the period of nationalisation, it seems that over-staffing which is non-nally 
pointed out as a specific problem of a nationalised industry was not the issue in the 
case of the airports under the then British Airports Authority, apart from the years 
1973 and 1974. This is because an airport in operation is capital intensive and a 
problem if any would be that of capacity adjustment when the demand declines due to 
the bulkiness of investment. 
The result seems to show that productive efficiency during the period from 1983/84 to 
1986/87 had been improved compared to the period from 1981/81 to 1982/83. The 
period between 1983/84 and 1986/87 was when a different new financial target had 
been placed on the then nationalised British Airports Authority, i. e., the financial target 
in which the passenger numbers growth rate was incorporated. However, during this 
period, there were roughly three major factors which might have been influencing 
performance, but outside the control of the airport operator: (1) the economy was 
recovering from recession, (2) fuel prices were reducing and (3) the 
liberalisation of 
221 
the airline industry within Europe had begun. As to the last point (3), firstly there were 
bilateral agreements settled in this period between the UK Government and many other 
European nations aimed at liberalising air transport (e. g., with Luxembourg, Belgium 
and Switzerland, West Germany and the Netherlands in the period from 1984 to 1985). 
Thus during this period the then British Airports Authority, particularly with regard to 
Heathrow and Gatwick, may have become more eager to attract business as 
international hub airports inside Europe. Secondly, in 1985 domestic air fares in the 
UK were liberalised. Because of this the competition on scheduled domestic trunk 
routes inside the UK had the effect of constantly increasing ATM numbers (as a result 
the passenger numbers especially in 1984/85 had drastically increased by I I% in total 
for the then British Airports Authority). Therefore it is rather inconclusive as to how 
the new annual financial target during the period from 83/84 to 86/87 might have 
worked as an incentive towards productive efficiency. 
After regulatory reform the years which scored as efficient in my measurement were 
only three out of the nine years after privatisation. As seen from the figures above, the 
efficiency scores had continued dropping since the year following 1987 when BAA 
was privatised, for three years in a row until 1991. The efficiency scores calculated by 
DEA are regarded as a combination of both cost-reduction improvement and 
improvement of the investment level. Thus the questions to be raised from the result 
are: 
(1) As to the cost-reduction effort, is the difference between b and a, i. e., 
the marginal cost to the managers of inputting cost-reduction activity 
x, significantly large or ignorably marginal? 
(2) If the investment level has not been optimal as predicted after 
privatisation, what factors, other than the airline industry's 
demand 
fluctuation, were considered to cause the investment inefficiency? 
The efficiency scores had been gradually lowered since 1988/89 
for three years in a 
row until 199 1. The result of the slightly improved efficiency score 
for the year 
1991/92 might have been linked to the form of price regulation at 
BAA's London 
airports. The second quinquennium was to be started 
from 1992/93. The MMC's 
investigation and the formal announcement by the CAA regarding 
the value of X in 
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each year during the second quinquennium period between 1992/93 and 1996/97 had 
finished in early 1991. The management knew the following five year period's X 
values already in the year 1991/92. They knew that the values of X were going to be 
larger (especially for 1992/93 and 1993/94) than those in the first quinquennium. BAA 
seemed to be adjusting its inputs in this year in preparation for the tighter X of 8 in the 
following two years, although it is not clear whether the improved efficiency scores in 
the years 1993,1994 and 1995 are reflected in the tightening of the X values. The 
result of the 1991 efficiency target inputs suggests that the contribution of the 
inefficient level of staff costs was greater than the inefficient level of capital employed. 
In 1991 a new terminal at Stansted was opened and BAA might have been suffering 
an over-capacity problem due to the Gulf War and slow economic growth. Adjusting 
the staff costs is easier than adjusting the capital stock level. Thus the result of the 
efficiency in the year 1991/92 might have been evidence that management was 
influenced by the review where the CAA announced tighter X values in the second 
quinquennium. If the main cause of the efficiency improvement during the year 
1991/92 was expectation of the tighter price regulation, the possible answers to the 
questions above could be as follows: 
(1) As to the cost-reduction effort, the marginal cost to the managers to reduce costs, 
a, would not be substantially larger than b, implying that the pressure from the capital 
market by itself did not reduce managerial slack which might have existed during the 
period of the first quinquennium. However, it is not certain whether the slack was 
mainly caused by the lack of competition among airports or by the first 
quinquennium's X being too leniently set. 
(2) If RPIA price regulation is in fact very similar to the rate of return regulation, 
there might be an incentive for 'gold plating' the cost of capital before the review, as 
per one of the implications shown at the end of Chapter 5. However, there 
is no clear 
evidence for inflating the cost of capital before the investigation of the 
MMC in 1991, 
and it is not conclusive whether there existed 'gold plating' as such. 
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6-5. Results of the panel comparison between private airports 
and local authority airports 
Where a few very large or very small DMUs are included within a data set, it is 
known that they always tend to appear efficient due to the lack of available 
comparisons. Therefore I excluded the data for Heathrow from the panel comparison 
data as Heathrow is the only airport which has two runways, thus being on too large a 
scale to compare within the data set. 
As for the privatised airports other than BAA's airports, the data for Belfast 
International and East Midlands was also available at the time of carrying out the 
calculation. Of these airports the former was sold by the Government and the latter 
was sold by the local authority. However, they were relatively recently privatised (1994 
and 1993 respectively) so I decided not to use them and used only the privatised 
airports owned by BAA. 
As to the local authority airports, I selected the largest three, i. e., Manchester, 
Birmingham and Luton. Other local authority airports are remarkably small in their 
operating scale, and inclusion of these small airports in the calculations would distort 
the results as mentioned above. Thus I selected the three largest local authority airports 
of comparable scale with the selected privatised airports. The airports which are 
included in the panel data comparison, i. e., measurement (B) are as follows: 
e private airports: Gatwick, Stansted, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Aberdeen 
local authority airports: Manchester, Birmingham, Luton 
The period was from 1988/89 to 1995/96 so that the panel data 
is made up with eight 
years x eight airports =64 samples. However, I have made the 
following three versions 
of the calculations: 
(1) 8 years x all 8 airports = 64 samples 
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(2) 8 years x 7 airports (excluding Gatwick) == 56 samples 
(3) 8 years x 6 airports (excluding London airports) = 48 samples 
The reason for arrangement (2) is that Gatwick is a large scale airport and the 
inclusion of this airport might affect the result. The reason for arrangement (3) is that 
Gatwick and Stansted are within the London system of BAA and the inclusion of the 
two airports might affect the result because of (a) the location, (b) the fact that 
Stansted was still in the middle phase of its development at the time of calculation, and 
(c) the possibility of Stansted being subsidised by Heathrow and Gatwick. 
The results summary tables are shown below. 
Table 6-3 summary of (1) 
1) total pooled data 
mean s. d. min max sample 
all 8 airports 0.82 0.15 0.363 1.000 64 
5 privatised airports 0.88 0.15 0.363 1.000 40 
3 local authority airports 0.73 0.09 0.594 1.0001 24 
2) efficiency scores separately measured: privatised & local authority 
mean s. d. min max sample 
5 privatised airports 0.88 0.15 0.363 1.000 40 
3 local authority airports 0.97 0.04 0,842 1.000 24 
3) policy efficiency for privatised airports vs local authority airports 
mean s. d. min max sample 
5 privatised airports 1.00 0.00 0.993 1,000 40 
3 local authority airports 0.75 0.08 0.640 1 1.000_ 24 
4) Mann-Whitney Test for policy efficiency 
=211.6 Z=-7.2359 
P=0.0000 
.0 
W=321.0 
. -j - _týýýZý=-7.2ý3591P=OEOO 
privatised vs local authority U=21 
: 0: ýO 
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Table 6-4 summary of (2) 
1) total pooled data 
mean s. d. min max sample 
all 7 airports 0.84 0.15 0.366 1.000 - 56 
4 privatised airports 0.88 1 0.16 1 0.366 1 1.000 32 
3 local authority airports 0.80 0-1?!: FO6ý 1 T 1.000 24 
2) efficiency scores separately measured: privatised & local authority 
mean s. d. min max sample 
4 privatised airports 0.88 0.16 0.366 1.000 32 
3 local authority airports 0.97 0.04 0.842 1.000 24 
rports vs local authority airports 3) policy efficiency for privatised ai 
mean - s. d. min max sample 
4 privatised airports 1.00 0.00 1.000 1.000 32 
3 local authority airports 1 
0.82 0.1 1.000 24 
4) Mann-Whitney Test for policy efficiency 
privatised vs local authority ý U=99.0 ý W=399.0 
ý Z=-5.59351 P=0.0000_ 
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Table 6-5 summary of (3) 
1) total pooled data 
_ 
mean s. d. min max 
all 6 airports 0.83 0.14 0.594 1.000 48 
3 privatised airports 
- 
0.92 
- 
0.10 0.687 1.000 24 
3 local authority airpo rts 0.7 3 -0 09 - 0.594 - 1.000 - 24 
2) efficiency scores separately measured: privatised & local authority 
_ 
mean s. d. min max sample 
3 privatised airports 0.92 0.10 0.687 1.000 24 
3 local authority airports 0.97 0.842 1.000 24 
3) policy efficiency for privatised airports vs local authority airports -7 
mean s. d. min max sample 
3 privatised airports 1.00 0.00 1.000 1.000 24 
3 local authority airports , 
0.75 0.08 0.640 1.000 24 
4) Mann-Whitney Test for policy efficiency 
privatised vs local authority ý U=12.0 ý W=864.0 ý Z=-6.1408 ý1DA-0000_j 
As expected, the worst scores in the pooled data in the results of both (1) and (2) were 
those of Stansted. The result of (3) seems to be the most reliable considering the 
effect of Stansted's poor scores. The sample number is 48 in the measurement (3) 
which is quite small, but is at least an acceptable number considering the input 
number x output number (=4). The efficient airports in the pooled data in (3) are as 
follows: 
Edinburgh: 92/93,93/94 
Glasgow: 92/93*, 93/94*, 94/95*, 95/96 
Aberdeen: 88/89,92/93*, 93/94*, 94/95* 
Manchester: 88/89,94/95,95/96 
(the scores with * indicates that they were also efficient 
in the CRS 
calculation; no local authority airports were efficient under 
CRS 
assumption) 
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From the results of (3), there seems to be a significant difference between privatised 
airports and local authority airports in terms of efficiencies. The result showing the 
6policy efficiency' for both the privatised airports group and the local authority airports 
group implies that on average the airports that belong to the latter group are 25% less 
efficient than the airports that belong to the privatised airports group. The large 
absolute value of Z in the Mann-Whitney test implies that the DMUs that belong to the 
private airports group are significantly more efficient than those which belong to the 
local authority airports group. The result seems to reflect the prediction that the local 
authority airports' productive efficiency is sacrificed because of (a) under- investment 
problems due to the borrowing limit constraint and (b) the larger value of P (a in 
Manchester's case) than a caused by the lack of access to the capital market. However, 
it is not conclusive whether the main cause of inefficiency of the local authority airports 
relative to the privatised airports is due to under- investment or less effort on the part of 
managers to reduce costs. 
6-6. Other researchers' findings 
There are three papers where productive efficiency was tested in which the UK airport 
industry was included. Bishop and Thompson (1992) tested the major UK regulated 
industries which had seen drastic ownership changes in the eighties or early 
'90s. The 
empirical fmdings by Bishop and Thompson are based on the method of calculating 
weighted indices of the growth rates of outputs and inputs, i. e., so-called total 
factor 
productivity (hereafter TFP). Their purpose was to investigate, over nine 
industries in 
aggregate, whether TFP has grown significantly faster during the 
'80s than during the 
'70s. BAA (before privatisation the then nationalised British Airports 
Authority) was 
included in the nine industries. Bishop and Thompson disaggregated 
the weighted 
index for inputs in BAA into the three components of (a) labour (23.0%), 
(b) capital 
(50.5%) and (c) other materials (26.5%). Regarding the outputs 
the components of the 
indices are (1) passenger arrivals and departures and 
(2) ATM. The TFP for BAA was 
4.8% during the period from 1970 to 1980 and 0.3% 
during the period from 1980 to 
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1990. The labour productivity was 0.6% during the '70s and 2.7% during the '80s. 
Both the TFP values and the labour productivity values in the case of BAA are 
averaged over the relevant period but the value for each year is not shown m the paper. 
At least they showed that the labour productivity in BAA had grown more rapidly 
during the '80s than during the '70s. It is interesting that the TFP in BAA was smaller 
during the '80s than during the '70s. However, 1980 was long before the privatisation 
of BAA and the result cannot be compared with my result for productive efficiency 
measurement. The year 1980 was chosen by Bishop and Thompson in their 
investigation of the impact of privatisation over nine industries. 
Boussofiane, Martin and Parker (1997) (hereafter BMP) used DEA in order to test 
whether the ownership changes in the major UK regulated industries had had any 
impact on performance. Parker (1997) also used DEA to investigate whether there was 
any evidence of performance improvement in the BAA after privatisation. The input 
data which BMP chose were (a) employee hours, (b) capital, and (c) other costs 
deflated by the RPI for non-food items, whilst the output data was turnover deflated by 
the RPI for non-food items. Parker used physical data for both inputs and outputs: (a) 
numbers employed, (b) capital, and (c) residual of total operating costs deflated by the 
RPI for the inputs, and (1) passenger numbers handled and (b) cargo and mail business 
for the outputs. The period for measurements of both papers is from 1979/80 to 
1995/96. 
The results produced by BMP and Parker are quite different as the output data the 
former used was pecuniary units and that of the latter was physical units. 
Although 
both papers were carried out using both CRS and VRS models, I refer only to 
their 
results using VRS for the purpose of comparability with my result of measurement 
(A) 
in section 6-4. The comparison table is shown below: 
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Table 6-6 three different measurements of BAA (VRS model) 
year BMP Parker Ito BMP(business cycle) 
79/80 1 0.98 1 1 
80/81 0.94 0.95 0.81 0.95 
81/82 0.95 1 0.81 1 
82/83 0.97 1 0.87 1 
83/84 1 1 0.98 1 
84/85, 1 1 0.98 1 
85/86 1 1 1 1 
86/87 0.99 0.97 0.96 0.98 
87/88 1 1 1 0.99 
88/89 1 0.89 0.91 0.99 
89/90 1 0.92 0.85 0.96 
90/91 1 0.81 0.79 0.86 
91/92 0.93 0.81 0.92 0.86 
92/93 0.89 1 0.90 1 
93/94 1 0.94 0.99 1 
94/95 1 1 1 1 
95/96 1 1 1 1 
BMP refers to the result by Boussofiane, Martin and Parker 
Parker refers to the result by Parker 
Ito refers to my result as to the measurement (A) in section 6-4 
As a part of the analysis both BMP and Parker calculated BAA's efficiency scores 
adding another series of data, changes in real GDP, as an exogenous input. The 
purpose of this input was to capture the business cycle effect. The business cycle was 
assumed to be reflected by changes in real GDP. BMP's result of the calculation 
is 
shown in the last column of Table 6-6, whilst Parker chose not to report the result. 
The results by both BMP and Parker confirm that there was efficiency 
improvement 
during the preparation period before privatisation where the pressure on 
the 
management was predicted, although it is still not clear whether 
the improvement in 
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efficiency came from changes in the outside environment or mainly from pressure on 
management towards productive efficiency. All of the results confirm that there were 
inefficient years after privatisation. The output choice of my measurement is a mixture 
of pecuniary and physical data, whilst the output choice by BMP is purely pecuniary 
and that by Parker is purely physical. This may be the reason why any year which was 
measured as inefficient by either BMP or Parker was also inefficient in my 
measurement except for 79/80. 
My results shown in Table 6-6 were extracted from the measurement (A), i. e., 
efficiency calculation using the data during the period between 1966/67 and 1995/96, 
whilst both the results of BMP and Parker were calculated from the data starting 
1979/80. My result of having only 5 efficient years out of the period between 1979/80 
and 1995/96, as compared to BPM's II efficient years and Parker's 9 efficient years, 
can be considered to be a reflection of the possible productivity growth which the then 
British Airports Authority or BAA might have seen. 
The target reduction ratios of inputs in order to achieve efficiency was also shown in 
Parker's paper. The results showed a larger target reduction rate for capital than that 
for employment and operating costs from 1988/89 continuously to 1991/92. Parker's 
results may show clearer evidence that BAA had an incentive for 'gold plating' the 
cost of capital after privatisation before the first regulatory review. 
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Notes to Chapter 6 
1. The supporting hyperplane in (s + t)-dimensional Euclidean space given by 
-Fs I v*xi +t .1 
wj*yj + a)* = 0, where the xi andyj are now variables. vý, wý and (0* 'j- i 7.1 1 
are the values of vi, wj and o) which maximise the objective function in the following fractional 
progranuning problem which is equivalent to the linear programming problem (6-3-P): 
max eO = 
Z 
wj. Yjm 0 
+0) 
jýI 
s 
viximo 
1: wjyjm + (i) 
s. 
vixi. 
vi, wj 
2. This empirical analysis was carried out in 1996/97 and this is the reason why the end period of 
both two measurements in this chapter is 1995/96. 
3. Though recent data for staff costs after privatisation was not on the annual reports of 
BAA, it 
was available to the public and was not 'classified'. 
4. Chames, Cooper and Rhodes (198 1) in their 'programme follow through' concept used 
the 
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tern, 6programme efficiency' which has the same meaning in this chapter as 'policy efficiency'. 
5. Table 6-7 below shows a comparison between the results by VRS model and the results by 
CRS niodel. Because of the reason I explained earlier in section 6-2, i. e., the DEA measurement 
using CRS penalises the DMUs which are operating at a non-optimal scale, many more DMUs 
measured with the CRS model were judged to be less efficient than in vRS model. 
Table 6-7 VIRS scores and CRS scores 
year VRS efficiency CRS efficiency 
66/67 1 1 
67/68 0.989 0.986 
68/69 0.995 0.993 
69/70 1 1 
70/71 1 0.978 
71/72 1 1 
72/73 1 1 
73/74 0.999 0.978 
74/75 0.984 0.955 
75/76 1 0.954 
76/77 1 0.95 
77/78 1 0.986 
78/79 0.871 0.781 
79/80 1 0.706 
80/81 0.808 0.67 
81/82 0.808 0.694 
82/83 0.873 0.736 
83/84 0.98 0.872 
84/85 0.982 0.934 
85/86 1 0.958 
86/87 0.959 0.945 
87/88 1 1 
88/89 0.906 0.87 
89/90 0.848 0.753 
90/91 0.787 0.723 
91/92 0.915 0.672 
92/93 0.894 0.839 
93/94 0.991 0.983 
94/95 
95/96 
1 
1 
1 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
The regulatory reform of UK airports by the 1986 Act not only realised the 
privatisation of the then British Airports Authority, but also created local 
authority airports as plcs (as described in Chapter 2). The regulatory reform 
created a new framework for the economic regulation of the industry. As I have 
explained in the introduction to Chapter 1, the purpose of this thesis is to 
explore theoretical predictions as to whether and how there have been any 
efficiency changes since the regulatory reform of the UK airport industry, and to 
analyse how the predicted changes can be supported with evidence. In Chapter I 
I surveyed the literature on regulatory economics and the concept of positive 
theories, particularly in the context of public corporations. I then applied, in 
Chapter 3, a basic positive approach model which has been developed by 
Vickers and Yarrow (1988) and Rees (1984) to the different kinds of 
'institutional arrangements' for the UK airports, i. e., before and after the 
regulatory reform of both privatised/nationalised and local authority airports. I 
then explored how the predictions in pricing, cost-reduction activity levels and 
investment levels are different to what the benchmark conditions would suggest 
would be achieved if total welfare maximisation had been aimed at. The 
financial target constraint imposed on the then nationalised British Airports 
Authority can be regarded as a set of incentive mechanisms, thus I have tried 
analysing how they might be expected to work in terms of the efficiency change 
outcome. The effect of the change in the form of the financial target just 
before 
the privatisation was also analysed. Taking the central government grant and the 
ceiling for the capital borrowed into consideration I made a variation to the 
basic model for the local authority airports for the period when they were 
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directly owned and managed by the local authorities. After the regulatory reform 
the economic regulation framework made a clear definition between regulated 
revenue and unregulated revenue. Because of this in Chapter 41 focused the 
predictions in line with the basic model on changes in cost-reduction activity 
level and investment level, and made a more specific model of the airport's 
price structure where price cap regulation is imposed. Both the cost-reduction 
activity level and investment level of BAA airports were predicted to be 
improved after privatisation compared to the period under nationalisation, the 
investment level in particular was expected to be optimum under privatisation. 
The local authority airports' cost-reduction activity level was also predicted to 
improve after they became plcs, although the cost-reduction activity level of the 
local authority plc airports was expected to be less than that of privatised 
airports. Because of the capital borrowing limit constraint the change after the 
regulatory reform was expected to be from a tendency of over-investment 
towards under-investment for the local authority airports. 
I used a model in Chapter 4 based on the 'Average Revenue' form of price cap 
regulation. The airport charges for the 'designated' airports (Heathrow, Gatwick, 
Stansted and Manchester) have been regulated after the regulatory reform via a 
specific formula of price cap regulation. It has been pointed out in the recent 
literature that the outcome under the 'Average Revenue Approach' would be 
inefficient in the sense that the ratio of the price to the marginal cost would be 
higher for the service whose marginal cost is higher. The price cap regulation on 
the airport charges at the 'designated' airports is of a similar form to the general 
form of 'Average Revenue Approach', but the actual price cap constraint fonn Is 
designed to limit to the capped level the total revenue from all the airport 
charges averaged by the passenger numbers. Other quantities such as the number 
of landings and takeoffs are not included in the averaging factor. I 
have 
developed a simple model to encapsulate BAA's London airports price cap 
regulation in Chapter 4 in order to predict the price structure change after 
the 
h. 
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regulatory reform. I have then tried predicting the price rebalancing effects 
(1) between peak passenger charge and off-peak passenger charge, 
(2) between passenger charge and landing charge, 
(3) between peak landing and off-peak landing charges, 
(4) between passenger charge and unregulated service price and 
(5) between landing charge and unregulated service price. 
Making several assumptions, I have predicted the price ratios of the above five 
categories after the price cap regulation was introduced. I then compared them 
to the period when the airports were subject to financial target constraint under 
nationalisation. The direction of the changes for the ratios mentioned above 
respectively were predicted as follows: 
(1) higher than before 
(2) lower than before 
(3) higher than before 
(4) lower than before 
(5) higher than before 
In the appendices to Chapter 41 included the predictions from the model 
including the demand interdependency between passenger service and landing 
service, and also the effect of international charge and domestic charge as a 
variation of the model. 
In Chapter 51 looked for any empirical evidence for the predicted rebalancing 
effect between different airport charges. As it was impossible to estimate the 
marginal cost for each airport charge, the empirical analysis was carried out 
in 
the form of price ratio change, I have used a linear time trend regression 
analysis using both slope dummies and intercept dummies. 
The analysis of the 
actual change in the price ratios carried out in Chapter 5 was 
based on the 
change over time, whereas the price ratio change predicted 
in Chapter 4 was 
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aternporal. The results which show significantly different coefficients in both the 
slope and the intercept before and after the regulatory reform were considered as 
evidence that price ratio change existed. The airports for which the airport 
charge data was available were BAA's three London airports (which are subject 
to price cap regulation) and BAA's three Scottish airports (which are subject to 
no price regulation per se). The price ratios with which I carried out the trend 
analysis using the six airports' data are as follows: 
the price ratio of peak passenger charge to off-peak passenger charge 
the price ratio of peak landing charge to off-peak landing charge 
the price ratio of international passenger charge to domestic 
passenger charge 
Of the three kinds of ratios above, only the results from the price ratio of 
international passenger charge to domestic passenger charge seem to support the 
predicted rebalancing effect for most of the airports. It was found that not only 
was there no clear evidence for the price ratio trends to be in the predicted 
direction regarding the first two categories, but also the passenger charge ratio 
between peak and off-peak showed that the direction of the actual price ratios 
were in the opposite direction in most of the BAA's London airports, i. e., there 
seems to have been a tendency towards the lowering of price ratio of peak 
passenger charge to off-peak passenger charge after the regulatory reform. 
In Chapter 6 productivity efficiency measurement was carried out in order to 
investigate (A) whether the predicted improvement in productivity efficiency in 
BAA after privatisation existed and (B) whether the BAA's privatised airports 
are more efficient in productivity than the local authority airports. I have used 
the DEA method (VRS input minimisation model) and calculated technical 
efficiency for both measurement (A) and (B). The inputs are staff costs and 
capital employed, and the outputs are ATM and the commercial service revenue. 
As to measurement (A) I used the aggregated data for all the airports of 
BAA 
and calculation was carried out in time series. As to measurement 
(B) I used a 
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technique to decompose technical efficiency measured by DEA in order to 
identify inefficiency that is attributable to the type of ownership. The results for 
measurement (A) show no appreciable improvement change in BAA's 
productive efficiency after privatisation. The results for measurement (B), 
however, showed that the airports that have been privatised were significantly 
more efficient than those that remain in local authority ownership. 
As far as the empirical analyses in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 are concerned, apart 
from the relatively convincing results of measurement (B) in Chapter 6, the 
results for both BAA's price rebalancing effect and BAA's productivity 
improvement are either opposite to the predictions or rather inconclusive. There 
then arises a question: 
e Have there, since the regulatory reform, been any factors which the 
managers of BAA might have been more conscious of than the visible 
constraint of price regulation? 
As I have already mentioned in the last section of Chapter 5, there are two 
important factors which BAA may have been taking into account: 
(1) the process by which the maximum airport charge revenue is set, 
i. e., the way the value of X is set, and 
(2) international obligations. 
With regard to factor (1) the process of determining the X values has been 
closely related to the rate of return of the 'designated' airports as I mentioned 
in 
section 5-5. The price regulation of the 'designated' airports based on the 
4single-till' principle means that identifying the cost of capital employed 
in both 
areas of 'air-side operations' and 'commercial- side operations' plays a 
significant role. As using the rate of return on capital is 
defacto the criterion in 
determining charging formulae, the RPI-X form of price regulation in 
the 
'designated' airports is very similar to the rate of return regulation. 
Where the 
Cost of capital plays a major role in price regulation, there 
is room for a 
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regulated firm to manipulate the cost of capital, i. e., 'gold plating' of cost of 
capital. Although it cannot be said with certainty that there was any evidence for 
its 'gold plating' activity during the first quinquennium, the results of 
measurement (A) in Chapter 6 suggested that the possibility existed that the 
management of BAA can have been influenced by the regulatory review for the 
second quinquennium. 
The results of the ratio of peak passenger charge to off-peak passenger charge 
(both international and domestic) suggested that the ratio at both Heathrow and 
Gatwick had been lowered since privatisation, which is the opposite to the 
prediction that was made by the model in Chapter 4 for analysing the 
rebalancing effect of the 'designated' airports' price cap regulation. Lowering 
the peak price and raising the off-peak price in an inefficient manner, i. e., 
setting the peak price below the marginal cost at peak period and setting the 
off-peak price above the marginal cost at off-peak period can be a possible 
behaviour of a firm regulated by rate of return regulation. This is because 
inflating the demand at peak period by lowering the peak price can be a strategy 
to expand the capital base, thereby earning the firm a larger profit. It is 
unfortunate that the difference between the international peak passenger charge 
and the international off-peak passenger charge at Heathrow was required to 
be 
phased out as per the international agreement based on the 'Exchange of 
Notes 
1994' between the UK and the USA. Domestic passenger charge at Heathrow 
and international passenger charge at Gatwick and Stansted were not relevant 
to 
the issue of the international agreement. However, the peak and off-peak charge 
difference particularly the daily peak and off-peak 
difference applied for both 
international and domestic passengers has been gradually reduced 
at each BAA 
London airport. This tendency by itself cannot suggest 
that BAA had any 
incentive to expand its terminal capacity. There may 
have been actual changes 
in demand fluctuation between peak and off-peak periods at these airports, 
or 
even the possibility that the difference of the marginal costs 
of terminal services 
between the peak and off-peak period might 
have been diminishing. This price 
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setting behaviour can also be related to the second f actor mentioned above , i. e., intemational obligations. BAA might have feared that there could be future 
conflicts between airlines or other countries and BAA as to the airport charges, 
similar to the conflict which started in the early '80s and related to the 1983's 
MOU and ended with the 'Exchange of Notes 1994'. Even without any direct 
legal action by the airlines, the airlines can complain against a particular BAA 
price setting to the CAA and the CAA might decide to either intervene with the 
price setting policy or 'informally advise' BAA not to use a particular price 
setting (The CAA is mindful that any economic conditions which the CAA 
decides can be overridden by the Minister's directions in respect of international 
obligations. ). The CAA seems to be conscious of the distortion in allocative 
efficiency caused by the 'single-till' principle 1, and it is not likely that the CAA 
would take actions against price differentiations which are based on the 
opportunity cost difference. Yet, the CAA is also the regulator of the airline 
industry, which might influence the CAA's behaviour. 
There is another factor which is important in the reviews in so far as BAA is 
concerned. As an airport needs bulky investment in advance, there are problems 
with regard to funding investment in large terminals or runways. In the past 
quinquennia the funding method for future capacity expansion has always been 
discussed both in the case of BAA and Manchester. Particularly, a commitment 
problem between BAA and the CAA has been raised during the process of 
setting the price caps for the second quinquennium in terms of whether the 
Terminal 5 investment programme at Heathrow should be explicitly considered 
in determining the charging formulae. Though the second quinquennium was not 
expected to see the construction of the terminal, BAA 
had demanded that the 
CAA make a commitment in the long run to allow 
BAA to have a predictable 
income stream before it made any decision for the project. 
Although no such 
commitment was made for the second quinquennium, 
the contingent plans were 
made in setting the values of X during the third quinquennium 
in respect of the 
timing of the investment programme2. Thus 
BAA seems to have been more 
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interested in securing the long term profit. However, the predictions from the 
model in Chapter 4 are based on the airport operator's objective function which 
is to maximise the profit at each quinquennium, i. e., short term profit. This is 
one of the limitations of this thesis. The analyses do not include capacity as a 
variable and do not cover the issue of the airport's long term profit. Also, the 
models in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 are based on the comparative statics method. 
In order to fully analyse the dynamic aspects of the airport industry one would 
need to explore its strategic behaviours. The objective functions of both the 
government and the regulator would also need to be clearly defined, so that the 
strategic context could be fully analysed including the negotiation process in the 
reviews among the airport, the regulator, the government and the airline 
industry. The unique point is that an airport offers an infrastructure and needs to 
solve the problem of financing lumpy investment in a timely manner. This is an 
interesting subject for further research. 
The airports policy the government announced in 1978 seems still to exist, i. e., 
the government's implicit policy is to keep each regional airport's given 
function (see Chapter 2), thus trying to avoid the situation where the airports in 
the UK become competitive in airport charges (As I have mentioned in Chapter 
2, the government does not seem to believe the outcome and the benefit of 
competition among the airports in the UK (because of their natural monopolistic 
nature), and places a greater weight on the competition among airlines to 
improve the consumers' welfare. ). Suppressing the competition among airports 
can have an effect on the airline industry's competition, i. e., where the 
competition among airports is not strong, the possibility of an airline company 
gaining a monopolistic power through dominating a hub airport can 
be avoided 
to a certain degree. On the other hand, there seems to exist competition among 
international airports as hub airports within Europe, particularly 
in the case of 
Heathrow and Gatwick. Although the UK airports are considered to 
have 
monopolistic power at least locally (one of the reasons 
for the price regulation at 
the 'designated' airports), if the international competition 
became more intense 
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the necessity for regulating the airport charges would become weaker. This 
thesis does not cover the issues of international competition. However, it is 
worth mentioning that there is room for future research in international 
competition among the airports including slot problems, airports' investment 
decisions and the national airports policy for regional balance. 
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Addendum to Chapter 7 
1. Incidentally, after finishing the research for this thesis, the CAA made a new 
move. From the year 2000 the CAA launched a series of investigations as to 
whether the price regulation form should be changed. It published documents 
mainly covering subjects such as (a) the possibility of the advantage in changing 
the current 'single-till' principle into a 'double-till' principle, (b) usage of 
incremental cost in the review and (c) changing the form of price cap from the 
current 'Average Revenue' approach to the 'Tariff Basket' approach. At the time 
of writing this thesis, the consultation with all the parties involved ongoing, and 
this thesis does not cover these issues. However, it is worth mentioning that the 
CAA is fully aware of the problems in allocative efficiency outcomes in relation 
to the way BAA's price level is determined. 
2. The investigation mentioned in the above note I is basically related to the 
issue of securing long term investments such as for Terminal 5. The recent 
demand fluctuations in the airline industry (including those caused by the latest 
incident of the terrorist attack in the USA on September 2001) triggered the 
CAA to speed up the investigation, because 'encourag(ing) investment 
in new 
facilities at airports in time to satisfy demands by airport users' 
is one of the 
CAA's duties, and it is in the regulator's interest to establish ways to allow 
the 
airport industry to finance large capital programmes when the airline 
industry's 
demand is unpredictable. 
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